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THE MANNER OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
RANDALL P. BEZANSONt
INTRODUCTION
The government speech doctrine began inauspiciously in Rust v.
Sullivan in 1991.' It has grown metastatically since that time. It is now a
largely uncontroversial rule that when the government is speaking, its
expressive actions are immune from First Amendment freedom of speech
limits. Beneath the smooth and judicially-comforting surface of this rule,
however, lie many difficult problems. The problem I address is the
"manner" of the government's speech-what forms of speech should
count as government speech, and what forms should not.
In addressing this question, I will make two points at the outset.
First, the government speech doctrine is mis-named. It is not just immu-
nity for the government's act of speaking, but also for the government's
exclusion of unwelcomed speech in the time, place, and space of gov-
ernment speech activity. The doctrine, in short, is really a government
speech forum doctrine. 2 My second point is that because the government
speech doctrine reserves a forum in which the government possesses a
monopoly on the ability to speak-a right to exclude all other speech it
doesn't want or like-we must be concerned about the way the govern-
ment conducts itself expressively-the manner of its speech-in its new
forum.
I. THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH FORUM
How is it that we have gotten to this point? Let me begin with a
brief history of the government speech forum doctrine. Its beginnings
emerged from the public forum doctrine. Public forums are classified in
three types.3 First is the open public forum: public space where private
speech of the uninhibited, robust quality is allowed. Examples include
streets, sidewalks, and parks. Second, there are designated public forums,
which are times, places, and spaces whose public function justifies a
limitation on the types of individual speech activity taking place there-
for example, schools and concerts. In a designated public forum the gov-
t David H. Vernon Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
I. See 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991) (holding that the government can script a doctor's
discussion with a patient on the subject of abortion when the doctor is an agent of the government in
a federally funded clinic).
2. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and Gov-
ernment Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953 passim (1998).
3. In the interest of simplicity I refer the reader to the wonderful discussion and analysis of
the public forum categories and criteria by Erwin Chemerinsky in his treatise, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1127-1144 (3d ed. 2006).
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ernment can restrict the forms and even the subjects of individual speech
by means reasonably adapted to the function of the forum (time, space,
or place), but the government cannot restrict speech solely because of its
point of view. Finally, the third kind of forum is the non-public forum, a
space reserved by the government where no individual free speech is to
take place-an opera in a public hall, a museum, or a Presidential press
conference, for example. In this forum, the government can prohibit free
speech by non-government speakers, but it cannot selectively permit
some individual speech but not other speech because of the speech's
point of view. In other words, the government cannot close off a time or
place or space from individual speech and then open it up solely for a
viewpoint the government favors.4
The three-part government forum doctrine worked well for many
years, but in due course it ran into a few problems-namely, the gov-
ernment's felt need to selectively admit certain points of view into its
forum and not others. Consider a doctor's advice to a patient at a family
planning clinic supported by government funds, where the doctor is an
agent of the government and thus subject to the government's/clinic's
policy against abortion. 5 Can the non-public forum principle do the work
necessary to justify excluding abortion advice? Probably not, under the
no-point-of-view-discrimination rule. How about a government-owned
flag whose desecration is prohibited? 6 Or government arts funding deci-
sions based on artistic quality or even consistency with traditional Amer-
ican values and decency?
7
The government speech doctrine grew out of these kinds of cases
because the Supreme Court found itself unable to squeeze the right result
out of the public forum categories. It began with the rather benign idea
that of course the government can speak to its public, its democratic rul-
ers. Indeed, the government must speak, and propose, and defend, and
inform in order for democracy to work.8 But the situations in which the
cases arose were never benign, though the danger was never apparent to
the Court-even to this day, I think. Of course the government can
speak. But the government speech claims were of a different ilk: to be
the only speaker to the patient in the family planning clinic;9 to be the
editor of the public television station;10 to deny government funding to
all indecent art, even where the government is the only funder in an ex-
4. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1404-05 (2001).
5. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94, 198.
6. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
7. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998). See RANDALL P.
BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7-49 (2009), for a discussion of the Finley case.
8. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1380; see Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good,
53 VAND. L. REV. I, 8-11 (2000).
9. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94.
10. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1998).
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hibition or performance, or owns an art museum at which only decent art
will be shown;" to be the principal advertiser of beef, even if not in the
government's own name;' 2 to express through monuments or through
government web sites' 3 the government's religious, ideological, or even
political preferences, and none other; to assume control, and authorship,
of employee speech in the workplace;' 4 to endorse Christianity with a
cross in the Mohave Desert, not just for a minute, but for as long as gov-
ernment likes, and without a symbol to the contrary allowed.' 5
The government speech doctrine began, and it has survived, as
something other than its name implies. The doctrine does not protect the
government's ability to speak. Instead, it grants the government a forum
for its expression that can span time, place, and space, and in which only
ideas it favors may be spoken, and other ideas with which the govern-
ment would ordinarily have to compete may be excluded. 16 I do not
doubt the government's need for such forums for the conduct of execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial business, and indeed for other operational
purposes, 17 such as a military commander giving troops a motivational
talk before going into battle. And I do not doubt the need for the gov-
ernment's right to exclude other and contrary speech in its forum no mat-
ter what the subject of its speech. Every day that I teach, I benefit from
the right to exclude certain speech in my government classroom.
But when the forum protects government speech on public matters
to its publics in a society committed to individual freedom of speech and
democratic self-government, we should recognize that the government's
exclusive forum is potentially very dangerous. Frankly, its dangers are
not much blunted by the limits on government speech that I and others
have previously proposed, such as no government monopoly power over
an idea;' 8 no ventriloquism;' 9 and transparency about government au-
thorship. 20 These may help limit the government's forum power, but they
do not limit the ways in which the government is free to couch its expres-
1I. Finley, 524 U.S. at 574-75, 587-88.
12. Johanns v Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 560-63 (2005).
13. See, e.g., Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 329-31 (lst Cir. 2009).
14. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 436-38 (2006); see Helen Norton, Constraining Pub-
lic Employee Speech: Government's Control of Its Workers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression,
59 DUKE L.J. 1, 11-13 (2009).
15. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 772 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (awaiting decision).
16. Of course the government itself, through its agents or otherwise, need not speak in the
forum; instead, the government may express its views through selected private speech. See Finley,
524 U.S. at 587-88; Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998).
17. Government websites limited to government information and government policy views
are an example. See, e.g., Sutliffe, 584 F.3d at 329-35.
18. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1488-90, 1510-11; Greene, supra note 8, at 27-29.
19. Greene, supra note 8, at 49-52; Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
833, 844 (2010); see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1457-63, 1467.
20. Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899
(2010).
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sion and the objects on which it may speak publicly in its forum-the
manner of government speech, as I call it.
II. THE MANNER OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Armed with this more full-bodied idea of a government speech fo-
rum-a place, time, or space where competing views are not allowed-
how should we think about the manner of speech that enjoys the luxury
of the government's forum? My concerns here are twofold.
My first concern is what the government says in its forum. The gov-
ernment's speech activity should be limited by the specific purposes its
speech serves under the Constitution. In the government's capacity as a
speaker, just as in its capacity as a regulator, the work of the First
Amendment is to limit government, not free it.2 1 As my colleague Bill
Buss and I have written, to consider the government as a First Amend-
ment rights-holder would be "deeply inconsistent with individual free-
dom and with constitutional notions of democratic self-government. 2
My second concern is how government says what it says. That is,
the government should be restricted in the expressive ways it carries out
its constitutional responsibilities.
[W]hen the means government employs to speak its message inter-
fere with private speech or distort the private marketplace of speech,
those means should be closely scrutinized in the interest of protecting
the fundamental constitutional purpose of preserving 'an independent
realm of speech within which public opinion is understood to be
forged.'
23
I begin, briefly, with the first concern, the "what." Government
speaking is essential to accomplishing the democratic goals of individual
freedom and self-government. It is necessary that the government speak
publicly in order to inform, explain, educate, and even attempt to per-
suade, clearly, transparently, intentionally, and understandably. Without
this, Alexander Meiklejohn famously declared, the polity cannot engage
in the business of government, evaluate government policy, or disagree
and dissent.
24
In many ways free speech law has outgrown Mr. Meiklejohn.
Whether that is good or bad is a matter for another day. But Meiklejohn's
conception of the range and rules of free speech seem, on reflection, par-
ticularly apt for the government when it speaks in its own forum. "The
21. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1501-08.
22. Id. at 1508.
23. Id. at 1508-09 (quoting Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 151
(1996)).
24. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
26-27 (1948).
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principle of the freedom of speech.., is not a Law of Nature or of Rea-
son in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement
that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage." 25 This, in turn,
"requires that so far as time allows, all facts and interests relevant to the
problem shall be fully and fairly presented . .. [so] that all the alternative
lines of action can be wisely measured in relation to one another." 26 Fur-
ther, "Ulust so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue
are denied acquaintance with information or opinion .. .which is rele-
vant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered."2 7 "The
First Amendment, then, is not the guardian of unregulated talkative-
ness."28 In its own constitutionally favored forum, the government's
speech should be governed by the duty to fully inform, and it should be
limited by the requirement that the informing be reasoned and fair.
What the government says may often turn on how it says it. This is
my second concern. The business of government in a democracy is not
faith, or force, or unrestrained emotion, or deception. It is instead reason
and disagreement and compromise and discourse on matters falling with-
in the realm of government authority. The government's speech in its
forum should thus be transparent in its origins, clear in its meaning, and
capable of reasoned, cognitive understanding. These are the govern-
ment's expressive stock in trade in a democracy in which people rule and
in which passion and prejudice are best blunted by the reasoned ex-
change of ideas and information.
Means of communication that appeal only to the senses and pas-
sions short circuit the dialectic with the declarative, reason with force.
Individuals are free under the First Amendment to engage in such forms
of expression. 29 Government, too, may usually have the power to do so,
since the content and even the style of the government's public commu-
nications are, as a general matter, left to the political branches.
30
But with the government speech doctrine we are dealing with a fo-
rum for government speaking that permits the government to exclude all
others-that is, all private speakers and all opposing viewpoints-from
the forum the government has created for the communication of its own
viewpoints: the doctor advising a patient about a choice the government
dislikes (abortion); the grant officer declining to support art and artists
that the government finds offensive; the tenets of belief in a religion that
not all people share and upon which many people, but not the govern-
25. Id.
26. Id. at 25.
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id. at 25.
29. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971).
30. Many controls of this sort have been enacted through the political process. See Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 799, 845 (2010).
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ment, find offensive;3 1 a web site reserved for expressing the govern-
ment's political preferences and views. 32 In a democracy, the government
can surely arrive at the policies embodied in each of these (and many
other) instances of government action through expression. But when the
government's action is expressive, the effect of giving the government
the power to exclude other views from its speech forum is that the com-
petition in ideas is blunted and the views of individuals are muted in a
society in which individuals alone have the freedom of speech.
In this limited setting the government possesses the constitutional
power of the censor. This is why the government's power of expression
in its forum should be held to the very limits that justify its right to ex-
press: reason, not force; explanation, not declaration; cognition, not pas-
sion. The government serves the people. In a democratic order it owes
them an explanation and justification, if for no other reason than without
those things individuals are unable to dissent and disagree in the forums
available to them for free speech.
What does this principle of openness and reason mean, especially at
a time when technology is opening up new ways in which the govern-
ment can employ its expressive power?33 How does reason fit into the
new visual, immediate, image-laden forms of expression? My answer is
that in its forum the government should not be able, free of counter-
speech, to speak publicly on public matters in exclusively aesthetic and
emotional ways. To place a monument with the Ten Commandments
before the courthouse is a declaration-of faith and belief-and not an
argument or reasoned expression. It's not a teachable moment in which
the values of the commandments are explained. The monument in that
place doesn't invite discussion. It simply "is." The same can be said
about a very large cross placed on a promontory in a national park-
even, I would say, if the government sold the tiny parcel on which it sits
to the private group that originally sponsored it.34 Government can speak
through selling land as easily as it can speak through scripting a private
doctor.35
This is, in fact, far from a radical idea. The working definition of
speech for purposes of the First Amendment has always been a linear
one.36 As Justice Harlan put it in the setting of expressive conduct, free
31. E.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129-30, 1138 (2009).
32. See, e.g., Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 334-35 (1 st Cir. 2009).
33. Norton & Citron, supra note 20.
34. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom Salazar
v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (challenging a large cross on a small piece of land atop an other-
wise isolated promontory in the
national park in the Mojave Desert).
35. See id.; Joseph Blocher, Property and Speech in Summum, 104 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 83, 90 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/colloquy/2009/3 I/
LRColI2009n31 Blocher.pdf.
36. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-22 (1971).
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speech presumes a speaker intending to send a message to an audience
that reasonably understands the message.37 This is a useful linear model
of communication, narrower than it need always be, but appropriate for
the public speaking activities of the government in its exclusionary fo-
rum. It closely fits the ideal of purposeful, cognitive, and rational dis-
course in which the government should be engaged when informing,
explaining, and persuading in the open marketplace of political debate
and discussion. 38 In its own forum it is appropriate to insist that the gov-
ernment have a message that it intends to communicate to an audience
that will reasonably understand that message, if for no other reason than
that people will thus be able to understand what government is saying
and agree or disagree with it in other available forums.
The aesthetic quality of speech can of course be useful and should
not be categorically limited in the hands of government. But aesthetics
can also be dangerous, for aesthetic expression is capable-indeed, per-
haps uniquely capable--of disrupting the linear and cognitive model.
This is because much aesthetic expression-just like much art, or adver-
tising-appeals dominantly to the sensual and emotional response of an
audience in a process that disengages the text or object communicated
from the audience's sensual act of interpretation and imagination. 39 As
Karol Berger puts it, aesthetic expression has the "ability to evoke imagi-
nary worlds, and not representation in the strict and narrow sense.'
'4
[I]n an act of cognition whereby we get to know an object, the...
powers of imagination .. .and understanding ... are engaged like
two gear wheels. But in an act of aesthetic contemplation, the two
wheels spin without engaging and the cognitive mechanism runs on
idle .... 41
Thus representations of soup cans can be made to mean quite differ-
ent and various things to those who see them presented in a certain way,
place, or at a certain time. Likewise a perfectly cognitive and logical
statement can, by aesthetic additions or amplifications, be made to carry
a very different and sometimes inconsistent meaning to readers or view-
ers, as, for example, the carefully insinuated message of race in the infa-
mous political ad featuring Willy Horton.42 Lawrence Lessig describes
37. See id. at 21.
38. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 24, at 24-27.
39. "Aesthetic" is defined as: "Of or pertaining to sensuous perception, received by the
senses." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). For an extended discussion of aesthetic
versus cognitive expression, see generally BEZANSON, supra note 7, passim.
40. KAROL BERGER, A THEORY OF ART 62 (2000).
41. Id. at 236 (interpreting IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 59-60 (James
Creed Meredith trans., Oxford University Press 1952)).
42. YouTube, Willie Horton 1988 Attack Ad,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lo9KMSSEZOY (last visited Apr. 7, 2010); see also Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 354-55 (2003) (discussing the intimidating effect of the Ku Klux Klan's burn-
ing cross).
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such techniques as "tying," efforts "to transform the social meaning of
one act by tying it to, or associating it with, another social meaning that
conforms to the meaning that the architect wishes the managed act to
have. 43
Is the "de-linearization" of speech through aesthetic and emotional
forms of communication like Serrano's "Piss Christ" photograph or Du-
champ's urinal really any different from the mute object of the cross
standing high in the desolation of the Mohave Desert, or the insignia and
name of the Ku Klux Klan on a "Helping Keep our Highways Clean"
sign on the public interstate as it passes through a Black area of town?
These are all instances of speech protected by the First Amendment
when communicated by free-willed individuals. But that does not mean
that they should be immunized from First Amendment challenge if
communicated to the public by the government in its exclusive speech
forum. The government is a speaker that enjoys no individual liberty or
free will, and whose need to express itself is limited by a different consti-
tutional role and duty.44 The government's duty is to facilitate the mar-
ketplace of political expression and the process of self-government
achieved by information and ideas; indeed, to model the form of dialog
and exchange that marks the ideals of a free democratic society. Indi-
viduals may promote political falsehood, or racial hate, or unleash pas-
sion in the service of destruction; the government should not. If it does so
it should be denied a government speech forum protected from First
Amendment challenge.
Can the line between the cognitive and the aesthetic, between the li-
near and the broadly aesthetic, be legally drawn and enforced as a limit
on government speech activity immunized from First Amendment chal-
lenge? My own view is that such a line can be managed. We do so now
in the fields of obscenity,45 evidence,46 intellectual property,47 and politi-
cal campaign speech,48 to name but a few.49 Judges and juries seem to do
a pretty good job even without special training in aesthetics, or art, or
communication theory.
43. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHi. L. REV. 943, 1009 (1995)
(discussed insightfully in Norton, supra note 14, at 42).
44. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1508.
45. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
46. Courts regularly judge proposed evidence as prejudicial on very similar criteria.
47. For example, whether a use of copyrighted material is "transformative." 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2006) (outlining the "fair use" of a copyrighted work); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
48. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 546 U.S. 410, 411 (2006); R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
49. For a wonderful discussion and analysis of the ambiguities in audience interpretation of
the meaning of speech, see Lidsky, supra note 30, at 805-09. See also Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic
Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 538-41 (2006).
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It is worth noting that Congress has placed similar speech restric-
tions on appropriations resolutions since 1951. The resolutions provide
that "[n]o part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act
shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes within the United
States not heretofore authorized by the Congress. '50 Recently, the Office
of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice has interpreted the restric-
tions as "intended to eradicate (i) agency efforts to direct and control
public thinking on various issues of public debate, particularly through
overt political action; (ii) useless, excessive, or frivolous agency publica-
tions; and (iii) agency self-promotion, aggrandizement, or puffery.'
The opinion stated, "The overarching concern [is] the use of federal
funds to manipulate and control public opinion about policy issues," and
"covert attempts to mold opinion through undisclosed use of third par-
ties."52 There is thus reason to conclude that a similar constitutional rule
governing the manner of expression in a broader range of government
speech forums would succeed.
CONCLUSION
Government speech and the government speech forum will not go
away. It is a practical necessity-the more so in our information age.
Many questions about the role and status of government speech remain
to be answered. In the meantime, however, we will be safer and on much
firmer democratic and constitutional ground if we insist that government
speech on public matters to the public must, in the government's own
forum, be transparent, cognitive and reasoned, and limited to those mes-
sages communicated intentionally to a public audience and so understood
by that audience. Anything less, I believe, would unleash a very danger-
ous power in the hands of government, a power, ironically, immunized
from challenge by the First Amendment itself.
50. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of Feb. 20, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11,
§ 626, discussed in STEVEN G. BRADBURY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL,
MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES (July 30, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opfinal.htm [hereinafter DOJ
OLC OPINION].
51. DOJ OLC OPINION, available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opfinal.htm.
52. Id. (first emphasis added). This longstanding policy has been the subject of numerous
OLC opinions over the course of its fifty-nine year history, and it seems to have been largely hon-
ored in the promise, not the breach. A few judicial opinions reflect this policy as well. See, e.g.,
Nat'l Treasury Employees' Union v. Campbell, 654 F.2d 784, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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PROPAGANDA FOR WAR AND TRANSPARENCY
RICHARD B. COLLINSt
Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
INTRODUCTION
Other papers in this Symposium Issue on Government Speech are
based on the Supreme Court's categorical position that government
speech is not restricted by the Free Speech or Free Press Clauses. Some
papers have raised difficulties with that position, but the Court seems
2quite set. This Essay turns to another source of regulation: international
law. The section of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) quoted above is meant to forbid both private and gov-
emnment advocacy of aggressive war.3 I shall first outline the history of
this provision, then analyze the difficulties it poses. Finally, I shall con-
sider the standard American reply to speech restrictions, that the best
answer to harmful speech is more speech. In the context of war propa-
ganda, this requires consideration of government secrecy and efforts to
counter it-that is, to promote government transparency.
I. HISTORY OF COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
ARTICLE 20(1)
Promotion of aggressive war is surely the most destructive form of
government speech. Its use in pre-modern recorded history was docu-
mented by Hawaii's East-West Center in 1979. 4 Then World War I
raised the stakes. War technology expanded the slaughter manifold.5 At
the same time communications technology spread war propaganda far
more effectively. 6 The U.S. Government in particular entered the war
when our largest immigrant population was from Germany and the Aus-
trian Empire, and German was the foreign language most widely spoken
and studied.7 The Government decided that it needed to demonize the
t Professor of Law, University of Colorado. LaKischa Cook, class of 2009, and Benjamin
Schler, class of 2010, provided valuable research assistance.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www2.ohchr.orglenglish/law/ccpr.htm.
2. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009).
3. See infra notes 46, 71, 106, 110 and accompanying text.
4. See I EAST-WEST CENTER, PROPAGANDA AND COMMUNICATION IN WORLD HISTORY
(Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner & Hans Speier eds., 1979); see also JOHN B. WHrITON &
ARTHUR LARSON, PROPAGANDA: TOWARDS DISARMAMENT IN THE WAR OF WORDS 12-30 (1964).
5. See Sheldon Hochheiser, World War I Technology, IEEE GLOBAL HISTORY NETWORK,
http://www.ieeeghn.org/wikifindex.php/World War I Technology (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
6. See WHITTON & LARSON, supra note 4, at 30-34; Arthur Larson, The Present Status of
Propaganda in International Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 439, 440 (1966).
7. See John Simkin, German Immigration, SPARTACUS EDUCATIONAL, http://www.spartacus
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enemy nations, particularly Germany, and it did so with stunning suc-
cess. War posters featuring fearsome and bloody portrayals of 'The
Hun" became staples of poster art.8 Cities and towns removed German
place names.9 Citizens anglicized German family names.' 0 Local laws
outlawed use of German words such as sauerkraut and forbade perform-
ances of music by Beethoven and Mozart."' Several states curtailed study
of foreign languages or in one instance of German alone. 12 Of course all
belligerents engaged in war propaganda, and some say greater skill in
using it was important to the war's outcome. 13
American involvement in the war lasted such a short time that this
propaganda blitz quickly faded. Soviet propaganda then replaced the
war's as a subject of concern. 14 During the 1920s, systematic study of
propaganda for war began, led by Walter Lippmann and Harold Lass-
well. 15 In 1927, Lasswell published his University of Chicago doctoral
thesis titled Propaganda Technique in the World War.16 In the 1930s, the
Nazi regime and the Japanese Empire supplied fresh inspiration for study
and analysis. International law theorists and the League of Nations began
to discuss outlawing propaganda for war. 17 In 1931 the League commis-
sioned a study of the use of radio broadcasts in the cause of peace. Two
years later the League authorized preparation of a draft convention on
propaganda and broadcasting. These initiatives generated the Convention
on the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, completed in 1936.18 It
required States Parties to forbid transmissions within their territories of
incitements to wars of aggression. Many states ratified or acceded to the
Convention, but they did not include Germany, Italy, Japan, the USSR,
or Spain. 19 The United States was not a League member and did not par-
ticipate in drawing up the Convention or ratify it. 20
.schoolnet.co.uklUSAEgernany.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
8. See Anti-German Hysteria, Birth of the Hun: The Propagandists, http://www.exulanten
.com/hysteriaintro.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
9. Simkin, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. Anti-German Hysteria, Our Destroyed Heritage Continued: Goodbye Sauerkraut,
http://www.exulanten.com/cr7b.html (last visited Arp. 21,2010); see also Simkin, supra note 7.
12. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923) (holding one such law invalid); Bartels
v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 409 (1923) (holding two other laws invalid). Ohio had specifically targeted
German. Bartels, 262 U.S. at 410 n.2. Two justices thought that made a constitutional difference. Id.
at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting and concurring).
13. See, e.g., WHTrTON & LARSON, supra note 4, at 30-34.
14. See MICHAEL G. KEARNEY, THE PROHIBITION OF PROPAGANDA FOR WAR IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (2007), available at http://0-www.oxfordscholarship.com.pacman.aw
.du.edu/oso/public/contentltaw/978019923245 1/toc.html.
15. See WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 24-29,43-45 (1922).
16. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE IN THE WORLD WAR (1927).
17. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 24-28.
18. Id. at 28.
19. Id. at 30-31.
20. Id. at 3 1.
[Vol. 87:4
2010] PROPAGANDA FOR WAR AND TRANSPARENCY 821
World War H1 of course increased awareness of the question of war
propaganda. During the war, Professor Lasswell was Chief of the Ex-
perimental Division for the Study of War Time Communications at the
Library of Congress. His office studied Nazi propaganda to understand
the methods used to gain support of the German people for Hitler.2'
After the war, issues about war propaganda arose in the war crimes
trials in Tokyo and Nuremberg. As is well known, the trials were the first
efforts to punish war crimes internationally. They also included the first
efforts to punish war propaganda in particular.22 The Nuremberg Charter
was drawn up by the four convening nations, Britain, France, the
U.S.S.R., and the U.S., so its legal pedigree was a blend.23 Indictments of
twenty-four Nazi leaders were drawn up and served. They stressed the
central role of propaganda in war preparation, but the Charter did not
24state that propaganda or incitement alone constituted a crime. Count
One of the indictments alleged a common plan or conspiracy to commit
crimes against peace. Count Two charged substantive crimes.25
A year later, the International Military Tribunal issued its judg-
ments. They emphasized the importance of Nazi propaganda in the lead-
up to war. The Tribunal considered the conspiracy to have begun with
formation of the Nazi party in 1919.26 Findings of guilt on the conspiracy
count included references to war propaganda in several cases. These in-
cluded prominent defendants Rudolf Hess, Wilhelm Keitel, and Alfred
Rosenberg. Rosenberg in particular was found to have been chief ideolo-
gist of the Nazi Party. However, for these and others, guilt was also pre-
dicated on substantive crimes; references to propaganda were contribut-
ing factors.27
Charges in two other cases were based on pure speech. Julius Strei-
cher was charged both with war propaganda and with being the chief
propagandist promoting hatred and violence against Jews. He was acquit-
ted of the former and convicted of the latter, based on his role as pub-
lisher and editor of a virulently anti-Semitic newspaper.28 Hans Fritzsche
was charged with war propaganda and anti-Jewish activities for his work
in the Nazi propaganda ministry. The Tribunal acquitted him of all
charges, finding that he had not been involved in direct incitement to war
21. Harold Lasswell, http://www.answers.com/topic/harold-lasswell (last visited Apr. 21,
2010).
22. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 34.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 34, 37.
25. See id. at 34.
26. Id. at 36.
27. See id. at 38-39.
28. See id. at 40-42.
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and that he had not been proved to know of extermination of Jews, but it
assumed validity of the charges if proved. 29
A later indictment of twenty-one more Nazis was tried as what is
called the Ministries case. Charges against two of these defendants, Otto
Dietrich and Ernst von Weizsaeker, were based directly on speech activi-
ties as war propaganda. The Tribunal decided that conviction required
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that each defendant knew of Hitler's
war plans. Both were acquitted for lack of sufficient proof of this ele-
30ment. But the judgments again assumed validity of the charges.
The Tokyo Tribunal was almost a solo American effort, so its legal
forms are more familiar to Anglo-American lawyers. The conspiracy
count in the indictments looks like the common-law offense; it charged
conspiracy to wage aggressive war.31 Defendants were again accused of
propaganda for war as part of the conspiracy count. Five of the accused
were found guilty of conspiracy based largely on propaganda activities.
Sadao Araki was found to be chief propagandist in preparing the Japa-
nese people for war as early as 1928. Koichi Kido's guilt was based on
his work as education minister.32 A clearer instance of punishment for
speech alone was the case of the twelve women who made propaganda
broadcasts under the name of Tokyo Rose.33
Propaganda for war was also discussed in the newly established
United Nations. Its 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights en-
shrined the right to freedom of expression with no specific exceptions.34
But several General Assembly resolutions condemned war propaganda,
and the draft Convention on Freedom of Information and the Press, first
published in 1948, added a 1960 provision that condemned "incitement
to violence and crime. 35 Other international treaties adopted in the post-
war period made some reference to the question.
36
Advocates for an international ban on war propaganda achieved
success with adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
29. See id. at 42-45.
30. See id. at 48-49.
31. See id. at 50.
32. See id. at 50-52.
33. See Ann Elizabeth Pfau, Miss Yourlovin: GIs, Gender, and Domesticity During World
War II ch. 5, (2008), http://www.gutenberg-e.orglpfau/chapter5.html; see also JUDITH KEENE,
TREASON ON THE AIRWAVES: THREE ALLIED BROADCASTERS ON AXIS RADIO DURING WORLD WAR
II pt. 11 (2009); D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1951).
34. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(I 11), art. 19, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/
documents/udhr/. However, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
chapter I.shtml.
35. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 56-65.
36. See id. at 70-78.
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cal Rights in 1966.37 Its Article 19 is a typical modern guarantee of free-
dom of expression, subject only to restrictions necessary for "respect of
the rights or reputations of others" or "for protection of national security
or of public order ... or of public health or morals., 38 Article 20 adds
two specific exceptions, the war propaganda provision quoted at the head
of this article, and Article 20(2), which forbids "advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence., 39 In other words, Article 20 forbids warmongering
and hate speech.
Article 20(1)'s supporters must be disappointed by the failure of
some nations to agree to the provision and the failure of others to imple-
ment it. The article requires that "propaganda for war" be forbidden by
law, so it requires action by acceding states. But it does not say what
form a prohibition should take. Moreover, most of the debate during
adoption of the Covenant related to warmongering by the press.4° There
was very little attention given to war propaganda by governments except
where governments control the press.
The majority of nations that passed legislation directly responsive to
the text of Article 20(1) were the U.S.S.R. and others in its former bloc.4 1
This reflected national positions during the Covenant's drafting and in
prior General Assembly resolutions and other forums. These nations saw
a rule against propaganda for war as a device to suppress internal dissent
and to counter western media.42 When the U.S. objected to the concept of
a ban on propaganda for war, the Russians chided America as soft on
aggressive war.4 3 In agreeing to the Covenant, nations can make reserva-
tions and declarations, and the U.S. refused to agree to either part of Ar-
ticle 20.44 The U.S. also forbade domestic enforcement and did not agree
37. ICCPR, supra note I; see also Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 32, 64-66 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE 10 (1996). National agreements to the Covenant followed according to laws
and politics of each state party. For example, the U.S. signed the covenant in 1977, and the Senate
ratified it with extensive qualifications in 1992. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, CONSIDERATION OF
REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE COVENANT: INITIAL REPORTS
OF STATES PARTIES DUE IN 1993, Annex I11 (1993),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/133836.pdf.
38. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 437 (2d ed. 2005).
39. Id. at 468.
40. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 92, 101, 134, 142, 159, 167, 169.
41. See id. at 135-38.
42. See id. at 87, 95, 122.
43. See id. at 96, 100.
44. See NOWAK, supra note 38, at 479; HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, CONSIDERATION OF
REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE COVENANT: INITIAL REPORTS
OF STATES PARTIES DUE IN 1993, Annex II (1993), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
133836.pdf.
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to review of complaints by the U.N. Human Rights Committee.45 A
number of other western democracies balked at Article 20(1).46 Still oth-
ers made half-baked attempts at compliance. Forms of compliance dealt
only with private sector warmongering. 47 No nation seriously addressed
the concept of adopting a restraint on the government itself. A further
disappointment is the paucity of scholarship on the provision.
Article 20(2), forbidding hate speech, has had a more robust life. It
has generated substantial scholarship.48 Many nations have passed legis-
lation to curb hate speech.49 But again these actions have outlawed pri-
vate sector hate speech. No nation that engages in verbal persecution of
minorities has curtailed these actions because of Article 20(2). Of course
the two parts of Article 20 to some extent overlap because nations have
used hate speech in campaigns to promote aggressive war.50 Serbian
propaganda against Bosnia is a grim example.51 The problem also arises
internally, as in Rwanda.
52
II. RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES53
A commission established by the Organization of American States
drafted the American Convention on Human Rights. 54 The Convention's
Article 13 is its guarantee of freedom of expression.55 Article 13(5) de-
rives from its U.N. ancestor but with important changes:
45. On domestic enforcement, see Oscar Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Cove-
nant in Domestic Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 311, 321 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01, S4783 (daily ed.
Apr. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). On interpretation by the Human Rights Committee, see
infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
46. See NOWAK, supra note 38, at 479.
47. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 139-41.
48. See, e.g., Stephanie Farrior, Molding The Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Founda-
tions of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1 (1996). Art. 20(2)
substantially overlaps Art. 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation art. 4,660 U.N.T.S. 195 (Dec. 21, 1965), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/
cerd.htm. The latter is more demanding by requiring criminal penalties for hate speech.
49. See Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative
Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1541-57 (2003).
50. Nazi Germany used its campaigns against Jews and others both internally and in its war
aims. See supra text accompanying notes 21-30.
51. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 213-19.
52. See id. at 219-34.
53. In addition to the treaties reviewed in this section, propaganda for war is forbidden by the
preamble to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), Annex (Dec.
19, 1966), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2222(XXI), and
by the Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Preamble,
U.N. Doc. A18028 (Oct. 24, 1970), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdfOpenElement.
54. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 175-76.
55. Id. at 176.
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5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or
religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to
any other similar action against any person or group of persons on
any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or na-
tional origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.
56
The U.S. opposed, on free speech grounds, an initial draft that
tracked ICCPR Article 20 and persuaded the commission to adopt this
"incitements to lawless violence" version that was deemed compatible
with the First Amendment.57 The Convention was approved and entered
into force in 1978, but the U.S. has yet to agree to it. 58 The Convention
established an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Court
of Human Rights. 59 Both have opined extensively on Article 13 but have
said almost nothing about part 13(5). 60
The international human rights treaty in most active use is the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. From its original ten signers, it has
expanded to serve forty-seven States Parties including Turkey, Russia,
and other former Soviet bloc nations. 6' The Convention's Article 10 pro-
tects freedom of expression with the general exceptions typical in mod-
ern provisions, but it has none for war propaganda.62 Like the American
treaty, the European Convention establishes a Commission on Human
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights that sits in Strasbourg.
The Court's active docket is shown by its 35,460 decisions in 2009.63
Although European Convention Article 10 lacks express exceptions
from its free expression guarantee for war propaganda, a series of deci-
sions from Turkey have sustained applications of a statute that forbids
56. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/
zoas3con.htm..
57. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 178-79.
58. Id. at 176,183.
59. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Information History, http://www.corteidh.
or.cr/historia.cfm (last visited Apr. 21, 2010); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, What
is IACHR?, http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
60. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 180-83.
61. Council of Europe in Brief, Who We Are, http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=
quisommesnous&l=en (last visited Apr. 21, 2010).
62. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11 (2003), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7
-DC I3-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf. The text of Article 10.2 states:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Id.
63. See European Court of Human Rights Annual Report 2009, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C25277F5-BCAE-4401 -BC9B-F58D0 15E4D54/0/Annual_
Report_2009_versionProv.pdf, at 137.
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"propaganda ... aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of the Re-
public of Turkey or the indivisible unity of the nation." 64 Thus the Euro-
pean Convention's jurisprudence seems to allow prohibitions adopted to
comply with ICCPR Article 20.65
Another discussion about banning propaganda for war arose in con-
nection with drafting the Rome Statute for the International Criminal
Court. The U.N. established its International Law Commission in 1947,
and the Commission began to draft an international criminal code in
1950.66 The process included detailed discussions aimed at forbidding
incitement to war or war propaganda. 67 But no agreement was reached
for adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998.68 The statute asserts jurisdic-
tion over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime
of aggression. However, it defines and claims present jurisdiction over
the first three but postpones jurisdiction over aggression until the crime
is defined, and this has not yet occurred. 69 Debate leading to this stale-
mate was vigorous and complex.
70
11m. ANALYSIS
Trying to forbid war propaganda encounters substantial obstacles.
As is often the case, the problems begin with basic definitions. When
should advocacy of war be defined as forbidden war propaganda? The
history of Article 20(1) and its antecedents make it clear that the intent is
to forbid advocacy of wars of aggression. Therefore defensive wars are
not within the provision.71 Modem conditions have generated claims of
preemptive war as a justification and thus not a war of aggression. That
distinction is difficult to define, but international law at least provides a
procedure to try. To oversimplify somewhat, actions sanctioned by the
U.N. Security Council are lawful, others are not.72 By this metric, the
64. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 185-88.
65. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is another regional human rights
treaty. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/charter en.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). However, it
lacks any reference to war incitement or propaganda, and its guarantees of free expression have not
been interpreted in relevant ways.
66. See Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), U.N. Doc. A/519
(Nov. 21, 1947), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/textsfinstruments/english/statute/statute
_e.pdf; KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 193.
67. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 193-212.
68. See William A. Schabas, The Unfinished Work of Defining Aggression: How Many Times
Must the Cannonballs Fly, Before They Are Forever Banned?, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 123, 131-35(Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe &
Eric Donnelly eds., 2004).
69. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 234-35.
70. See Schabas, supra note 68, at 123-41.
71. See U.N. Charter art. 5 1, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charterl
chapter7.shtml; Nowak, supra note 38, at 473.
72. See U.N. Charter preamble ("to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution
of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest"), available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml; U.N Charter ch. VII ("Action with Respect
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2001 American invasion of Afghanistan was lawful, while the 2003 in-
vasion of Iraq was not.
73
Another basic issue is the intended scope of the word propaganda.
The word itself originated in modern Latin to describe an office of the
Catholic Church.74 At times it has been used in a positive sense, for ex-
ample, to describe William Wilberforce's campaign to outlaw the slave
trade in the British Empire.75 But its modern uses are almost entirely
negative, implying deceptive advocacy of bad actions or policies.76 Yet
many uses involve issues of honest debate, and free expression is a fun-
damental value. Political rhetoric often calls legitimate opposing argu-
ments propaganda.77 So when does war propaganda depart from useful
debate and become a reasonable target for legal restrictions?
Common-law legal systems have always held that conspiracy or in-
citement to commit a substantive crime can be punished.78 But the right
of free speech has required strict definitions of both conspiracy and in-
citement to avoid excessive suppression of expression.79 Famously,
American constitutional law restricts punishment of incitement to in-
stances of clear and present danger of substantive harm.80 This issue
arose in the Tokyo and Nuremberg prosecutions. The counts based on
speech and writings were couched as accusations of conspiracy to com-
mit substantive crimes. 81 As related above, charges against some defen-
dants were substantially based on their speech activities well beyond
conspiratorial agreement. 82 But the judgments also relied on the success
to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"), available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml.
73. See Onder Bakircioglu, The Right to Self-Defence in National and International Law: The
Role of the Imminence Requirement, 19 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 40 (2009); Global Policy
Forum, UN Involvement in Afghanistan, http:/lwww.globalpolicy.orglsecurity-councilindex-of-
countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/afghanistan.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2010); Global
Policy Forum, UN Role in Iraq, httpJ/www.globalpolicy.org/iraq/political-issues-in-iraq/un-role-in-
iraq.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). For a thorough review of the legality of the Iraq war under
international law, see DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, FROM '94 lTO THE 'IRAQ WAR 2003' 52-86 (2004).
74. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 3.
75. See William Wilberforce, William Wilberforce: Encyclopedia of World Biography,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/l G2-3404706863.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
76. See WHrI7ON & LARSON, supra note 4, at 9.
77. See id.; Nowak, supra note 38, at 471-73; Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and
Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 209, 227-30 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
78. See Aaron Fichtelberg, Conspiracy and International Criminal Justice, 17 CRIM. L.F. 149,
149 (2006); Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 655-57. Incite-
ment as a crime is essentially synonymous with solicitation. The latter term is generally used in
American statutes, the former in international and British sources. Compare Model Penal Code §
5.02 (1985), with KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 195-200.
79. See Greenawalt, supra note 78, at 687-728 (discussing U.S. case law on solicitation);
David B. Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 198-200 (1972).
80. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
81. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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of the conspiracies. No one was punished for advocacy that did not
achieve its aim.
83
In the discussions and debates leading to adoption of Article 20 of
the Covenant, representatives of the U.S. and other western democracies
advocated limiting forbidden propaganda to incitement to wars of ag-
gression, but these efforts lost out to the broader term propaganda.
84
Nevertheless, the history is murky enough to justify wording a compli-
ance using the word incitement rather than propaganda. That would still
leave a gap between the very strict American definition of incitement and
broader usages elsewhere. Note that section 2 of Article 20 forbids only
hate speech that constitutes incitement to discrimination, although that
was nevertheless too much restriction on free speech for American
agreement to it.
85
American law has at times employed the word propaganda, and the
experience illustrates difficulties in defining the word. In 1938 Congress
passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which required agents of
foreign governments who wished to disseminate "political propaganda"
in the U.S. to register with the Attorney General and to identify the mate-
rial with that label and to disclose the agency. 86 In 1987, a divided Su-
preme Court sustained the act against a First Amendment challenge.
87
But in 1995 Congress replaced the quoted phrase with the term "informa-
tional materials." 88 A 1948 statute forbids use of defense appropriations
for "propaganda purposes within the United States not otherwise specifi-
cally authorized by law. 89
If these difficulties are mastered, one reaches the daunting problem
of trying to deter government propaganda for war. Private actors have
promoted aggressive war at various times in world history. Religious
authorities have done it, as have some modern press and broadcast voic-
es.90 But in modern times propaganda for war is largely about govern-
ment speech.9' It thus poses two of the most basic problems of interna-
83. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
84. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 116, 120, 123, 126, 128.
85. See HUMAN RIGHTS COMMrTEE, supra note 44.
86. Foreign Agents Registration Act, ch. 327, 53 Stat. 631 (1938) (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (2006)).
87. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 467-69 (1987).
88. Act of Dec.19, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-95, 109 Stat. 700 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611,
614, 616, 618, 621 (2006)).
89. Smith-Mundt Act, Pub. L. No. 80-402, 62 Stat. 6 (1948) (codified as reenacted at 10
U.S.C. § 224 1a (2006)). However, there is no record of attempts to enforce it. See Allen W. Palmer
& Edward L. Carter, The Smith-Mundt Act's Ban on Domestic Propaganda: An Analysis of the Cold
War Statute Limiting Access to Public Diplomacy, II COMM. L & POL'Y. 1, 29-30 (2006).
90. See Robert Brentano, Western Civilization: The Middle Ages, in I PROPAGANDA AND
COMMUNICATION IN WORLD HISTORY, supra note 4, at 552-90; WHITTON & LARSON, supra note 4,
at 133-80.
91. For an extended discussion of the forms of government propaganda for war, see WHITTON
& LARSON, supra note 4, at 62-132.
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tional law. First, how can a government wishing to comply with Article
20(1) do so effectively? Second, what can be done about violators?
Consider the first issue under the U.S. Constitution. If Congress
passed a statute that purported to limit war propaganda by the Executive
Department, the statute's constitutional validity could be challenged on
separation of powers grounds. 92 The issue would be related to the tor-
tured history of the 1973 War Powers Resolution. 93 There is a chance
that the courts would decline the issue under the political question doc-
trine.94 Even if the merits were reached, the Executive could well win.95
If instead the President issued an executive order forbidding incitement
to aggressive war, it could be repealed or modified at the stroke of a pen.
If the issue arose under a British-style constitution based on parliamen-
tary sovereignty, a change of government would allow incoming authori-
ties to disregard actions of prior parliaments. 96 Like problems are prob-
able under other legal systems, although Finland has made a careful at-
tempt to comply.
97
Second, of course international law lacks any general system of di-
rect enforcement. Interpretation of the Covenant is made primarily by the
U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), which the Covenant established
for that purpose.98 On request of the Committee, the Covenant requires
reports by States Parties detailing their compliance with it.99 The Com-
mittee examines these reports, makes its reports and comments to the
submitting States Parties, and makes an annual report of its activities to
the General Assembly that in practice includes extensive commentary on
reports by States Parties.'l° This process generates the most extensive
interpretive commentary on the Covenant. 10 1 The Covenant also has pro-
cedures for a State Party to submit a communication to the HRC accus-
ing another State Party of failing to fulfill its obligations under the Cove-
nant and for conciliation of the dispute.102 However, the HRC can receive
92. On judicial review of executive authority generally, see HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF
FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 79-92 (2006). There is in
fact a statute that forbids use of defense appropriations for "propaganda purposes within the United
States not otherwise specifically authorized by law." See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
93. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006). See Michael J. Glennon, The War Powers Resolution,
Once Again, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 75, 78-79, 81 (2009).
94. See John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and
War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 293, 306-08 (1993).
95. See Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Originalism?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 353, 372 (2008).
96. See UK Parliament, Parliamentary Sovereignty, http://www.parliament.uk/aboutlhowl
laws/sovereignty.cfm (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
97. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 166-71.
98. ICCPR art. 28, supra note 1, quoted in MCGOLDRICK, supra note 37, at 517.
99. ICCPR art. 40, supra note I, quoted in MCGOLDRICK, supra note 37, at 519. For links to
U.S. reports, see U.S. Department of State, U.S. Treaty Reports, http://www.state.gov/gldrllhrl
treaties/index.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
100. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 37, at 79-88, 97-98.
101. See id. at 62.
102. NOWAK, supra note 38, at 753-86.
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and act on a communication only if both complaining and accused states
have consented to the procedure on the date of submission, and the pro-
cedure has had little use. 10 3 There has been much more activity under the
Covenant's first Optional Protocol, which allows individuals to submit
communications to the HRC for its review. 1°4
The HRC has interpreted ICCPR Article 20 in decisions on com-
munications under the first Optional Protocol, but these are few in num-
ber and have concerned only issues arising under Article 20(2).05 Thus
its only interpretations of Article 20(1) have been in reviews of reports
by States Parties, which have often been empty generalities or eva-
sions.' ° The HRC has objected vigorously, but its complaints have had
few concrete achievements.'
0 7
The Covenant can also be asserted before the International Court of
Justice and other forums.' 0 8 But jurisdiction of these tribunals requires a
defendant nation's consent.' °9 Nuremberg-Tokyo style punishments are
inflicted after military defeat. Thus coercive enforcement of Article 20(1)
is extremely unlikely beyond special situations like the former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda.1 0
However, in both domestic and international forums, the fact that
international law condemns warmongering could be a powerful influence
in argument. It gives opponents of aggressive war legal as well as moral
high ground. Thus in an odd way, the value of Article 20(1) is mostly
based on its use in international debate and discourse-an instance of
more speech. One can argue that this is no value at all because condemn-
ing propaganda for war would be equally effective were there no interna-
tional covenant forbidding it. In the shadowy world of events leading to
war, this claim cannot be proved or disproved. Yet at the least the Article
103. Id. at 753, 757-58.
104. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 37, at 120-246. Neither the U.S. nor Britain has agreed to
the Protocol, and many other nations have qualified their consent to review by the HRC. See UNITED
NATIONS, TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.orgPages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&Mtds
g-no=lV-5&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited 8 June 8, 2010). The Covenant's second Optional
Protocol concerns the death penalty. See THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 375-77 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000).
105. NOWAK, supra note 38, at 476-79.
106. See KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 142-73 (including reports that rely on reservations and
declarations and HRC's response to them).
107. See id. passim.
108. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Ch. IV Human Rights: Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://treaties.un.orgIPagesNiewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg_.no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
109. See, e.g., Cesare P. R. Romano, Progress in International Adjudication: Revisiting Hud-
son's Assessment of the Future of International Courts, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 433,
440 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies eds., 2008).
110. On the latter, see Dominic McGoldrick, Criminal Trials Before International Tribunals:
Legality and Legitimacy, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND
POLICY ISSUES 9, 22-24, 36-40 (Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe & Eric Donnelly eds., 2004).
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provides a clear and formal warning to defendants in a future Nuremberg
or Tokyo trial.
IV. MORE SPEECH
Turning to the last subject, the U.S. and some other western democ-
racies maintain that the proper response to propaganda promoting ag-
gressive war is opposing speech and press, or for short, more speech."'
How effective is this response in the context of a government's war
propaganda? To what extent does the answer depend on effective gov-
ernment secrecy?
America's recent past gives us a fresh basis to evaluate these ques-
tions. The Bush Administration attacked Iraq after a sales job that can
reasonably be called propaganda. The invasion's theory was preemptive
war, but the supporting facts turned out to be false. 12 There is a debate
over whether the Administration made innocent mistakes, but the "more
speech" question is the same either way. All administrations keep se-
crets, but the Bush Administration kept more than most and strongly
defended the right to do so."
3
How successful were the press and other voices in countering the
Administration's war propaganda? Many opponents of the Iraq war ar-
gue not very effective, accusing the press of timid and subservient behav-
ior during the run-up to the invasion. 14 War supporters, on the other
side, argue that the Administration's errors were innocent mistakes, and
the invasion was supported honestly." 
5
A detailed study of the question makes a strong case to say that both
views are wrong." 6 The Administration did engage in distortions that
deserve to be called war propaganda. But the press did a good job in
countering the Administration. Within a short time after the invasion, its
false pretenses were unearthed and broadcast. Many Administration se-
crets were exposed, by leaks and otherwise." 17 A British observer con-
cluded, "The arguments for and against the war in Iraq were extensively
canvassed in [Security Council] debates, international fora, international
111. KEARNEY, supra note 14, at 104; see also NOWAK, supra note 38, at 479.
112. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 73, at 97-98.
113. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited,
92 IOWA L. REV. 489,491 (2007).
114. See, e.g., SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, WEAPONS OF MASS DECEPTION: THE
USES OF PROPAGANDA IN BUSH'S WAR ON IRAQ 134 (2003); Chaim Kaufmann, Threat Inflation and
the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War, 29 INT'L SECURITY 5, 44
(2004).
115. See, e.g., KARL ROVE, COURAGE AND CONSEQUENCE: MY LIFE AS A CONSERVATIVE IN
THE FIGHT (2010).
116. Brian A. Patrick & A. Trevor Thrall, Beyond Hegemony: Classical Propaganda Theory
and Presidential Communication Strategy After the Invasion of Iraq, 10 MASS COMM. & SOC'Y 95,
95-96 (2007).
117. See id. at 107-09, 115.
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and national public debate and in legal challenges."' 18 Thus a reasonable
case can be made that events in Iraq were reported more accurately and
extensively than those for any other American war. More speech seems
to have worked. Moreover, sunshine laws have made government more
transparent in general, and technology has undermined governments'
ability to keep secrets and has made dissemination of revealed govern-
ment information much more effective."
19
CONCLUSION
Article 20(1) of the ICCPR is an odd provision indeed. It is almost
completely ineffective as a coercive approach to forbidding war propa-
ganda except to punish the minions of defeated nations after the fact.
(For the latter purpose, it does provide formal legality.) However, it is a
platform to criticize advocacy of aggressive war and to argue against it in
the Security Council. A provision that the United States refused to adopt
based on the argument that the right remedy for harmful speech is more
speech has its practical utility as a voice in the pantheon of more speech.
118. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 73, at 47.
119. See, e.g., the cautious optimism of Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow "War":
FOJA, the Abuses of Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.




In this Essay, I evaluate three issues of attribution and misattribu-
tion that arise in the so-called area of "government speech."' First, I ex-
plore when an individual might have a constitutional claim for misattri-
bution by the state. Second, I discuss the citizen's interest in proper attri-
bution by the government when it is speaking. Third, I consider the gov-
ernment's interest in avoiding expression being improperly attributed to
it. This concern arises less often than is commonly assumed; what many
scholars (and governments) claim to be a state interest in avoiding attri-
bution or endorsement is in fact a state interest in not providing a plat-
form for certain types of private speech. As such, the matter cannot be
resolved according to the categories of "public forum" or "government
speech," and instead we must decide how much content-based decision-
making is appropriate for the state when creating speech opportunities
that fall into neither of these more doctrinally understandable forms.
I. IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST MISATIRIBUTION BY
THE STATE?
A. Paul, Johanns, and Grange
In Paul v. Davis,2 the U.S. Supreme Court held that defamation by
the state does not constitute deprivation of liberty or property-and thus
does not buttress a due process claim-unless the state action also alters
or extinguishes a "right or status previously recognized by state law."
3
Davis had made out a prima facie case for defamation but could show no
other harm, in part because he had not been fired from his private job as
a result of the state's defamatory publications.4 The Court distinguished
Wisconsin v. Constantineau5 as permitting a due process claim because
t Leonard F. Manning Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Many thanks to Richard
Collins and Helen Norton for putting on such a splendid conference and to Caroline Corbin for
posing hard questions as the responder. For helpful comments on my paper, thanks to Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, John Nagle, Helen Norton, Fred Schauer, and Steve Shiffrin. I am also grateful to Alissa
Black-Dorward of the Fordham Law School library for much-needed research.
I. Misattribution issues arise in various legal settings, including libel, plagiarism, right of
publicity, and trademark. For a helpful discussion of the latter, see generally Helen Norton, The
Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression's Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 611-14
(2008). See also Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § I06A (2006), construed in Mass. Museum of
Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 47-48 (lst Cir. 2010) (noting that the Act
includes a right of attribution "protects the author's right to be identified as the author of his work
and also protects against the use of his name in connection with works created by others").
2. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
3. Id. at 711-12.
4. See id. at 696.
5. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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the state not only defamed Constantineau, but also, by so doing, altered
her legal status (her right to purchase or obtain liquor).6
These cases did not deal with freedom of association claims, but
they reveal caution by the Court in recognizing a constitutional claim for
falsehoods uttered or printed by the state. It's a complex question how
the state might violate one's freedom of association by falsely attributing
a belief or statement or affiliation to an individual or group. Such false
attribution wouldn't directly prevent or compel association. Rather, mis-
attribution by the state would create a false image, which could lead to
other harm (say, if others refuse to associate with you because they false-
ly believe you to hold certain views). But if Davis/Constantineau refuse
to recognize a due process claim for libel by the state, because there is no
deprivation of liberty or property from the mere creation of a false im-
age, would the Court recognize a constitutional freedom of association
claim in similar circumstances?
Two recent cases suggest, in dicta and in concurring and dissenting
opinions, that the answer might be "yes." In Johanns v. Livestock Mar-
keting Ass'n,7 the Court considered a federal statute promoting beef
products. The law gives the Secretary of Agriculture power to establish a
board of beef producers and importers, who then set up an operating
committee, and to impose a $1 per head assessment on local and im-
ported cattle. The money is used for, inter alia, promotional campaigns,
which the committee designs and the Secretary approves. The campaigns
have included the well-known "Beef. It's What's for Dinner" ads. (As a
vegetarian, I can assert that the ads have failed to persuade me, nor have
I switched to beef for breakfast, lunch, or midnight snack.8) Many,
though not all, of the ads bear the attribution "Funded by America's Beef
Producers." And most ads "also bear a Beef Board logo, usually a check-
mark with the word 'BEEF."' 9
Although in prior cases of targeted federal assessments used for ge-
neric product advertising the Court had not considered the ads govern-
ment speech,10 Johanns held such ads, under the aegis of the Department
of Agriculture, are government speech." Furthermore, the Court squarely
held "compelled funding of government speech does not alone raise First
Amendment concerns."' 2 Since the Court held the statutory scheme on its
6. Davis, 424 U.S. at 707-09.
7. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
8. See id. at 561 n.5.
9. Id. at 555. For the factual and legal background, see id. at 553-55.
10. See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 416-17 (2001) (not address-
ing the government speech issue); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 483 n.2
(1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Secretary of Agriculture does not argue that the advertisements
at issue represent so-called 'government speech,' with respect to which the Government may have
greater latitude in selecting content than otherwise permissible under the First Amendment.").
I1. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-64.
12. Id. at 559; see also id. at 564 n.7.
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face constitutes a government speech program, it was able to reject plain-
tiffs' arguments that the program compelled speech by a private entity or
that it compelled a private entity to subsidize another private entity's
message.13 Thus, the Court was able to take the case out of the Bar-
nette/Wooley14 line and to distinguish Abood/Keller.
15
Justice Souter's dissent in Johanns (joined by Justices Stevens and
Kennedy) raised two related but separate issues. First, for the govern-
ment to resist a First Amendment claim in this setting, it should have to
make clear the speech is its own.16 Second, if a reasonable viewer would
see the ads as coming from the private parties who were assessed money
for the ads, such parties should have a First Amendment claim based on
the combination of the compelled subsidy and the misattribution.' 7 These
are separate issues because there could be a case in which attribution is
murky, i.e., in which it is not clear whether the speech in question is
coming from the government or a private party (or both). In Johanns,
however, both aspects of Justice Souter's concern seemed to be met-the
USA had done nothing to make clear to the average viewer that the ads
were government speech, and such a viewer would almost certainly see
the ads as coming from the private beef producers.'
8
The Court responded as follows. It rejected Justice Souter's first
claim: if there is no misattribution to the private party, and if the speech
is formally the government's, that a reasonable viewer would not identify
the speech as such is insufficient to move the matter out of the govern-
ment speech category.' 9 It rejected Justice Souter's second argument by
saying it was confronted with a facial challenge only, and the statu-
tory/regulatory structure doesn't require misattribution. 20 The Court was
open to an as-applied challenge "if it were established ... that individual
beef advertisements were attributed to [the plaintiffs]. ' '21 But the trial
court had made no findings on this issue. Note well the Court didn't say
proof of misattribution would make out a First Amendment violation; it
13. Id. at 564-65, 565 n.8.
14. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); see also infra notes 52-83 and accompanying text.
15. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209 (1977); see also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 557-59; infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
16. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 571-72, 577-79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 572, 577-80.
18. Whether the average/reasonable viewer would attribute the ads to any specific beef pro-
ducer or producers was a tricky question. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
19. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564 n.7 ("[Plaintiffs] enjoy no right not to fund government
speech-whether by broad-based taxes or targeted assessments, and whether or not the reasonable
viewer would identify the speech as the government's.").
20. See id. at 564 n.7, 564-65. Souter responded, "But the challenge here is to the application
of the statute through actual, misleading ads, as shown by a record replete with examples." Id. at 577
n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 565 (majority opinion).
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only said such a theory "might (again, we express no view on the point)
form the basis for an as-applied challenge.,
22
What would be the nature of such a constitutional claim? The Court
says it "relates to compelled speech rather than compelled subsidy,"
2 3
while Justice Souter links the two, arguing that the violation is being
compelled to pay for speech that seems like yours when it's not.24 But
neither seems correct. As I'll explain below, Abood/Keller are indeed
about the combination of a compelled subsidy and resulting expression,
but they are not about misattribution. And a possible as-applied claim in
a Johanns-type case would not be about compelled speech, because if we
detach the subsidy from the speech (as the Court seems to say we should
do), then there is not even an arguable case that plaintiffs have been
compelled to speak (or carry the government's or a private party's mes-
sage). Rather, Justice Thomas, concurring, came closest to explaining the
constitutional harm if plaintiffs could show misattribution: "The gov-
ernment may not, consistent with the First Amendment, associate indi-
viduals or organizations involuntarily with speech by attributing an un-
wanted message to them, whether or not those individuals fund the
speech, and whether or not the message is under the government's con-
trol. 25
The right at stake is freedom of association; the violation is creating
a false image of one's beliefs and expression. To see how this has noth-
ing to do with the targeted assessment,26 consider this hypothetical: the
government produces ads out of general tax revenue, falsely associating
a specific beef producer with a generic beef message with which that
beef producer doesn't agree (say, because she believes her product is
superior to how people perceive beef product generally 27). The govern-
ment has harmed the specific beef producer by creating a false associa-
tion between it and a certain idea or expression. Despite the difference in
approach to such a claim among Souter, the Court, and Thomas, the Jus-
tices appear open to recognizing this kind of misattribution as the basis
for a constitutional claim. That the Court has not yet so held may reflect,
in part, a Paul v. Davis-like unease with recognizing a constitutional
claim for false speech by the government detached from any other claim
of harm. We might seek to overcome this unease with two observations.
First, mere falsity by the government could easily lead to harm if others
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 564-65.
24. See id. at 571-72 (Souter, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring).
26. Cf. Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v Livestock Marketing
Association, 2005 Sup. Cr. REV. 195, 207 n.64 ("[C]onstitutional issues raised by government
stealth do not depend upon whether government speech is funded by a general tax or by targeted
assessments.").
27. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 570-71 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing how plaintiffs ad-
vanced just such a concern).
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refuse to associate with you, and we might not believe the Constitution
requires you to wait until such harm occurs to have a cause of action (at
least for injunctive relief). Second, although you could conceivably rem-
edy the problem by loudly disclaiming the connection made by the false
attribution, why should that burden be on you, the citizen, rather than on
the government, who caused the problem to begin with?
The second case in which the Court appears open to recognizing
what I'd call a free-standing claim of cognizable constitutional harm
from government-caused misattribution is Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party.28 The State of Washington estab-
lished a new primary system, whereby candidates self-designate a party
preference, which is then listed on the ballot.29 Parties may separately
nominate their own candidates, but the top two vote-getters in the state-
run primary advance to the general election, regardless of self-designated
party preference and regardless of whom the parties have nominated.3 °
Plaintiffs' principal claim was based on freedom of association-voters
will assume (erroneously) that the political parties mentioned in the self-
designations actually back the self-designating candidates.3' In parallel
fashion to Johanns (although without citing Johanns), the Court rejected
the facial claim, concluding the electorate might be well-informed, in
part because of the possibility of disclaimers on the ballot.32 (No election
had been conducted pursuant to the new rules.)
In a concurrence joined by Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts rea-
soned that whether voters erroneously perceive the self-designations as
actual party preferences is relevant to the constitutional inquiry,33 citing
Dale and Hurley and distinguishing FAIR.34 Since this was a facial chal-
lenge, in advance of knowing how the actual ballots would look and how
an election would go, Justice Roberts agreed with the Court that no claim
was currently available.35 Interestingly, Justice Scalia dissented (joined
by Justice Kennedy). 36 He deemed the system one that compels associa-
tion between a political party and a candidate it hasn't endorsed, and thus
would invalidate the law on its face.37 Part of his opinion discussed likely
28. 552 U.S. 442 (2008).
29. Id. at 444.
30. Id. at 444, 453.
31. See id. at 454.
32. See id. at 454-58; see also id. at 457 n.9 ("We are aware of no case in which the mere
impression of association was held to place a severe burden on a group's First Amendment fights,
but we need not decide that question here.").
33. See id. at 459-60 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
34. See id. (referring to Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), Hurley v. Irish-Ameican
Gay, Lesbian and Bi-Sexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), and Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), all discussed at infra notes 70-82 and accompanying
text).
35. See Grange, 552 U.S. at 460-62 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
36. See id. at 462 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 462-64.
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confusion in this setting.38 I say "interestingly" because this is the same
Justice Scalia who was loath to accept the likelihood of confusion as part
of a facial challenge in Johanns!
Thus, Grange, like Johanns, suggests a constitutional claim for as-
applied proof that the government has falsely associated you with an idea
or expression or belief or other person with which or with whom you do
not wish to be associated. 39 This makes sense as a conception of freedom
of association, although that it doesn't follow directly from Bar-
nettelWooley (where the Court invalidated laws compelling one to speak
or carry a message) or from Abood/Keller (where the Court invalidated
laws compelling one to fund a private party's message), and that the
Court was reluctant in Davis/Constantineau to recognize a self-standing
claim of harm from government falsity, should make us cautious about
predictions. Note that a majority of Justices in Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette40 were open to finding an Establishment
Clause violation from private religious displays that a reasonable ob-
server would erroneously attribute to the state,4' and that even the Pinette
plurality was open to such a claim if the state fostered or encouraged
such a mistaken impression.42 Establishment Clause harm is not the same
as harm to freedom of association, but it's worth noting another area in
which misattribution might result in a constitutional claim.
There are still a few details to address. First, if the Court were to
find a freedom of association violation in an appropriate as-applied case,
it would have to resolve who the "reasonable" or "average" viewer is.
This issue divided the concurring and dissenting Justices in Pinette, with
Justice O'Connor more willing than Justice Stevens to attribute (!) know-
ledge about local history and context to such a viewer.43 How the Court
resolves this dispute will matter a great deal to how it proceeds with
freedom of association claims of the misattribution sort; if the Court at-
tributes too much knowledge about the formal legal-regulatory structure,
then there will never be an as-applied claim.
Second, the issue of who has a freedom of association claim re-
quires resolution. For example, who has a claim if a reasonable viewer
would attribute generic food ads to producers of the product generally,
rather than any specific producer? Maybe a trade association would have
a claim. Writing for the majority in Johanns, Justice Scalia pointed this
38. See id. at 467-68.
39. Cf Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REv. 1377, 1433 (2001) (anticipating this development).
40. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
41. See id. at 772-783 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment, joined by
Souter and Breyer, JJ.); id. at 797-816 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing).
42. See id. at 766 (plurality opinion).




out, concluding from the record there was insufficient evidence to show
association of any particular beef producer with the ads.44 This was an-
other interesting Scalia moment, coming in the context of otherwise re-
fusing to address the as-applied challenge because the trial court had
made no relevant findings.45
B. Misattribution in the Compelled Speech Cases
Neither Abood/Keller nor the Barnette/Wooley line of cases turns on
misattribution, although this is more apparent in the former than in the
latter. Abood and Keller, as originally explained and as discussed in Jo-
hanns,46 involve a specific and fairly unusual circumstance-one in
which the state compels a targeted group of persons to pay a fee that
goes, inter alia, to ideological activities of a private group. Because the
assessed persons don't have to say anything or carry anyone's message,
and because the private group's ideological speech doesn't identify the
assessed persons by name, there is no obvious route to misattribution.
Perhaps one could say, in Keller for example, "people who know I'm a
member of the California bar will associate me with the bar's ideological
speech." But now we're one step removed from the assessment, because
the association could be made between any California lawyer who's a
member of the state bar and the bar's ideological speech whether or not
dissenting members are assessed the relevant fees. Fees aside, there's no
right to stop the ideological speech of an organization of which you're a
48member when you're in the minority on the relevant issue.
Rather, the right infringed in Abood/Keller is freedom of association
without misattribution; it's a right to not have your money taken from
you by state compulsion and spent by a private group with whose mes-
sage you disagree.49 In Johanns the Court rejected any similar right if the
government is the spender/speaker. Precisely why your freedom of asso-
ciation is infringed if the government is transferring the assessed money
to a private group rather than spending it itself is a bit unclear.50 But this
44. See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 566 (2005); see also Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,471 (1997).
45. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 565-66.
46. See id. at 557-58.
47. See Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Inter-
ests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 15, 19, 28 (1983).
48. See id. at 21-22.
49. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13-14, 17 (1990) (discussing the concern with
compelled association); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232-37 (1977) (discussing
freedom of speech and freedom of association); see also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 557-58 (explaining
Abood and Keller without analysis); id. at 565 n.8 ("being forced to fund someone else's private
speech unconnected to any legitimate government purpose violates personal autonomy"); Howard
M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REV. 163, 167,
207 (2002).
50. See generally Post, supra note 26.
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is not a paper meant to justify AboodlKeller;51 it is enough to explain that
neither case turns on misattribution.
In the Barnette/Wooley line of cases, the Court has sometimes dis-
cussed misattribution, and sometimes not. It has sometimes deemed the
presence of misattribution important to striking down a law as unconsti-
tutional compelled speech, and sometimes not (and conversely for the
absence of misattribution). And sometimes its analysis seems just plain
wrong. I'll briefly canvass the case law here. One conclusion is that mis-
attribution is not a necessary condition for a constitutional claim in this
setting.52 As I analyze the cases, there was no real likelihood of errone-
ous attribution in Wooley or in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (PG&E),5 3 yet
the Court invalidated the compelled speech in those cases.
Barnette did not discuss misattribution; neither did Red Lion54 or
Miami Herald.55 In Wooley, then-Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, said we
wouldn't attribute New Hampshire's "Live Free or Die" motto to the
Maynards (or anyone driving a car with New Hampshire plates).56 The
majority didn't really respond. It talked about making the Maynards "an
instrument for fostering public adherence" 57 to an idea they don't like,
which isn't the same as saying a reasonable viewer would attribute the
"Live Free or Die" message to them. In response to a concern that the
holding would invalidate "In God We Trust" on coins and currency, the
Court said currency is passed from hand to hand and needn't be dis-
played to the public; in contrast, "an automobile ... is readily associated
with its operator." 58 This is different from saying the license plate motto
is attributed to the car owner or operator.
In PruneYard,59 the Court mentioned, as a factor in upholding Cali-
fornia's compelled access for private speakers in privately owned shop-
ping centers, that the views of the various speakers who take advantage
51. For a critique, see Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12-18
(2000).
52. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 579 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting there is still harm in the
BarnettelWooley line even if proper disclosure cured any misattributional harm). But cf Bezanson &
Buss, supra note 39, at 1433 (suggesting that in Barnette and Wooley "a reasonable observer will see
the ideas as that person's own") (emphasis added). For a discussion of "unwanted association" in the
compelled speech cases, see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Pledges, Parades, and Mandatory Payments, 52
RUTGERS L. REV. 123, 158-62 (1999). For more general skepticism about the harm from compelled
speech, see Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONsT. COMMENT. 147 (2006); Abner S.
Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 473-89 (1995). But see
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 Nw. U. L. REV.
839, 852-64 (2005) (discussing harms from compelled speech and association, specifically (1)
concern regarding the distortion of one's thinking process (cognitive dissonance), and (2) the effects
from lack of sincerity).
53. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
54. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
55. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
56. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,720-21 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 715 (majority opinion).
58. Id. at 717 n.15.
59. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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of the right of access "will not likely be identified with those of the own-
er,"6 adding that it's easy for a mall owner to post signs disavowing any
connection to the messages of such speakers.6' The status of the latter
point in compelled speech cases is questionable; as Justice Powell noted,
it puts the mall owner in a position of having to speak (to disavow) when
perhaps she would rather remain silent.62 And the former point, the key
one here, although clearly correct (the California rule turns private malls
into public forums, in which no particular view is attributed to the prop-
erty owner, public or private), failed to distinguish Wooley, unless one
believes the average viewer of a car with New Hampshire plates would
associate "Live Free or Die" with the car's driver. (Wooley differs in
other ways-the state is dictating a single message there, rather than
opening a type of public forum; carrying a message on one's car is dif-
ferent from opening one's mall to messages being spoken/displayed.)
In PG&E, the state forced the utility company to include private
party messages in the company's monthly billing envelopes, and required
a disclaimer that the messages were not those of PG&E.63 Despite the
required disclaimer, the Court (in striking down the compelled access
rule) expressed concern about forcing PG&E to associate with speech
with which it might disagree 64 and to "appear to agree' 65 with the views
of the group gaining access to the billing envelopes (or be "forced ... to
respond").66 But especially because the rule required the included mes-
sage to come with a disclaimer that the views were those of the private
party and not those of PG&E, why would anyone believe PG&E was
"agree[ing]" with the message?
In upholding cable television must-carry rules in the first TBS
67
case, the Court justified the result in part on this ground: "Given cable's
long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals, there appears
little risk that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations
carried on a cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the ca-
ble operator." 68 The point is similar to that in PruneYard: when govern-
ment is requiring a private property owner to open a kind of public forum
for other speakers, the average viewer won't associate any particular
message with the property owner.
69
60. Id. at 87.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 99 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 5, 7 (1986).
64. Seeid. at 15-16, 16n.11.
65. Id. at 15.
66. Id.; see also id. at 15 n. 11, 16.
67. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
68. Id. at 655.
69. See Greene, supra note 51, at 14.
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Hurley is the one case invalidating state action as compelled speech
in which misattribution analysis makes the most sense.70 The Supreme
Court invalidated the application of a Massachusetts law forbidding the
exclusion of a gay and lesbian group from a privately sponsored St. Pat-
ick's Day parade.7' Although in theory a reasonable viewer would know
the group was marching in the parade under compulsion of state law, and
thus wouldn't attribute the group's message to the parade organizers, the
Court sensibly reasoned otherwise. "[The group's] participation would
likely be perceived as having resulted from the Council's customary de-
termination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its message was
worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as well., 72 Further-
more:
Unlike the programming offered on various channels by a cable net-
work, the parade does not consist of individual, unrelated segments
that happen to be transmitted together for individual selection by
members of the audience. Although each parade unit generally identi-
fies itself, each is understood to contribute something to a common
theme, and accordingly there is no customary practice whereby pri-
vate sponsors disavow "any identity of viewpoint" between them-
selves and the selected participants. Practice follows practicability
here, for such disclaimers would be quite curious in a moving parade.
Without deciding on the precise significance of the likelihood of mis-
attribution, it nonetheless becomes clear that in the context of an ex-
pressive parade, as with a protest march, the parade's overall mes-
sage is distilled from the individual presentations along the way, and
each unit's expression is perceived by spectators as part of the
whole.
73
This is the most detailed and overt use of misattribution analysis in this
line of cases. Note that prior to Hurley, the Court had not "decid[ed] on
the precise significance of the likelihood of misattribution, 74 and it
hasn't done so since.
In Southworth,75 the Court correctly rejected the compelled subsidy-
speech argument, because student fees that go into a general pot of mon-
ey to fund various student groups (including those with ideological mes-
sages) would not be attributed to any particular assessed student. This is,
thus, similar to PruneYard and to TBS; the state has established a kind of
public forum (here a funding forum) and no view expressed in that forum
would be attributed either to the forum's owner or to any of its funders.
70. For discussion of some of the complexities of a misattribution analysis here, see Randall
P. Bezanson, Speaking Through Others' Voices: Authorship, Originality, and Free Speech, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983, 1013-14 (2003).
71. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 559, 581 (1995).
72. Id. at 575.
73. Id. at 576-77 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 577.
75. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
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Dale is a complex case 76 about compelled association in which the
Court discussed compelled speech as well. The core of its holding is that
the "presence" of an openly gay man as an assistant scoutmaster would
"force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members
and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a le-
gitimate form of behavior., 77 How this is so is baffling. Dale was not
advocating (or engaging in) homosexual conduct when he acted as assis-
tant scoutmaster, nor was he using that position as a bully pulpit for dis-
cussing gay rights. It is unclear how Dale's mere presence-under state
compulsion-as an assistant scoutmaster would force the Boy Scouts to
send any message, let alone that they "accept[] homosexual conduct.,
78
Despite my critique here (following Justice Stevens' dissent79), misattri-
bution does seem to play a key role in the holding.
Finally, FAIR represents one of the best and clearest uses of misat-
tribution analysis to reject a compelled speech claim. The Court turned
away law schools' contention that forcing them to permit military re-
cruiters on campus would falsely attribute the military's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy on gay men and lesbians to the schools. 80 The Court
cited PruneYard, concluding:
Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any
speech by recruiters, and nothing in the [law] restricts what the law
schools may say about the military's policies. We have held that high
school students can appreciate the difference between speech a
school sponsors and speech the school permits because legally re-
quired to do so, pursuant to an equal access policy. Surely students
have not lost that ability by the time they get to law school.
81
Rejecting misattribution because the reasonable viewer would appreciate
the speech was compelled-"legally required to do so" 8 -would place
in jeopardy prior holdings invalidating compelled speech, particularly
those where we can assume the reasonable viewer understands the
speech was compelled. Wooley and PG&E fall easily into this category;
Barnette and Hurley perhaps less so. There is no sense from FAIR,
though, that any precedent is in jeopardy; the "equal access policy" as-
pect of the case allows us to place it on the PruneYard/IBS/Southworth
side of the ledger.
76. See generally Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833
(2007); Shiffrin, supra note 52.
77. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 694, 697-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47, 65
(2006).
81. Id. (citations omitted).
82. Id.
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What should we conclude from the Court's treatment of misattribu-
tion in the compelled speech cases? Several things seem clear. First, if
the compulsion is to fund or open one's property to a plethora of speak-
ers (i.e., to help create a type of public forum), then misattribution won't
occur and a compelled speech claim won't lie. Thus, compelled speech
(or perhaps we should say compelled fostering of another's message) is
not sufficient for a constitutional claim. Second, even if misattribution
seems unlikely, as in Wooley and in PG&E, the Court will invalidate
compelled speech outside of the public forum-type settings, indicating
the harm from compelled speech goes beyond misattribution. (Although
whatever harm there is can be cured, as it were, if the case falls into the
creating-a-public-forum category.) This is also the best way to under-
stand Barnette, namely, that it turns not on an average viewer's attribut-
ing the sentiments of the pledge of allegiance to each schoolchild who
recites it, but rather on something else. What that something else is is a
complex matter, not the subject of this Essay.83 Third, that you can dis-
sent from the compelled speech, and thus disabuse any viewer of a pos-
sible association between you and the message, has been relevant in the
creating-a-public-forum compelled speech cases, but otherwise the Court
doesn't want to place the burden on the compelled speaker or message
fosterer to speak (even to dissent or disavow) when she might prefer to
remain silent. This matches my point in discussing a possible Jo-
hanns/Grange as-applied case, i.e., we might consider the possibility of
the individual's curing misattribution through "more speech" as an im-
proper shifting of the burden from the state, who created the problem.
(Note that if misattribution is not present, such as I claim it wasn't in
Wooley and PG&E, then it is a different matter to ask the individual to
disavow or dissent if she deems it necessary.)
HI. IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DEMAND THAT THE
GOVERNMENT OWN UP TO ITS EXPRESSION?
Does the government act unconstitutionally when it behaves as a
ventriloquist, throwing its voice through the dummy of others?84 Or is
such masking of government speech a concern of ideal political theory
and not of our Constitution? If such ventriloquism is unconstitutional, is
a right against it enforceable in court? If so, under what circumstances?
Or should we consider the matter part of the under-enforced Constitu-
tion?
The demand that government own up to its expression-e.g., that it
make clear its role in expressive choices it makes through conditional
83. See Greene, supra note 52, at 480-82, 483-84, 486-87 (critiquing Wooley and PG&E in
part because of the absence of misattribution and the possibility of simultaneous dissent/disavowal,
while supporting Barnette because of the autonomy interest in not using one's body to communicate
another's message).
84. See Greene, supra note 51, at 49-52.
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funding-is grounded in a basic conception of a republican form of gov-
ernment.85 Government, which operates through human beings we might
call agents, is responsible to the sovereign citizens, the principals. At
least this is so in the United States (at least in theory). The accountability
and responsibility of the agents to the principals is at the center of gov-
ernance through representation where the citizens are sovereign. To be
sure, much of our constitutional structure divides power to ensure against
any person or branch of government gaining too much power, and in so
doing makes the lines of accountability and responsibility murky.86
These are core, accepted aspects of our constitutional structure. But when
possible, within this structure, we want our government agents and enti-
ties to act transparently.
This concern applies to all government action in a republican form
of government, not just to government expression. And arguably we
should consider this a political theoretic norm or part of our under-
enforced Constitution.87 Part of the concern is with the grievances being
generalized; often, the complaint that a government agent or branch has
hidden the ball is a complaint we all share as U.S. citizens. The Court has
not allowed such claims to go forward, sometimes by invoking the case
or controversy requirement for standing in Article EE[ courts. 88 The better
explanation for many of these "generalized grievances" cases is that the
claimed rights don't exist in our Constitution, or if they do, that they
exist in an under-enforceable manner, to be worked out through poli-
85. Many scholars have stressed this in writing about government speech. See Bezanson &
Buss, supra note 39, at 1384, 1431-32, 1436, 1484-85, 1510; Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech:
When Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 666-67 (2008); Leslie
Gielow Jacobs, Who's Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 35, 57, 61, 63, 66 (2002) [hereinafter Jacobs, Who's Talking?]; Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free
Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discretion: The Example of Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L.
REV. 419, 452, 458 (2001); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1357, 1391 (2001) [hereinafter, Jacobs, Public Sensibilities]; Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Trans-
parency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005); Norton, supra note 1, at 591-92,
599-600; Helen Norton, Not for Attribution: Government's Interest in Protecting the Integrity of Its
Own Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1333 (2004); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler,
Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 565, 570 (1996). For some of
the complexities of insisting on government transparency, see Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Trans-
parency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006).
86. See Abner S. Greene, Discounting Accountability, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1489, 1504-05
(1997); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 123, 177-79 (1994).
87. Cf Lee, supra note 85, at 1040 (arguing transparency in government communications is
generally a constitutional ideal rather than an enforceable right). On the under-enforced Constitution,
see LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
PRACTICE 84-128 (2004); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). Here I do not parse the difference between
government transparency as a norm of political theory or as part of our under-enforced Constitution.
For my argument suggesting we have an aspirational Constitution and should not be drawing lines
between ideal political theory and the Constitution, see Abner S. Greene, Can We Be Legal Positiv-
ists Without Being Constitutional Positivists?, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401 (2005).
88. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215-16 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974).
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tics. 89 If we all share the injury, and if channels of political change re-
main open, arguably courts are not needed as a corrective. These are not
situations of protecting discrete and insular minorities or rights of politi-
cal participation, where we believe independent judges have a key role to
play.9°
For government's masking of its expression to be actionable (and I
include both deliberate masking and more inadvertent failure to dis-
close), we should require the masking to have caused some otherwise
cognizable constitutional harm. The two best and most discussed exam-
ples are Johanns and Rust v. Sullivan.91 In Johanns, the argument is the
U.S. should not be able to invoke government speech and move the case
out of a possible freedom of association claim unless it clearly owns up
to its role in the beef ads. That would accomplish two things-it would
make the government accountable for its actions (the beef program, the
ads, etc.), and it would disassociate from the ad's content any beef pro-
ducer who might otherwise be so associated. By claiming government
speech but hiding behind ads that appear to be those of private parties,
the U.S. avoids accountability while simultaneously creating a false as-
sociation between the message and certain private parties.
In Rust, doctors receiving federal Title X money to provide family
planning services to indigent women were prevented by federal regula-
tion from counseling such women about abortion or referring them to
abortion providers.92 In upholding the regulation against statutory and
constitutional challenges, the Court invoked a version of the government
speech doctrine:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative pro-
gram which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so do-
ing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint;
it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other.
93
89. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849), is sometimes cited for the proposition that Guarantee
Clause questions-pertaining to Article IV, Section 4, "[Ihe United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a republican form of govemment"-are nonjusticiable. Luther dealt with an
unusual and narrow set of facts, though, and can't by itself be understood as precluding all judicial
recourse under the Guarantee Clause. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-26 (1962).
90. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Arguably,
though, lack of government transparency blocks the channels of political change and thus should not
be cordoned off as a political question.
91. 500 U.S. 173 (1991); see also, e.g., Lee, supra note 85, at 1042-52; Norton, supra note 1,
at 628-3 1.
92. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-81.
93. Id. at 193.
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While recognizing some limits to conditional funding-such as tradi-
tional public forums and public universities94-the Court said even if the
doctor-patient relationship might also be protected from alteration via
funding conditions,
the Title X program regulations do not significantly impinge upon the
doctor-patient relationship. Nothing in them requires a doctor to rep-
resent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold. Nor is the
doctor-patient relationship established by the Title X program suffi-
ciently all encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of
the patient of comprehensive medical advice. The program does not
provide postconception medical care, and therefore a doctor's silence
with regard to abortion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a
client into thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an ap-
propriate option for her. The doctor is always free to make clear that
advice regarding abortion is simply beyond the scope of the program.
In these circumstances, the general rule that the Government may
choose not to subsidize speech applies with full force.
95
Because people expect their doctors to be free to discuss a range of med-
ical options, if a patient--especially an indigent one who likely has no
other medical assistance-hears a doctor discuss childbirth and adoption
as options but hears nothing about abortion as an option, she might con-
clude that the doctor does not consider abortion a good option. Her con-
stitutionally protected choice-whether or not to carry the fetus to
term-thus will not be knowingly made. We generally think of the exer-
cise, and the waiver, of a constitutional right as something that must be
made knowingly and voluntarily. Even if women in this setting are not
coerced, and thus their choices are voluntary, arguably they have been
misled by the government-paid doctors into exercising their constitu-
tional right unknowingly. That the regulation doesn't require the doctor
to lie about her own views, and that it permits her to say "advice regard-
ing abortion is simply beyond the scope of the program," is a far cry
from disclosure of the government's role in truncating the normal doctor-
patient conversation. 96 Thus, the combination of the lack of government
transparency plus the hit to a woman's substantive due process rights
arguably should have led to an actionable claim in Rust.
I will make two final points here. First, the toughest question arising
from the above analysis is whether the availability of abortion-related
information outside the Title X setting-even from the very same doc-
tors, so long as they keep their non-Title X practice "'physically and
financially separate' from prohibited abortion activities --means that a
94. See id. at 199-200.
95. Id. at 200.
96. Id.; see, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,
1017 (1995).
97. Rust, 500 U.S. at 180.
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woman's abortion-related choice could still be sufficiently knowing to
satisfy constitutional standards. 98 Second, what sort of government
speech would be satisfactory to remedy the problem raised here? Would
it suffice to place a sign above the clinic saying "You are now entering a
government-funded facility. The information you are about to receive has
been dictated by the U.S. government, and represents the viewpoint of
the U.S. government only"? 99 Or should each doctor have to say some-
thing similar to each patient, and also be required to state she may have
different views regarding the woman's choices that she is not allowed to
communicate in this setting?
1I1. WHEN AND HOW MAY THE GOVERNMENT SEEK TO AVOID
EXPRESSION BEING IMPROPERLY ATTRIBUTED TO IT?
In theory, when compulsion is involved, there should be no misat-
tribution. In the compelled speech cases, assuming perfect knowledge of
the law, we should never falsely associate the speaker or message carrier
with the compelled speech, because it was compelled and not chosen.'
°°
(In that setting, though, as we have seen, something else is motivating
the Court to invalidate the compelled speech laws. Some of the cases
arguably involve imperfect information and resulting misattribution
(Hurley is the best example), but even where it's clear the speech is un-
der compulsion, being compelled to utter or carry the government's or
someone else's message causes harm, though not of the misattribution
sort, or so the Court has held.) Likewise, when the Constitution or other
law requires the state to keep its hands off messages and speakers, then,
again assuming perfect information, there should be no misattribution,
this time of a private party's message to the state. Take the two most
obvious settings in which this is so. When, for example, the state of Tex-
as lets Gregory Johnson go free for expressive flag burning, because the
U.S. Supreme Court says the First Amendment requires it,'0 we
shouldn't attribute Johnson's expression to Texas. The same is true for
any private speech act the government doesn't regulate because the Con-
stitution says it may not do so. And when a city permits all sorts of odi-
ous speakers to have their say in a municipal park, we shouldn't attribute
any of the speech to the city, because the Constitution requires that parks
be open on a content-neutral basis. Governmental entities are compelled
98. For discussions of this difficult question, see Bezanson & Buss, supra note 39, at 1396-
1401; Greene, supra note 51, at 28-29; Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 168-
76. (1996).
99. Greene, supra note 51, at 50; see also Carole I. Chervin, The Title X Family Planning Gag
Rule: Can the Government Buy Up Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 401, 428 (1989).
100. See Greene, supra note 52, at 473-75.
101. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
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by the Constitution to permit speech they don't like, and in the public
forum setting are compelled to foster it-to provide a platform for it.'
0 2
Things get more complex when we drop compulsion out of the pic-
ture. In certain settings, the state has a constitutionally legitimate interest
in making content-based decisions to advance some ideas and not others,
and as a result we properly attribute the resulting expression to the state.
For example, in the "government as educator" setting, we give signifi-
cant deference to the state's desire to advance certain ideas, and thus we
correctly see the pedagogical choices as those of the state (or its agents).
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier10 3 is best understood as support-
ing such a rule of deference and concomitant association-attribution. The
state's interest in content-based decision-making, and thus controlling
the resulting attribution, also arises in core government speech examples
(speeches by government officials, agency statements on public health
and safety, etc.) and in some examples that might seem less central. For
example, consider government's decision to place a motto on state li-
cense plates or to issue commemorative stamps with images of certain
people, events, or institutions. 104 These are also examples of government
control of expression we are happy to consider government speech rather
than the provision of a public forum and thus where government may
make content-based choices and be associated with the expression that
results. Even some specialty license plate programs, where the state ap-
proves some and not other messages to be placed along with the state
name and license plate letters, may be seen as examples of government
speech, where the state chooses to be associated with some and not other
messages. Note carefully, though, that the government's interest in
choosing the ideas and messages it wants to advance, and thus being
associated with those and not other ideas and messages, follows from our
understanding that the Constitution doesn't otherwise restrict content-
based decision-making. If it did-for example, if we understood the First
Amendment to require commemorative stamps to be subject to a random
drawing for which images get placed on the stamps-then it would be
102. 1 put aside the complex question of a governmental entity that closes all of its public parks
and turns all of its public thoroughfares over to private control. Cf Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377
U.S. 218 (1964); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). But cf Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S.
217 (1971). For recent discussion of some problems arising on this public-private margin, see Nel-
son Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70 (2009),
http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/colloquy/2009/30/LRCo112009n3Tebbe.pdf.
103. 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (deferring to school principal's content-based editorial decisions for
the school newspaper, produced through the journalism class).
104. In addition to commemorative stamps, the U.S. Postal Service allows privately produced
and printed stamps for regular mail, subject to the following:
The material must be consistent with the Postal Service's intent to maintain neutrality on
religious, social, political, legal, moral, or other public issues.... The material must not
harm the public image, reputation, or goodwill of the Postal Service and must not be oth-
erwise derogatory or detrimental to the Postal Service's interest.
USPS DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL § 604.4.3.3(d)(1), (4) (Feb. 1, 2010). This is an example of the
kind of opening of a platform for private speech subject to significant content-based restrictions that
I discuss below.
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wrong to attribute any message associated with the image to the govern-
ment.
Now consider hard cases that appear to fall between government
speech and government as regulator; cases such as vanity license plates
(where the individual selects her own license plate identifying letters),
adopt-a-highway programs and signs, and ads on public transit buses and
subways. If the state's primary interest in these cases were in avoiding
association with certain messages or speakers, the easiest route would be
if the Constitution required these speech venues to be treated as public
forums. Then it would be the Constitution and not the state that would be
permitting (in fact, requiring) that the messages be displayed. Perhaps we
could invoke a concern with imperfect information, i.e., that the average
viewer would not understand the speech is only present under compul-
sion. But the state could take steps to enlighten the public. And although
private party should not have the burden of clearing up misattribution
caused by the state, the state has no similar claim when the misattribution
is caused by public misunderstanding of when the state is forced by law
to allow expression.
I suggest the primary state interest in these settings in maintaining
content-based control over vulgarity, indecency, hate speech, and politi-
cally odious speakers is to refrain from providing a platform for such
speech. The state wants to avoid turning such speech venues into public
forums (even though the attribution/association/imprimatur problem
would then disappear). If we treat these speech venues as properly sub-
ject to state content-based decision-making, then, and only then, should
the state have an attribution issue to deal with, because only then is it
making choices about expression, and only then may the expression it
permits be in some sense attributed to it. The state may have reasons for
permitting some expression other than agreement with the message,
though. At least we can say the state tolerates the message or doesn't
consider it the kind of message for which it would be harmful to provide
a platform. The same is true when the state chooses not to regulate (or
chooses to under-regulate) in one of the content-based categories--e.g.,
obscenity, libel, fighting words-in which the Court has held it may re-
gulate. But saying the state doesn't want, for example, vulgar vanity li-
cense plates or KKK adopt-a-highway signs because it doesn't want to
be associated with such speech or to give such speech the state's impri-
matur is the tail wagging the dog. 10 5 The state doesn't want these mes-
105. Many scholars point to the state's concern in these cases with attribution, association,
endorsement, imprimatur, and legitimation. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 39, at 1477 (discuss-
ing adopt-a-highway signs; agreeing the KKK's message wouldn't be attributed to the state, but still
saying "the State could be understood to legitimate the Klan through its endorsement, not necessarily
sharing the Klan's policies or prior history but attesting to its rehabilitation in a new form"); Corbin,
supra note 85, at 647-62 (arguing one problem with viewing these hard cases as private speech is
the government may still be seen as approving/endorsing/tolerating that speech and is therefore
concerned with the resulting association/attribution/imprimatur); Id. at 686-87 (arguing even if we
850 [Vol. 87:4
(MIS)A ITRIBUTION
sages out there at all; it can't control them through its general regulatory
powers or in public forums, but it wants to create new speech opportuni-
ties without offering a platform for these disliked messages.
The key predicate question, then, is not whether the state has an in-
terest in not giving its imprimatur to certain speech in certain settings.
Rather, it's whether we can sensibly treat these hard cases as limited
public forums,'0 6 pursuant to which the state may open a new avenue for
expression while making content-based exclusions. The question is diffi-
cult, because these are not the kind of managerial domains of which Ro-
bert Post writes.10 7 Our background understandings of these settings
don't dictate giving the state content-based (and perhaps even viewpoint-
based) discretion. And these aren't instances of government as educator
or as patron of the arts. Perhaps we could say these are "government as
editor" cases, but that is a bit of a stretch, since the state isn't producing a
newspaper or television or radio show or website.
So we are left with the difficult issue whether we have to treat these
new-fangled speech opportunities as we treat classic public forums. We
treat streets and parks as public forums subject to normal free speech
rules because of their history, their compatibility with all kinds of
speech, a cultural need for public space in which all can meet and wit-
ness and share ideas, 10 8 and the temporary nature of the speech we permit
in streets and parks. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum' °9 made an impor-
tant point here. The basic holding is that when the government decides
which monuments shall be placed and fixed to the ground in state-owned
parks, it doesn't have to play by public forum rules.' 0 This holding is not
about a concern with limited physical space and thus the need to make
some inclusion/exclusion judgments. (If that were our main concern, we
could run a lottery to decide which monuments go up.) And, somewhat
more controversially, despite what Summum says, we don't have to see a
view these hard cases as mixed public/private speech, the state might still be concerned with en-
dorsement and association); Norton, supra note I, at 597, 614 (providing examples of private parties
seeking government imprimatur in several of the settings discussed here); Norton, supra note 85, at
1320, 1341-48 (defending government's concern with misattribution, endorsement, imprimatur, and
the like in several of the settings discussed here).
106. I don't want to get caught up in semantics here. I am using "limited public forum" to
mean new speech opportunities the government opens up, limited either affirmatively (e.g., "we're
funding dog paintings only" or "this is a theater for musicals only") or negatively, such as the con-
cerns I discuss in the text.
107. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 199-267 (1995); Post, supra note 98, at 164-76.
108. See, e.g., David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutral-
ity in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 718 (1992). For helpful discussion of the
relationship between public forum doctrine and government speech, see Steven Shiffrin, Govern-
ment Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 572-88 (1980).
109. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). For insightful commentary on free speech issues raised by Sum-
mum, see Joseph Blocher, Property and Speech in Summum, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 83
passim (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/31/
LRColl2009n31Blocher.pdf; Tebbe, supra note 102, at 70-74.
110. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129, 1138.
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municipality's inclusion/exclusion decisions about fixed monuments as
government speech to validate its discretion. Rather, we might expand
our conception of what a limited public forum may be. Just as the state
may wish to avoid vulgarity, indecency, hate speech, and politically odi-
ous speakers when it speaks on its own behalf, so may it wish to do so
when it provides opportunities for private speech, outside the setting of
the kinds of temporary, in-person speech it must permit in traditional
public forums.' It's not just that monuments generally raise a greater
risk of attribution to the state than does temporary in-person speech; it's
that monuments (and fixed displays, temporary or otherwise, such as
vanity license plates, adopt-a-highway signs, and transit ads) offer a po-
tentially more harmful and culturally insidious platform for messages
and speakers than does temporary in-person speech. Establishment
Clause issues aside, we should see these government decisions as choices
properly subject to content-based decision-making, with limits.
Permitting the state to restrict vulgarity and indecency in the speech
venues under discussion here makes sense. Such speech is still permitted
privately and in traditional public forums. Despite their virtues (some
would say arguable but I'm fine with agreeing they exist), vulgarity and
indecency also harm, and creating a non-vulgar, non-indecent vanity
plate, adopt-a-highway, or transit ads program properly balances the cre-
ation of new speech opportunities with preventing offense to the sensi-
bilities of many. This makes sense even if we don't consider the speech
that of the government.
111. These concerns with specific types of content-based harm might not have sufficed to
uphold Pleasant Grove's decision to reject Summum's monument, and thus only by deeming the
decision government speech could we approve of the Court's holding. For a discussion of the malle-
ability of public forum doctrine, see Greene, supra note 51, at 61-67. The discussion that follows
shares a great deal of common ground with Corbin, supra note 85 and Jacobs, Public Sensibilities,
supra note 85. For arguments that would seemingly reject the discussion that follows, see Jacobs,
Who's Talking?, supra note 85, at 88-105 (setting up an either/or world: either speech is the gov-
ernment's in one way or another and therefore it is okay to make viewpoint distinctions, or it is
private speech and subject to standard public forum rules); Norton, supra note I, at 602-03 (tradi-
tional free speech analysis applies when government declines to claim speech as its own as a formal
matter, even in these hard case settings); id. at 622-24 (specific adopt-a-highway program doesn't
satisfy functional government speech test; thus, apparently relegated to private speech status and
traditional free speech principles); id. at 627-28 (stating that selling commemorative bricks to be
fixed at public school is not government speech and thus is subject to traditional public forum analy-
sis; while I agree the per se exclusion of religious references was probably invalid, the school should
have the kind of content-based flexibility I discuss in the text); Norton, supra note 85, at 1333, 1341,
1349-50 (arguing government may defend some of these hard cases by adopting the speech as its
own, but if government is not speaking then traditional free speech principles including public forum
principles apply); Redish & Kessler, supra note 85, at 546-47 (would disapprove my position here,
deeming it a viewpoint-based subsidy and not a matter of judgmental necessity). See also Randall P.
Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and Government Speech Selection
Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953, 992-94 (1998) (permitting leeway when government itself is
speaking, but applying standard free speech rules otherwise; it is not clear how the argument would
apply to cases such as vanity plates, adopt-a-highway signs, and transit ads, if we agree with my
proposition that the government isn't advancing its own message in these settings).
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More complicated are exclusions of certain political messages or
groups, like saying no to racial hate speech or to groups such as the KKK
or Nazi Party. The concerns here should not be the positive ones of
speech theory-autonomy, participation in public affairs, and opening a
marketplace of ideas-because we're leaving open purely private speech
and traditional public forums and because the speech value to harm cal-
culus should be different in the state-created speech forums under discus-
sion here. Our principal concern should be with "negative theory,"" 2
namely, that we might distrust the state's ability to make sufficiently
politically neutral judgments. That said, again I would suggest viewing
these forums as subject to relaxed speech rules, and allowing the kind of
more common mainstream understanding of what's harmful to permit
exclusions. We can run the greater risk of harm from hateful/odious
speech when dealing with purely private speech and traditional public
forums; we can run the greater risk of government merely playing favor-
ites in its newly created, limited speech forums.
For both sets of exclusions-vulgarity/indecency and hate-
ful/odious-although we're not deferring because the government is
speaking or because its motivating interest is in avoiding association or
attribution, some of the reasons we defer to government content-based
speech are at play here, as well. When the government isn't acting as
regulator, it has a role to play in shaping public culture, and inevitably
that shaping will track mainstream sensibility. So long as the state's
choices are transparent and its regulatory and public-forum administra-
tion roles properly limited, we should permit it to exercise other pow-
ers-both of speech and of platform-providing-in ways that better
match majoritarian sensibilities." 3
CONCLUSION
I conclude with four points. First, the Court has decided a set of
cases in which public schools or universities opened up either physical
space for speech activity or administered a special set of dollars for
speech activity." 4 The Court's rulings in these cases have been: (1) ex-
cluding religious speech in these settings violates the Free Speech
Clause; and (2) permitting such speech doesn't violate the Establishment
Clause." 5 The Court's language shifts in these cases from treating the
forums as akin to streets and parks, in which standard free speech rules
112. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 80-85 (1982).
113. See Greene, supra note 51, 2-6.
114. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (the one case in which the
predicate wasn't a free speech holding but rather a federal access statute); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981).
115. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46; Lamb's Chapel, 508
U.S. at 393, 395; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253; Widnar, 454 U.S. at 277.
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apply, to acknowledging some content-based restrictions (but not view-
point restrictions) would be permissible if reasonably related to the na-
ture of the forum. It's not important for this Essay precisely how to char-
acterize this line of cases-whether they're best seen as acknowledging a
type of forum that once the state opens it must treat as it does streets and
parks, or whether they're best seen as still leaving a fair bit of discretion
for the state to make subject-matter restrictions. Either way, two points
from these cases are clear and relevant here: (1) viewpoint restrictions
are invalid however one characterizes these forums; and (2) the Court
has not dealt with a case in which the state opens a fairly broadly de-
scribed speech forum and seeks to preclude not religious speech, but
rather vulgar and indecent speech, or speech that we might deem hateful
or odious.
Second, if one agrees the state should be permitted to open the kinds
of forums discussed in this part of the paper (vanity license plates, adopt-
a-highway signs, and transit ads) and exclude vulgar, indecent, hateful,
and politically odious speech, then one either has to deem these not
viewpoint-based or be open to revising the doctrine. The latter is the
more accurate and better way to go. 16
Third, certain types of viewpoint restrictions in these intermediate-
type forums should, nonetheless, be constitutionally problematic. Con-
sider examples such as permitting Pro-Life vanity plates (or adopt-a-
highway signs or transit ads) while rejecting Pro-Choice messages. If the
state wants to adopt Pro-Life (or vice versa) as its own message or motto,
it may do so, even though the matter is one of current social contest.' 17
But in these limited public forums, content-based decisions should be
meant to advance widely shared values, such as those against vulgarity,
indecency, hate speech, and odious political views. Permitting one side
or the other of the abortion debate to use one of these speech platforms
doesn't seek to prevent the kind of harm the state believes exists from
vulgar, hateful, or odious speech.
Fourth, the state may, and perhaps should, make subject-matter ex-
clusions to avoid possible controversy in these forums. This is one way
of understanding and affirming Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, in
which the Court upheld the city's permitting commercial advertising but
not political speech in its transit ads.' 18 An advantage of this method is
that it renders moot the need to decide which political views are odious
(KKK, Nazi, etc.), a matter of central concern to negative theory.
116. See Greene, supra note 51, at 31-40, for my related discussion of viewpoint discrimina-
tion in government speech.
117. See Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1667, 1669-70 (2001); Greene, supra note 51, at 2-6.
118. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
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WHAT THE ABORTION DISCLOSURE CASES SAY ABOUT
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PERSUASIVE GOVERNMENT
SPEECH ON PRODUCT LABELS
LESLIE GIELOW JACOBS t
INTRODUCTION
In Malaysia, it's a diseased lung.' In Thailand, it's skulls floating
behind the smoker.2 In Brazil, it's a dead fetus lying among cigarette
butts.3 "In New Zealand, it's a gangrenous foot."4 In the United States,
it's going to be the same type of color graphics, along with pointed warn-
ings, covering the top half of the cigarette package. 5 And tobacco labels
are just the tip of the iceberg. Alcohol vendors already must include
warnings on their labels, 6 the new national health reform legislation re-
quires that fast food chains post calorie counts on signs and menus, 7 and
proposals continue to surface to mandate "cigarette-style" warnings on a
range of other products because they pose a public health danger. Prod-
ucts targeted for warning labels, both here and abroad, include sugary
sodas, violent video games, cell phones, sun beds, butter, cheese, foods
children consume which contain artificial coloring that may increase
hyperactivity, and vacation travel because it results in global warming.
8
t Professor and Director, Capital Center for Public Law & Policy, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law. Thanks to Abner Greene and Helen Norton for their helpful comments on
a draft of a related article. Thanks to Mike Claiborne and Rebecca Whitfield for their excellent
research assistance.
I. Ranit Mishori, Packing a Heavier Warning; Elsewhere, Cigarette Boxes Bear Graphic
Evidence of Smoking's Ill Effects; U.S. Labels Will Soon Do the Same, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2009, at
HEI.
2. Miranda Hitti, Cigarette Warnings: Is Bigger Better?, CBS NEWS.COM, Feb. 6, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2007/02/06/health/webmd/main2439660.shtml.
3. Mishori, supra note 1, at HEI.
4. Id.
5. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act requires that the Secretary of
Health and Human Services issue guidelines no later than June 2011 requiring color graphics depict-
ing the health effects of smoking to accompany label warnings. See Act of June 22, 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-31, § 201(d), 123 Stat. 1776, 1845 (2009) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)).
6. See MICHAELS. WOGALTER, HANDBOOK OF WARNINGS 669-85 (2006).
7. Stephanie Rosenbloom, Calorie Data to be Posted at Most Chains, N.Y. TIMES, March
24, 2010, at B 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com2010/03/24/business/24menu.html.
8. See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Joe Baca, Rep. Baca Introduces Legislation to
Make Violent Video Games Sold With Health Warning Label (Jan. 7, 2009) ("Warning: Excessive
exposure to violent video games and other violent media has been linked to aggressive behavior."),
available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ca43_baca/videogamehealth_010709.html; Press
Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, CSPI Calls on FDA to Require Health Warnings on Sodas
(July 13, 2005), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/20050713l.html ("To help protect your
waistline and your teeth, consider drinking diet sodas or water."); Daily Mail Online, Dairy Products
to Carry Cigarette-Style Health Warnings as Government Uses 'Shock Tactics', MAIL ONLINE,
March 3, 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-52493]/Dairy-products-carry-cigarette-
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Of course, producers protest the labeling requirements and, fre-
quently, succeed in defeating proposed regulation.9 But sometimes they
don't; and then, increasingly, they go to court, arguing that the Constitu-
tion protects the integrity of their commercial message from government
imposed speech.' 0 Specifically, cigarette sellers contend that, even if the
purpose is public protection, Congress cannot force them "to disseminate
a Government-drafted anti-tobacco message" or to "stigmatize their own
product on their own packaging."' 1 The district court hearing the ciga-
rette sellers' case has rejected this part of their challenge, 12 but the parties
will likely appeal. And other challenges to new labeling requirements
will surely follow.
One may have thought this battle was over, given the ubiquity of
product disclosure requirements and the fact that more cautious and less
eye-catching cigarette package warnings have been in place for over 40
years. 13 Furthermore, even though the Court has elevated product adver-
tising to a category of constitutionally protected speech, early on it sig-
naled that its skepticism would be directed primarily toward regulations
that restricted the free flow of commercial speech 14 and that it would
accord more deferential review to requirements that vendors disclose
additional information along with their own speech.15
style-health-wamings-Government-uses-shock-tactics.htm (England's Food Standards Agency
considered and rejected a proposal to put warnings on cheese and butter); Kate Devlin, Sunbeds
'Should Carry Cigarette-Style Health Warnings', TELEGRAPH, June 20, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/5579038/Sunbeds-should-carry-cigarette-style-health-
warnings.html; Liane Katz, Call For Cigarette-Style Warnings for Flights, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, April
5, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/travel/2007/apr/05/travelnews.green.cheapflights; SnackCheck,
The Twenty Worst Snacks, http://www.snackcheck.co.uk/2566/bottom-20-snacks/ (last visited June
3, 2010) ("In July 2010, the [European Union] will make it mandatory to put cigarette-style labels on
products that include these colourings [that the Hyperactive Children's Support Group recommends
againsti."); Posting of Michelle Quinn to The Bay Area, S.F. May Require Warnings About Cell-
phone Radiation, http://bayarea.blogs.nytimes.com2009/1 2/23/sf-may-require-warnings-about-
cellphone-radiation (Dec. 23, 2009, 5:40 PM).
9. See, e.g., Press Release, Wash. Legal Found., WLF Opposes Efforts By Food Police
Targeting Soft Drink Beverages, Dec. 16, 2005 (explaining comments filed with Food and Drug
Administration opposing proposed labeling requirement).
10. See infra Part I.C (discussing recent lower court disclosure requirement decisions).
11. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief 39, 51, Commonwealth
Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. I:09-CV-117-M) (plain-
tiffs include: Commonwealth Brands, Inc.; Conwood Co., LLC; Discount Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Co.; National Tobacco Co.; and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.).
12. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 529-30 (W.D. Ky.
2010).
13. The 1964 Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health led to enactment of the
FCLAA in 1965, which required that health warnings be included on cigarette packages. Lindsey v.
Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dep't, 195 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute and its
amendments represented a compromise between health proponents and tobacco interests. NAT'L
CANCER INST., MONOGRAPH 19: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN PROMOTING AND REDUCING TOBACCO
USE 301-03 (2008).
14. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 755
(1976).
15. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
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But things are changing across the free speech landscape. Recently,
the Supreme Court has rendered decisions that interpret the free speech
guarantee more expansively to protect commercial
16 and corporate 17
speakers from government regulations that restrict their speech. The re-
curring and unresolved question is whether and how these changes in the
jurisprudence of speech restrictions will modify the authority of govern-
ments to achieve their legitimate regulatory objectives by means of in-
formation disclosure requirements imposed on commercial speech. All of
the current Supreme Court justices agree that governments have the con-
stitutional authority to require commercial speakers to publish some re-
levant facts when the government purpose is to supplement advertising
that would otherwise be false, misleading, or have the potential to mis-
lead consumers.' 8 But countering the potential for consumer deception
has never been the only purpose that disclosure requirements have
served.19 Increasingly, government regulators require disclosure along
with commercial speech to counter the potential for consumer persuasion
as well. That is, governments select information and require its disclo-
sure not only to aid the rational, self-interested decision making of indi-
vidual consumers, but also to influence the consumer's decision making
in a way that serves a broader public interest.20 Consequently, that broad-
er public interest may well be reducing demand for the lawful product on
which the information disclosure must appear. In the context of speech
restraints, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that governments may
not constitutionally engage in the. "paternalism" of restricting truthful
commercial speech that individual consumers may hear, when the pur-
pose of that restriction is to reduce demand for a lawful product. 21 Left
uncertain is whether the Court's constitutional interpretations that limit
16. See infra Part I (discussion of commercial speech).
17. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (pre-election
corporate spending is constitutionally protected from federal regulation).
18. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1341 (2010) (up-
holding federal statutory requirement that law firms offering bankruptcy services "include certain
information about its bankruptcy-assistance and related services" because the requirement was
"'reasonably related to the [Government's] interest in preventing deception of consumers' (quoting
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)); Id. 1343 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging the Court's
"longstanding assumption that a consumer-fraud regulation that compels the disclosure of certain
factual information in advertisements may intrude less significantly on First Amendment interests
than an outright prohibition on all advertisements that have the potential to mislead").
19. See Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555,
584 (2006) ("[C]ommercial speech is routinely and pervasively compelled for reasons that have little
to do with the prevention of deception."); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes,
and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 123, 125-27 (1996).
20. The new cigarette package labeling mandate makes obvious the persuasive objectives that
underpin, at least in part, many disclosure requirements imposed to advance public purposes in the
modern marketplace. It is indeed difficult to deny that the new labeling mandate is "plainly intended
to deliver a visually striking, attention-grabbing anti-smoking message." Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctive Relief 153, Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d
512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09-CV-1 17-M).
21. For a discussion of the anti-paternalism trend in the Court's commercial speech jurispru-
dence, see infra Part I.C.2.
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regulators' abilities to restrict commercial speech because consumers
may find it persuasive also apply to contract government discretion to
impose commercial speech disclosure requirements for the same public
purpose of reducing demand and because of the same presumption about
the potentially persuasive effect of unsupplemented speech.
Yet this apparent uncertainty in the commercial speech jurispru-
dence has an odd and inconsistent counterpart. At the same time that
members of the Court have suggested disclosure requirements imposed
on commercial speech for purposes other than preventing consumer de-
ception may be constitutionally suspect, in the entirely analogous context
of the abortion service transaction, the Court has applied deferential ra-
tional basis review to uphold selective and persuasive disclosure re-
quirements that were imposed for purposes other than correcting poten-
tially misleading speech.22 Although the Court's plurality analysis with
respect to the Free Speech Clause analysis' application to "informed con-
sent" to abortion requirements was terse, the lower courts have parsed,
expanded, and relied upon it.23 In light of the Court's changing jurispru-
dence, it is not clear what level of scrutiny should apply to the emerging
genre of informational and persuasive disclosure requirements that the
new cigarette labels exemplify. What is clear is that there is no difference
between the speakers' Free Speech Clause rights in the two lines of cases
that should lead to a different judicial analysis of government disclosure
requirements imposed on them. So long as the informed consent to abor-
tion jurisprudence remains unchanged, it is controlling in the context of
commercial speech disclosures. 24 Deferential rational basis scrutiny ap-
plies to judicial evaluations of information disclosure mandates imposed
on product labels and other types of commercial speech, even if the gov-
ernment's purpose is something other than preventing consumer decep-
tion and even if the information is obviously selected and presented to
persuade.
Part I situates disclosure requirements within the framework the
Court has developed to evaluate government regulations of commercial
speech. Part 1H describes the different law that courts have developed to
evaluate disclosure requirements imposed on the abortion procedure. Part
I points out that what courts tend to treat as different lines of cases-
compelled commercial speech and abortion disclosure-in fact involve
the same type of government action imposed on the same category of
22. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) ("To be sure, the phy-
sician's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medi-
cine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitutional infirmity
in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.") (citations
omitted).
23. See infra Part l.B.
24. See infra Part Ill.
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speech, and so the Free Speech Clause analysis applied to each must be
the same.
I. THE LAW OF GOVERNMENT MANDATED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DISCLOSURES
Government entities at all levels mandate that certain information
appear on product labels. These include Congress, 25 a number of federal
government agencies,26 state legislatures,27 state agencies,28 and city
councils and agencies. 29 California voters imposed a labeling require-
ment by voter initiative. 30 Product sellers have always used the political
process to fight labeling requirements, and have often succeeded. 3' Only
fairly recently have they begun to use the Free Speech Clause as a direct
means of challenging information disclosure requirements. 32 These chal-
lenges rely both on the lack of clarity in the disclosure requirement juris-
prudence and the trend evident in the speech restraint cases to interpret
the rights of corporate and commercial speakers more expansively to
limit the scope of permissible government regulatory actions.
A. The Disclosure Distinction in the Supreme Court's Commercial
Speech Jurisprudence
Free Speech Clause protection for commercial speech began in the
mid 1970's. Reversing previous interpretations, in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,3 3 the Court
25. See, e.g., Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA), 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
26. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1 -101.95 (2010) (Food and Drug Administration regulations
imposing Food for Human Consumption Labeling Standards); 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-4.5 (2010) (De-
partment of the Treasury, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, imposing labeling require-
ments for wine); 16 C.F.R. §§ 1201.1-1420.1 (2010) (Consumer Product Safety Commission prod-
uct labeling standards).
27. See, e.g., CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL,
SHREDDING THE FOOD SAFETY NET (2006), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/shredding
.pdf (reviewing state food safety and labeling laws that proposed action in Congress would preempt).
28. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 32912-32921 (West 1994) (milk product label-
ing); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 19080-19093 (West 1964) (home furnishings labeling).
29. See, e.g., 8 S.F. CAL. HEALTH CODE § 468.3 (2010) (menu labeling at chain restaurants).
30. Proposition 65, which became law as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement
Act of 1986, requires businesses to "notify Californians about significant amounts of chemicals in
the products they purchase, in their homes or workplaces, or that are released into the environment."
OEHHA Proposition 65: Proposition 65 in Plain Language!, http://oehha.ca.gov/Prop65/backgroundl
p65plain.html (last visited June 4, 2010).
31. See, e.g., Leonard H. Glantz & George J. Annas, The FDA, Preemption, and the Supreme
Court, 358 NEw ENG. J. of MED. 1883, 1884-85 (2008) (describing efforts by cigarette makers and
drug manufacturers to obtain immunity from state law requirements, including disclosure require-
ments, through federal law preemption); Dan Shapley, Pennsylvania Allows Hormone-Free Milk
Labeling: Monsanto is Lobbying States to Restrict Labeling, THE DAILY GREEN, Jan. 17, 2008,
available at http://www.thedailygreen.com/healthy-eating/eat-safe/hormone-free-milk-47011701
#ixzz0f5Mm9Csu.
32. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. Of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 117-18 (2d
Cir. 2009) (fast food calorie count labels); Nat'l Elec. Mfr. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 106 (2d
Cir. 2001) (labeling of products containing mercury); Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d
67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (milk hormone labels).
33. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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held that speech "propos[ing] a commercial transaction" is not "wholly
outside the protection of the First Amendment." 34 The Court explained
that the constitutional protection commercial speech receives is grounded
in the "public interest that [economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well-informed," and in the "particular consumer's interest
in the free flow of commercial information. 35 In other cases the Court
has described "[t]he commercial marketplace" as "a forum where ideas
and information flourish," to which "the general rule" applies, "that the
speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the
information presented. 36 Still, a majority of the Court continues to ac-
knowledge "the 'distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government
regulation, and other varieties of speech.'
3 7
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of New York, 38 the Court established a four-part test 39 which both
protects commercial speech because of its "constitutional value" and
recognizes that commercial speech's distinguishing attributes make cer-
tain types of content based government regulation more constitutionally
permissible.40 The Court has described the Central Hudson test as impos-
ing "intermediate scrutiny," a standard between the rigorous strict scru-
tiny that applies to other speech regulations and the rational basis stan-
dard that the Court uses to review regulations that do not implicate the
free speech right.41 Although a number of justices have criticized the test
as insufficiently protective of commercial speech, at least in particular
contexts, the Court's majority continues to apply it to evaluate regula-
tions that restrict or suppress commercial speech. 42
34. Id. at 760-62 (overruling Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)).
35. Id. at 763, 765.
36. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761,767 (1993)).
37. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980)).
38. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
39. Id. at 564 (stating that if the speech is "neither misleading nor related to unlawful activ-
ity," the state "must assert a substantial interest," the restriction must "directly advance" that interest,
and the restriction must not be "excessive," meaning it cannot survive if more limited means could
accomplish the purpose).
40. Id. at 561. Specifically, the characteristics that distinguish commercial speech are its
"greater objectivity," which "justifies affording the State more freedom to distinguish false commer-
cial advertisements from true ones," and its "greater hardiness," which "inspired as it is by the profit
motive, likely diminishes the chilling effect that may attend its regulation." 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,499 (1996) (plurality opinion).
41. Milavetz , Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010); Loril-
lard, 533 U.S. at 554 (describing Central Hudson test as "'substantially similar' to the test for time,
place, and manner restrictions").
42. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367-68 (2002) (noting that "several
Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it
should apply in particular cases," but nevertheless finding it to provide "'an adequate basis for
decision"' of the case) (quoting Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554-555)).
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Soon after its decision in Central Hudson, however, the Court relied
upon the differences between commercial and other constitutionally pro-
tected speech to hold that a lower level of judicial scrutiny should apply
to at least certain types of government regulations requiring commercial
speakers to disclose additional information about their products or ser-
vices than to those that directly restrict or suppress commercial speech.43
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio,44 an attorney challenged the constitutionality of a state disciplinary
rule requiring any attorney advertisement that mentioned contingent fee
rates to "disclos[e] whether percentages are computed before or after
deduction of court costs and expenses." 45 His advertisement had stated
that clients would pay no fees if they lost, but it did not disclose that they
would still be liable for the lawsuit's costs.46 The Ohio Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel filed a complaint, alleging that, absent the required dis-
closure, the attorney's advertising was "deceptive" in violation of the
disciplinary rule.47 The Court upheld application of the disciplinary rule
to sanction the attorney for failing to include the required disclosure.48
The Court explicitly rejected the attorney's argument that "precisely
the same inquiry as determining the validity of [] restrictions on advertis-
ing content" should apply to determine the constitutionality of the disclo-
sure requirement. 49 The Court stated that the "[a]ppellant ... overlooks
material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohi-
bitions on speech." 50 The Court distinguished instances in which gov-
ernment mandated noncommercial speakers recite or publicize ideologi-
cal speech-mandates which the Court has consistently invalidated 5 1-
from the situation before it, in which the government required commer-
cial speakers to supplement their own commercial speech with additional
facts:
But the interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as
those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. Ohio has not at-
tempted to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein." The State has attempted only to pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising, and its pre-
43. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
44. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
45. Id. at 633 (alteration in original).
46. Id. at 652.
47. Id. at 631.
48. Id. at 655.
49. Id. at 650.
50. Id.
51. See id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating government re-
quirement that plaintiff display "Live Free or Die" license plate); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Torn-
illo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating right of reply requirement for newspaper); W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating mandatory pledge recitation and flag sa-
lute)).
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scription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant include in
his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about
the terms under which his services will be available. Because the ex-
tension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justi-
fied principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides, appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is mi-
nimal. Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date,
we have emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench
much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibi-
tions on speech, "waming[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately
required ... in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confu-
sion or deception." 52
However, the Court added:
We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate
the advertiser's First Amendment rights at all. We recognize that un-
justified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend
the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech. But
we hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest
in preventing deception of consumers.
53
The Court found the disciplinary rule disclosure requirement in the case
met the rational basis test, which meant that it accepted as reasonable the
state's assertion that the potential harm of deception existed, that the
disclaimer would help to correct it,54 and that it did not require the means
be closely tailored to achieve this end.55 The Court also rejected the at-
52. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (alterations in original).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 652-53 ("The assumption that substantial numbers of potential clients would be so
misled is hardly a speculative one: it is a commonplace that members of the public are often unaware
of the technical meanings of such terms as 'fees' and 'costs'-terms that, in ordinary usage, might
well be virtually interchangeable. When the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is in this
case, we need not require the State to 'conduct a survey of the ... public before it [may] determine
that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.' The State's position that it is deceptive to em-
ploy advertising that refers to contingent-fee arrangements without mentioning the client's liability
for costs is reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client's liabil-
ity for costs be disclosed." (quoting FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965)
(alterations in original)).
55. Id. at 651 n.14 ("Although we have subjected outright prohibitions on speech to [least
restrictive means] analysis, all our discussions of restraints on commercial speech have recom-
mended disclosure requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual sup-
pression of speech. Because the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirements
are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed, we do not think it
appropriate to strike down such requirements merely because other possible means by which the
State might achieve its purposes can be hypothesized. Similarly, we are unpersuaded by appellant's
argument that a disclosure requirement is subject to attack if it is 'under-inclusive'-that is, if it does
not get at all facets of the problem it is designed to ameliorate. As a general matter, governments are
entitled to attack problems piecemeal, save where their policies implicate rights so fundamental that
strict scrutiny must be applied. The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate informa-
tion regarding his services is not such a fundamental right." (citations omitted)).
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torney's claim that its application "would in fact be unduly burdensome
and would tend to chill advertising of contingent-fee arrangements.
'" 56
The Court in Zauderer thus planted the seeds for either a broad or
narrow interpretation of its holding. On the one hand, the Court broadly
distinguished between "disclosure requirements" and "outright prohibi-
tions on speech," noting that the former is an "acceptable less restrictive
alternative to actual suppression of speech. 5 7 It affirmed that the primary
reason commercial speech receives protection is "the value to consumers
of the information," and that, although vendors may prefer not to dis-
close certain information about their products or services, the extent of
their "constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular
factual information in . . . advertising is minimal. 58 It also confirmed
that governments may be selective rather than comprehensive in mandat-
ing factual disclosures, addressing one problem at a time. 9
On the other hand, and despite the broad language and reasoning
that seem to distinguish between speech restraints and required factual
disclosures, the Court discussed disclosure requirements in the context of
one imposed for the purpose of correcting commercial speech that would
otherwise be deceptive, and included that government purpose in the
articulation of its rational basis test.60 The Court also noted that, although
listeners' interests are the primary reason the Constitution protects com-
mercial speech, advertisers in fact possess "First Amendment rights,"
and that, at some point, even disclosure requirements may be "unjusti-
fied" or "unduly burdensome" and "might offend the First Amendment
by chilling protected commercial speech.'
In the 25 years since Zauderer, the Court's decisions and the state-
ments of various justices have muddied, rather than clarified, the deci-
sion's meaning with respect to the appropriate standard of review for
disclosure requirements imposed on commercial speech. In Meese v.
Keene,62 decided one year after Zauderer, the Court rejected a challenge
56. Id. at 652 n. 15 ("Evaluation of this claim is somewhat difficult in light of the Ohio court's
failure to specify precisely what disclosures were required. The gist of the report of the Board of
Commissioners on this point, however, was that appellant's advertising was potentially deceptive
because it 'left standing the impression that if there were no recovery, the client would owe nothing.'
Accordingly, the report at a minimum suggests that an attorney advertising a contingent fee must
disclose that a client may be liable for costs even if the lawsuit is unsuccessful. The report and the
opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court also suggest that the attorney's contingent-fee rate must be
disclosed. Neither requirement seems intrinsically burdensome; and they certainly cannot be said to
be unreasonable as applied to appellant, who included in his advertisement no information whatso-
ever regarding costs and fee rates. This case does not provide any factual basis for finding that
Ohio's disclosure requirements are unduly burdensome." (citations omitted)).
57. Id. at 650-51 & n.14.
58. Id. at 651 (first emphasis added).
59. Seeid. at651 n.14.
60. Id. at 651 ("[A]n advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure re-
quirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers.").
61. Id.
62. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
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by a California legislator to a federal statutory designation of films pro-
duced by the Canadian government as "political propaganda" and the
requirement that he disclose details about his connections to the "foreign
government" producer and details of its required registration with the
Department of Justice pursuant to the statute. 63 Although the case in-
volved a disclosure requirement imposed on core political speech, the
Court upheld the statutory requirements in strong language that distin-
guished disclosure requirements from prohibitions of speech:
Congress did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advo-
cacy materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public from con-
version, confusion, or deceit. To the contrary, Congress simply re-
quired the disseminators of such material to make additional disclo-
sures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the
propaganda. . . . Disseminators of propaganda may go beyond the
disclosures required by statute and add any further information they
think germane to the public's viewing of the materials. By compel-
ling some disclosure of information and permitting more, the Act's
approach recognizes that the best remedy for misleading or inaccu-
rate speech contained within materials subject to the Act is fair, truth-
ful, and accurate speech.
64
In contrast to its deferential treatment of Congress's "propaganda"
label, the Court in Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Profes-
sional Regulation, Board of Accountancy65 more rigorously reviewed a
state bar's reprimand of an attorney for, among other things, failing to
include a disclaimer in her advertising that explained the meaning of her
specialty designation.66 The Court's analysis of the disclaimer require-
ment confusingly mixed references to considerations that it used in Zau-
derer to analyze the constitutionality of disclosure requirements imposed
on commercial speech with references to considerations that it employs
to determine whether commercial speech restraints comport with the free
speech guarantee.
67
63. Id. at 467, 469. The legislator was not required to place the term "political propaganda" on
the film as he showed it to a public audience. The Court nevertheless held that he had demonstrated
injury sufficient to establish standing to challenge the term in the statute based upon evidence that
demonstrated that "his exhibition of films that have been classified as 'political propaganda' by the
Department of Justice would substantially harm his chances for reelection and would adversely
affect his reputation in the community." Id. at 474.
64. Id. at 481 ("The prospective viewers of the three films at issue may harbor an unreasoning
prejudice against arguments that have been identified as the 'political propaganda' of foreign princi-
pals and their agents, but the Act allows appellee to combat any such bias simply by explaining-
before, during, or after the film, or in a wholly separate context-that Canada's interest in the conse-
quences of nuclear war and acid rain does not necessarily undermine the integrity or the persuasive-
ness of its advocacy.").
65. 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
66. See id. at 139-40.
67. Most of the case involved review of the reprimand based upon the content of the attor-
ney's advertising, without reference to the possible alternative of including a disclaimer to explain
the significance of the specialty designation. The Court characterized the sanctions in this respect as
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In other cases not directly addressing disclosure requirements, com-
binations of justices have distinguished Zauderer in ways that suggest a
narrow interpretation. In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc.,68 a
closely divided Court rejected the claim of fruit growers that the manda-
tory assessments to fund generic advertising violated their free speech
rights.69 The four dissenting justices would have accepted it, and in the
course of their discussion rejected Zauderer as precedent for low level
scrutiny of the subsidization mandate:
In speaking of the objecting lawyer's comparatively modest interest
in challenging the state requirement, we referred to protection of
commercial speech as "justified principally by the value to consum-
ers of the information such speech provides .... ." We said "princi-
pally," not exclusively, and proceeded to uphold the state require-
ment not because a regulation adding to public information is im-
mune from scrutiny, but because the mandate at issue bore a reason-
able relation to the "State's interest in preventing deception of con-
sumers," who might otherwise be ignorant of the real terms on which
the advertiser intended to do business. Zauderer thereby reaffirmed a
longstanding preference for disclosure requirements over outright
bans, as more narrowly tailored cures for the potential of commercial
messages to mislead by saying too little. But however long the pedi-
gree of such mandates may be, and however broad the government's
authority to impose them, Zauderer carries no authority for a man-
date unrelated to the interest in avoiding misleading or incomplete
commercial messages.70
"restraints" on commercial speech and analyzed them under its mid-level test for commercial speech
restrictions, finding that the state had not established a substantial purpose for imposing the restric-
tion because it had not offered evidence that the specialty designation was actually or inherently
misleading. Id. at 139-43. At the end of its opinion, however, the Court addressed the state's alterna-
tive claim that, even if it could not prohibit the attorney's speech entirely, it was entitled to repri-
mand her for failing to publish a disclaimer because her use of the specialty designation was "poten-
tially misleading." Id. at 146. The Court did not directly acknowledge that the state's use of the
alternate means of a disclosure requirement might subject its action to a more lenient, rational basis
review under Zauderer. Instead, it said that "[i]f the 'protections afforded commercial speech are to
retain their force,"' then "we cannot allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to
supplant the Board's burden to 'demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree,"' which are requirements drawn from the Central
Hudson test that applies to speech restraints. Id. at 146 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 648-49 (1985) (addressing speech restraints),
and Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)). Next, however, the Court applied a portion of its
disclosure requirement reasoning in Zauderer, finding that the disclaimer at issue was "copiously
detailed," and invalidating it as unduly burdensome. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146-47 & n. 11. Throughout
its decision, the Court emphasized the state of the record, indicating that, with respect to the dis-
claimer, its analysis might well have been different had the State been able to "point to any harm that
is potentially real, not purely hypothetical." Id. at 146. The Court noted, as well, that it was unsure
whether use of the disclaimer would have "saved [the attorney] from censure," suggesting that it
viewed the reprimand, in the context of the case, as equivalent to a speech restraint. Id. at 147 n. 1I.
68. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
69. Id. at 460-6 1.
70. Id. at 490-91 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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In United States v. United Foods, Inc.,71 the Glickman dissenters
joined several justices in the majority to invalidate a federal statutory
requirement that mushroom producers pay an assessment for generic
advertising that was not government speech.72 Echoing the Glickman
dissenters, the United Foods Court adopted the view that product pro-
ducers have First Amendment rights that may be infringed by regulatory
actions compelling them to subsidize commercial speech with which
they disagree. In its short opinion, the Court also distinguished Zauderer:
Noting that substantial numbers of potential clients might be misled
by omission of the explanation, the [Zauderer] Court sustained the
requirement as consistent with the State's interest in "preventing de-
ception of consumers." There is no suggestion in the case now before
us that the mandatory assessments imposed to require one group of
private persons to pay for speech by others are somehow necessary to
make voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for consumers.
73
Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg commented directly on the confu-
sion that the Court's case law and comments have engendered in their
joint dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in a case in which the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Florida statute imposing dis-
closure requirements on dentists who practice implant dentistry.74 The
two justices argued that the Court should "provide lower courts with
guidance on the subject of state-mandated disclaimers," and distin-
guished Zauderer as insufficient to validate the "government-scripted
disclaimer" at issue in that case.75
Most recently, eight members of the Court avoided addressing the
outer boundaries of Zauderer's applicability by finding that a disclosure
requirement imposed on bankruptcy attorneys was subject to lenient ra-
tional basis review because the government's purpose was to correct
misleading commercial speech.76 Justice Thomas concurred, agreeing to
resolve the case pursuant to Zauderer, but indicating that he would be
willing to reexamine whether its standard "provide[s] sufficient First
Amendment protection against government-mandated disclosures" in an
appropriate case.77
71. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
72. Id. at 408-409.
73. Id. at 416 (citation omitted). The Justices in the majority were Kennedy, Rehnquist, Ste-
vens, Scalia, Souter and Thomas.
74. Borgner v. Ha. Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080, 1080 (2002).
75. Id. The Justices also noted that the dentist "also raises doubts about whether the Eleventh
Circuit's conclusion is consistent with Ibanez." Id.
76. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010).
77. Id. at 1342-45 & n. I (expressing doubt that the lesser burden that disclosure requirements
may impose on speakers 'justifies an entirely different standard of review for regulations that com-
pel, rather than suppress, commercial speech").
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B. The Consequences of Applying Commercial Speech Restraint Analysis
to Information Disclosure Requirements
Most of the commercial speech jurisprudence has developed in the
context of speech restraints. The general speech-protective trend appar-
ent in these cases, as well as the specific judgments that guide the
Court's application of the prongs of the Central Hudson test, provide
important background that helps to explain the uncertainty in the current
jurisprudence of disclosure requirements. The cases also provide a fore-
shadowing of the limitations government regulators would face if a ma-
jority of the Court were to limit the application of Zauderer's deferential
review standard to disclosure requirements imposed to correct deceptive
or misleading commercial speech.
In its most recent articulation, the Court confirmed that "[t]he Cen-
tral Hudson test is significantly stricter than the rational basis test,,,
7 8
which it described as follows:
[W]e ask as a threshold matter whether the commercial speech con-
cerns unlawful activity or is misleading. If so, then the speech is not
protected by the First Amendment. If the speech concerns lawful ac-
tivity and is not misleading, however, we next ask "whether the as-
serted governmental interest is substantial." If it is, then we "deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental in-
terest asserted," and, finally, "whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest." Each of these latter three inquiries
must be answered in the affirmative for the regulation to be found
constitutional.
79
This section discusses the consequences of transposing each of
these "stricter" speech restraint inquiries into the analysis of disclosure
requirements imposed on commercial speech.
1. Deceptive or Misleading Speech
Central Hudson's first prong most obviously incorporates the criti-
cal differences the Court has identified between commercial and other
types of speech. Although content discrimination is highly suspect with
respect to non-commercial speech, this prong permits governments to
suppress entirely commercial speech that is "more likely to deceive the
public than to inform it."'80 While a deferential approach to government
judgments could provide wide latitude to restrict commercial speech, the
choice apparent in the speech restraint cases is instead that the Court will
carefully scrutinize a government determination that commercial speech
should be suppressed to protect consumers from being deceived. The
78. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002).
79. Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
80. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
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Court has clarified that government authority to suppress commercial
speech entirely extends only to speech that is in fact deceptive or "inher-
ently misleading."'8' The Court requires proof to find speech in fact de-
ceptive, and will exercise de novo review to determine whether a
statement is inherently misleading.83 It has rejected state determinations
that certain advertising claims met either of these standards, noting "the
complete absence of any evidence of deception" 84 and opining that
members of the public are generally sophisticated enough to recognize
the limits of advertising and are not as easily misled as would-be regula-
tors claim them to be.
85
By contrast, the Court tends to accord more deference to govern-
ment determinations that commercial speech may mislead consumers
when the regulatory means are mandated disclosure rather than restric-
tion of speech. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that disclosure re-
quirements are less burdensome alternatives to restrictions of commercial
speech. Despite use of the same word, the Court in Zauderer seemed to
apply different degrees of deference to the State's assertions that the at-
torney's speech was "deceptive" according to the remedy the State
sought to apply.86 Since Zauderer, the Court has changed its wording
somewhat, acknowledging that a government's discretion to impose dis-
closure requirements extends beyond what is required to justify a speech
restraint, to supplementing speech that is "potentially misleading."
87
While it has seemed to say that, even when imposing a disclosure
requirement, a government regulator must demonstrate the "harms it
recites are real, 88 most recently, eight members of the Court signed on
to a reiteration of Zauderer's conclusion that a "possibility of deception"
may be so "self-evident" that no specific proof by the government regu-
81. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990) ("A
State may not.., completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading.").
82. See id. at 106 ("Given the complete absence of any evidence of deception in the present
case, we must reject the contention that petititioner's letterhead is actually misleading.").
83. See id. at 108.
84. Id. at 106.
85. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 105 ("We reject the paternalistic assumption that the recipients of
petititioner's letterhead are no more discriminating than the audience for children's television.");
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977) (rejecting the assumption "that the public is
not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising" as based on an "underestimation of
the public").
86. Compare Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 648 (1985) (rejecting State's contention that illustrations in advertisements created "unac-
ceptable risks that the public will be misled, manipulated, or confused" as sufficient to justify sup-
pressing them), with id. at 652-53 (accepting State's contention that the attorney's reference to
"fees" without mention of "costs" was "deceptive" where the remedy was a disclosure requirement).
87. See, e.g., Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007)
("[T]he Court has made a doctrinal refinement, distinguishing in the professional services context
between commercial speech that is inherently or actually misleading and commercial speech that is
only potentially misleading .... We need not (and do not) decide the issue, but we note that recent
decisions have applied this dichotomy beyond the professional services context.").
88. Ibanez v. Fla Dep't of Bus. & Prorl Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 146
(1994) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,771 (1993)).
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lator is required to justify mandating certain information be disclosed in
connection with commercial speech.89
But even applying the greater deference to government judgments
that commercial speech has the potential to deceive will not obviously
validate many modern disclosure requirements regulators impose to ful-
fill objectives other than preventing consumers from being misled by
uncorrected speech. That is, graphic cigarette warnings, calorie counts on
fast food, and statements about the adverse environmental impact of the
products on which they appear do not counter commercial speech the
Court would find has a self-evident "tendency to mislead." 90 Conse-
quently, were the Court to limit Zauderer's deferential review to disclo-
sure requirements that serve the purpose of preventing actual or potential
consumer deception, the remaining three prongs of the Central Hudson
test would become relevant to determining the constitutionality of the
many disclosure requirements that serve other regulatory purposes.
2. Substantial Purpose
Central Hudson's second prong requires the government to estab-
lish a "substantial" purpose for its regulation.9' It is in this purpose in-
quiry where a majority of the justices have drawn a sharp line between
unconstitutional and permissible commercial speech regulations. Early
on, the Court rejected what it characterized as the "highly paternalistic
approach" of restricting commercial speech to protect people from "the
reactions it is assumed [they] will have to the free flow of. .. informa-
tion. 92 Specifically, governments have often sought to achieve their va-
lid regulatory objective of reducing demand for a product by imposing
advertising restrictions on its producers. Governments' reasons for re-
ducing demand may be to promote public health,93 to conserve scarce
resources,94 to stabilize economic activity, 95 or to limit the spread of
"vice" activity.96 In each instance, the government regulator reasoned
that the advertising it restricted, if allowed, would influence consumer
89. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340 (2010) (quot-
ing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53).
90. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53); see, e.g., Nat'l Elec.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2001) (observing that the requirement that products
containing mercury disclose it served the purposes of providing information and protecting the
environment, not preventing consumers from being deceived).
91. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
92. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769-70
(1976).
93. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (reducing underage smok-
ing); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (plurality opinion) (reducing
alcohol consumption).
94. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 560 (conserving electricity).
95. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1977) (preventing
"white flight" and blight).
96. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 182, 185
(1999) (noting that the Fifth Circuit labeled gambling as "vice activity").
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activity in a way that would undermine the public interest, even if many
of the individual decisions based on unrestricted advertising might in fact
be in the rational self interest of the individual decisionmaker. 97 That is,
governments have sought to modify consumer behavior because they
have determined that the result of aggregated self interested individual
purchasing behavior would undermine a public interest.
Although the Court has acknowledged that regulating to modify
consumer purchasing behavior to achieve a public purpose is within gov-
ernments' legitimate authority, it has emphasized that it will view such
regulations with great skepticism when they take the form of speech re-
strictions. Restricting speech is a constitutionally offensive means of
achieving the government's legitimate citizen "protectiveness" objective
because its effectiveness "rests . . . on the advantages of their [citizens]
being kept in ignorance." 98 With increasing vehemence, the Court and
individual justices have condemned the "paternalistic assumption that the
public will use truthful, nonmisleading information unwisely," and the
Court has invalidated speech-suppressing regulations that are based upon
that assumption.99 The alternative that the Constitution requires speech
restrictions based on the "offensive assumption that the public will re-
spond 'irrationally' to the truth"'0° is to "open the channels of communi-
cation" so that people can be "well enough informed" to "perceive their
own best interests."10'
It is unclear precisely which characteristics of a regulation must ex-
ist for particular justices to label a government regulation as unconstitu-
tionally "paternalistic." All of the regulations condemned by the Court
on this basis have restricted commercial speech and some of the trouble-
some characteristics noted by the Court and individual justices are spe-
cific to speech restraints.102 One troublesome characteristic is that speech
restraints modify consumer behavior by "keep[ing] people in the dark for
... their own good." 103 Another is a political process concern that re-
stricting speech "to pursue a nonspeech-related policy" may "screen
from public view the underlying government policy."' 4 Additionally, the
Court continues to emphasize that disclosure requirements are a "far less
97. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 387 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("IThe Government fears the safety consequences ...[that] flow from the adverse cumulative
effects of multiple individual decisions each of which may seem perfectly reasonable considered on
its own.").
98. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769
(1976).
99. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996) (plurality opinion).
100. Id. at 503 (quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96
(1977)).
101. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
102. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193
(1999).
103. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503.
104. Id. at 500 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)).
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restrictive alternative" than advertising restrictions, although it is unclear
the extent to which this conclusion extends beyond correcting "mislead-
ing" advertisements.'
0 5
By contrast, some statements by individual justices and combina-
tions of justices suggest a view that the Constitution prohibits the more
general regulation of commercial speech for "paternalistic" behavior
modification purposes.' ° 6 Justice Thomas has most vociferously advo-
cated the view that strict scrutiny should apply to government regulations
that depend on the content of commercial speech, unless the government
can demonstrate that the speech is untruthful or misleading.'0 7 Other jus-
tices have joined in similar reasoning in some cases.10 8 Nevertheless,
these justices and others have also emphasized that such content based
purposes are particularly problematic in the context of broad speech re-
strictions, which they characterized as "blanket bans" that "entirely sup-
press" speech,' ° 9 and that governments may require the disclosure of at
least some types of "beneficial consumer information" without running
afoul of the anti-paternalistic purpose rule that they interpret the Consti-
tution to contain." 0 Consequently, it is unclear how a majority of the
Court would evaluate a disclosure requirement aimed to counter the po-
tentially persuasive, as opposed to deceptive, content of commercial
speech under Central Hudson's second prong.
105. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002) ("Even if the Government
did argue that it had an interest in preventing misleading advertisements, this interest could be satis-
fied by the far less restrictive alternative of requiring each compounded drug to be labeled with a
warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing and that its risks were unknown.").
106. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
107. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1342 (2010) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring); Thompson, 535 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
108. 44 L~iquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion) ("[W]hen a State entirely prohibits the
dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preserva-
tion of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the
First Amendment generally demands."). By contrast, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice
Breyer's dissent in Thompson, accepting the Federal Drug Administration's consumer demand
modification purpose for restricting compounded drug advertising. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 382
(Breyer, J., dissenting). This may be because the FDA's restrictions were tailored and not a "com-
plete ban."
109. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion) ("'[SIpecial care' should
attend the review of ... blanket bans .. ") (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 at 566 n.9); Peel v. Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of I1l., 496 U.S. 91, 110 n.17 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("[A]
holding that a total ban is unconstitutional does not necessarily preclude less restrictive regulation of
commercial speech."); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9 ("We review with special care regulations
that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy.").
110. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion) ("When a State regulates commercial
messages to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires
the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the
reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than
strict review.").
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3. Directly Advance
Prong three of the Central Hudson test looks to the relationship of
the government's means to its end."' Speech restrictions must directly
advance the government's substantial purpose for imposing the regula-
tion. 12 The Court has applied this test with increasing rigor, questioning
the details of government line-drawing and demanding proof that par-
ticular restrictions will actually advance the government objective sub-
stantially.' 13 Where government has imposed speech restrictions for the
purpose of reducing demand as the intermediary means to achieving a
public end, the Court has examined closely whether the restriction im-
posed will actually achieve the specific type of demand reduction the
government asserts. In 44 Liquormart, a four justice plurality refused to
assume, without findings of fact or evidentiary support, that restricting
price advertising of alcohol would "significantly reduce alcohol con-
sumption," finding, among other things, that a lack of such information is
unlikely to deter heavy drinkers.1 4 In both Greater New Orleans Broad-
casting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States
115 and Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,116
the Court rejected the one-step-at-a-time reasoning, failing to find a close
enough fit between the government's purpose and its means because of
contradictions contained in the overall regulatory schemes for alcohol
and gambling, respectively.' 17 And in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,"
l8
a plurality similarly rejected the state's assertion that requiring tobacco
advertising be at five feet or higher directly advanced its goal of curbing
minors' demand for cigarettes because, "Not all children are less than 5
feet tall, and those who are certainly have the ability to look up and take
in their surroundings." ' 19 Finally, in Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center, 20 the Court seemed to say that restricting advertisements to re-
duce consumer demand as a means to protect those same consumers
"from making bad decisions with the information" per se does not di-
rectly advance the government's interest.'2' Obviously, this close exami-
nation of means-end fit applied to disclosure requirements would invali-
date more of them than the Zauderer rational basis review.
111. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505.
114. Id. (requiring a strong showing by the State because of the "drastic nature of its chosen
means").
115. 527 U.S. 173(1999).
116. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
117. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190-93; Rubin, 514 U.S. at 489.
118. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
119. Id. at 566 (plurality opinion).
120. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
121. Id. at 374-76 ("Even if the Government had asserted an interest in preventing people who
do not need compounded drugs from obtaining those drugs, the statute does not directly advance that
interest.... [Tihe statute does not directly forbid such sales. It instead restricts advertising, of course
not just to those who do not need compounded drugs, but also to individuals who do need com-
pounded drugs and their doctors.").
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4. Alternate Means
When it reaches the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, the
Court inquires whether the regulation is "more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve [the government's] interest." 12 The Court has applied this
requirement increasingly rigorously as well, looking both to whether the
restriction imposed is well tailored to the government's purpose, 123 and
to whether alternative types of regulations that do not restrict speech
could adequately accomplish the government's objective. 124 According to
the Court, "[R]egulating speech must be a last-not first-resort."'' 25 A
number of speech restrictions imposed to reduce consumer demand have
failed this fourth prong inquiry. 126 The Court has consistently indicated
that direct, non-speech regulations are preferable to advertising restric-
tions, 127 although it has also recited more narrowly tailored speech re-
strictions as available alternatives that cause the regulation under review
to fail the fourth prong inquiry.128 In connection with this inquiry, the
Court has frequently mentioned that disclosure requirements are constitu-
tionally preferable, less-restrictive means to speech suppression,' 29 and
that governments are free to engage in their own speech to counter the
content of advertisements.1 30 Consequently, the extent to which the Court
would invalidate disclosure requirements because even less restrictive
122. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
123. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 563 ("The uniformly broad sweep of the geographical limitation
demonstrates a lack of tailoring.").
124. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371 ("In previous cases addressing this final prong of the Central
Hudson test, we have made clear that if the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that
does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.").
125. ld. at 373.
126. Id. at 371 (prescription drugs); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561 (cigarettes); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,490-91 (1995) (alcohol).
127. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 372 ("Several non-speech-related means of drawing a line between
compounding and large-scale manufacturing [of drugs] might be possible here."); Rubin, 514 U.S. at
490-91 (one alternative available to prohibiting alcohol content advertising of beer is "directly
limiting the alcohol content of beers"); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507
(1996) ("[H]igher prices [for alcohol] can be maintained either by direct regulation or by increased
taxation."); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (financial incen-
tives to reduce home sales are an available alternative to restricting display of For Sale signs).
128. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490-91 (alternatives to alcohol content advertising for all beer are
"prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol strength (which is apparently the policy in
some other western nations), or limiting the labeling ban only to malt liquors, which is the segment
of the market that allegedly is threatened with a strength war").
129. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 376; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980) (reasoning that in order to address its interest in promoting energy
conservation, the government "might, for example, require that the [utility's] advertisements include
information about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service"); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) ("[Tlhe preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less."); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (sug-
gesting that governments may "require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include
such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being decep-
tive").
130. See Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (suggesting the
alternative of government counter-speech).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
means of achieving the government's purpose are available, such as di-
rect regulation or government speech, is unclear.
C. Disclosure Requirements in the Lower Courts
The intersection of the Court's early distinction between commer-
cial speech disclosure requirements and restraints imposed on commer-
cial speech creates a number of open issues with respect to government
authority to mandate speech on product labels.
1. What is the test?
Lower courts have differed as to whether Zauderer's rational basis
review applies to all instances where governments mandate disclosure of
commercial information, or whether it is limited to instances where gov-
ernments act for the purpose of preventing consumer deception.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed this question in
a series of recent cases. In International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy
(IDFA),13 1 Judges Altimari and McLaughlin held for a two-judge major-
ity that dairy marketers had established a likelihood of success on the
merits of their claim that a Vermont statutory requirement mandating
producers to label certain dairy products-those made from milk derived
from cows treated with the synthetic growth hormone rBST-violated
the Constitution.1 32 The court applied the Central Hudson test to find the
disclosure requirement likely unconstitutional for lack of a substantial
purpose without explicitly addressing whether Zauderer's rational basis
test applied. 133 Judge Leval dissented, also without specifically distin-
guishing between the tests offered in Central Hudson and Zauderer.
134
Instead, he argued both that the state's interests were substantial under
Central Hudson, and that Zauderer's distinction between "disclosure
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech" rendered the Vermont
requirement constitutional.1
35
Five years later, in National Electrical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Sor-
rell,136 a unanimous panel composed of Chief Judge Walker, Judge Poo-
ler and then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor reversed and remanded a district
court decision and ordered preliminarily enjoining application of Ver-
mont statutory and regulatory requirements that manufacturers label
products to indicate they contain mercury and must be disposed of as
hazardous waste.137 The district court relied on the prior decision in
131. 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
132. Id. at 74.
133. Implicitly, the court seemed to limit Zauderer's application to disclosure requirements
aimed at "preventing deception of consumers." Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
134. Id. at 77-78 (Leval, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 81.
136. 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001).
137. Jd. at 116.
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IDFA and, applying Central Hudson, found the plaintiff manufacturers'
association likely to succeed on the merits of its constitutional claim.
138
The circuit court directly addressed the different tests articulated in Cen-
tral Hudson and Zauderer, and held that the district court had "misper-
ceived" which one applied to the disclosure requirement in that case.
39
According to the court, the Free Speech Clause objectives underlying the
distinction between disclosure requirements and restraints on speech
meant that the "reasonable-relationship rule in Zauderer" governed re-
view of the disclosure requirement before it, even though it "was not
intended to prevent 'consumer confusion or deception' per se."14 The
court explained:
Commercial disclosure requirements are treated differently from re-
strictions on commercial speech because mandated disclosure of ac-
curate, factual, commercial information does not offend the core First
Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information
or protecting individual liberty interests. Such disclosure furthers, ra-
ther than hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth
and contributes to the efficiency of the "marketplace of ideas." Pro-
tection of the robust and free flow of accurate information is the prin-
cipal First Amendment justification for protecting commercial
speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful information promotes that
goal. In such a case, then, less exacting scrutiny is required than
where truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is restricted.
Additionally, the individual liberty interests guarded by the First
Amendment, which may be impaired when personal or political
speech is mandated by the state are not ordinarily implicated by
compelled commercial disclosure. Required disclosure of accurate,
factual commercial information presents little risk that the state is
forcing speakers to adopt disagreeable state-sanctioned positions,
suppressing dissent, confounding the speaker's attempts to participate
in self-governance, or interfering with an individual's right to define
and express his or her own personality.
41
The court thus concluded that "Zauderer, not [Central Hudson], de-
scribe[d] the relationship between means and ends demanded by the First
Amendment in compelled commercial disclosure cases. The Central
Hudson test should be applied to statutes that restrict commercial
speech."'142 It distinguished its prior decision in IDFA as "expressly lim-
ited to cases in which a state disclosure requirement is supported by no
interest other than the gratification of 'consumer curiosity,"' noting that
"because our decision in IDFA was predicated on the state's inability to
138. Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 72 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456. (D. Vt. 1999).
139. Sorrell, 272F.3dat 113.
140. Id. at 115 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
141. Id. at 113-14 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 115.
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identify a sufficient legitimate state interest, we did not reach the proper
relationship between a disclosure regulation's means and its ends, the
issue we face here."'' 43 It commented as well that applying the Central
Hudson test to government disclosure requirements not aimed specifi-
cally at preventing consumer deception would "expose [many] long-
established programs to searching scrutiny by unelected courts. Such a
result is neither wise nor constitutionally required."'
44
In a later decision, with the panel again including Judge Poole and
then-Judge Sotomayor, the court rejected the New York State Restaurant
Association's (NYSRA) argument that New York City's requirement
that restaurants post the calorie content of food should be reviewed under
the Central Hudson test because its purpose was to combat obesity rather
than prevent consumer deception, and because the plaintiff association
disputed that the disclosure requirement would fulfill that purpose.' 45 The
court reiterated its Sorrell reasoning "that Zauderer's holding was broad
enough to encompass nonmisleading disclosure requirements"1 46 and that
"Zauderer, not Central Hudson .. .describes the relationship between
means and ends demanded by the First Amendment in compelled com-
"'47mercial disclosure cases.
The Second Circuit panel noted that "[w]e have not been alone in
accepting this broader reading,"1 48 citing the First Circuit's decision in
Pharmaceutical Care Management Ass'n v. Rowe. 14 9 In that case, the
court applied Zauderer to Maine's statutory requirement that middlemen
entities in the pharmaceutical distribution network disclose certain in-
formation about their operations and finances as a condition for doing
business in the state.'50 The court rejected plaintiff's argument that "Zau-
derer is 'limited to potentially deceptive advertising directed at consum-
ers,"' noting that it had "found no cases limiting Zauderer in such a
way.' 5' The weight of the lower court precedent, therefore, interprets
the Zauderer rational basis test to apply to disclosure requirements gen-
143. Id. at 115 n.6.
144. Id. at 116 (noting that "[jinnumerable federal and state regulatory programs require the
disclosure of product and other commercial information," including reporting of federal election
campaign contributions, securities disclosures, tobacco labeling, nutritional labeling, reporting of
pollutant concentrations in water, reporting of releases of toxic substances, disclosures in prescrip-
tion drug advertisements, posting notification of workplace hazards, warning of potential exposure to
hazardous substances, and disclosure of pesticide formulas) (citations omitted).
145. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA), 556 F.3d 114, 132-33 (2d.
Cir. 2009).
146. Id. at 133.
147. Id. (quoting Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 115) (alteration in original).
148. NYSRA, 556 F.3d at 133
149. 429 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 2005).
150. Id. at 316.
151. Id. at 310 n.8.
[Vol. 87:4
2010] GOVERNMENT SPEECH ON PRODUCT LABELS 877
erally, even if they are not specifically or exclusively aimed at preventing
consumer deception.'
52
Other courts, however, have applied the Central Hudson test to dis-
closure requirements, specifically in the context of advertising by law-
yers and other professionals, where the Court's decision in Ibanez mud-
dies the precedent. In Borgner v. Brooks,5 3 the case in which Justices
Thomas and Ginsburg dissented from denial of the writ of certiorari,
154
both the district court and the appellate court applied the Central Hudson
test to a state requirement that dentists include a disclaimer with their
advertisements of an implant dentistry specialty.15 5 Neither acknowl-
edged the option of lower level review that Zauderer presented.
56
In Mason v. Florida Bar,1 57 the Eleventh Circuit confronted a state
bar rule that on its face prohibited attorneys from making certain types of
"self laudatory" statements without a lengthy disclaimer in the lawyer's
advertising. 58 Confronted with the state bar's argument that "its restric-
tion on [the plaintiff attorney's] speech should be upheld because it has
not insisted upon an outright ban on speech, but merely requires the use
of a disclaimer,"' 59 the court interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in
Ibanez to require that "[elven partial restrictions on commercial speech
must be supported by a showing of some identifiable harm."' 6 It held
"that the Bar is not relieved of its burden to identify a genuine threat of
152. See, e.g., Conn. Bar Assoc. v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 286-87 (D. Conn. 2008)
(finding that for review of a required disclosure for bankruptcy attorneys "the reasonable relation test
is more appropriate," but also determining that the required disclosures are not misleading, are not
overbroad, and "advance[] a sufficiently compelling government interest and do[] not unduly burden
the attorney-client relationship"); European Connections & Tours, Inc. v. Gonzales, 480 F. Supp. 2d
1355, 1371-72 (N.D. Ga. 2007) ("IMBRA's disclosure requirements are properly analyzed under
Zauderer and must be upheld if there is a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government inter-
est .... IMBRA's disclosure requirements are reasonably related to Congress' legitimate interest in
preventing fraud and deception and addressing domestic abuse and human trafficking against so-
called 'mail-order brides."'); Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., Inc., No. EDCV 04-407-VAP
(SGLx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39779, at *36-39 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2007) (addressing the question
whether strict scrutiny or rational basis scrutiny applied to state statutory requirement that pharma-
cies conduct and distribute a bi-yearly rice survey, and concluding that no scrutiny applied because
the statistics were not required to be distributed with advertising materials and so did not burden
commercial speech); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 845 n.18 (9th Cir. 2003) (subject-
ing EPA rule that requires municipalities to distribute information about the hazards of storm water
run-off to unspecific low level scrutiny); Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar of Tex., 888
F. Supp. 1328, 1357-59 (E.D. Tex. 1995), affd, 100 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1996).
153. 284 F.3d 1204 (11 th Cir. 2002).
154. Borgner v. Fla. Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
155. Borgner, 284 F.3d at 1210.
156. Id. at 1214 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) for the rule that "[d]isclaimers are significantly different than out-
right bans on commercial speech," but applying the Central Hudson test); Borgner v. Brooks, 152 F.
Supp. 2d 1317, 1324 (2001) (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648-49 for the rule that restrictions on
advertising cannot be based on "'unsupported assertions' without 'evidence or authority of any
kind"').
157. 208 F.3d 952 (11 th Cir. 2000).
158. Id. at 954.
159. Id. at 958.
160. Id.
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danger simply because it requires a disclaimer, rather than a complete
ban on ... speech," and that the Bar "has failed to satisfy the third prong
of Central Hudson."'6 1 Similarly, the district court in Schwartz v.
Welch 162 reviewed a series of disclosure requirements imposed on lawyer
advertising under the Central Hudson test, characterizing the rules as
imposing "restrictions" because the requirements caused the lawyer-
plaintiffs to modify their advertisements and forego certain advertise-
ment techniques.' 63 A Massachusetts state court recently discussed the
difficulty of analyzing disclosure requirements coupled with an enforce-
ment mechanism present in the context of mandated security offering
registration and disclosure. 164 The problem of characterization arises
because the disclosure requirement serves "not to restrict speech, but to
expand it," but the "necessary corollary" of such a scheme is the prohibi-
tion of speech without the required disclaimer. 65 The enforcement me-
chanism "inherently restrict[s] speech," but "without such prohibitions it
is difficult to imagine how a ... disclosure system could operate with
any degree of effectiveness."'
' 66
In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 167 the district
court applied the Central Hudson test to a disclaimer imposed on law-
yers. 168 The appellate court agreed that Zauderer applied only to disclo-
sure requirements imposed for the purpose of preventing deception, but
applied that test because it determined that this was the government's
purpose in that case. 169 The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
reasoning,17  which meant that it did not resolve whether Zauderer's
"less exacting scrutiny" applies to disclosure requirements imposed for
purposes other than correcting potentially deceptive commercial speech.
Additionally, although the case before it did not depend upon the distinc-
tion, the Ninth Circuit recently appears to have assumed that the decep-
tion prevention purpose is essential to the application of the Zauderer
standard. 7'
161. Id.
162. 890 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
163. Id. at 573-74.
164. Bulldog Investors Gen. P'ship v. Galvin, No. 07-1261-BLS2, 2007 WL 4647112, at *9-
*10 (Mass. Dec. 26, 2007).
165. Id. at *9- 10.
166. Id. at *10.
167. 541 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2008).
168. Id. at 796.
169. Id. at 796 ("[Rlestrictions on non-deceptive advertising are reviewed under intermediate
scrutiny.... The district court in this case reviewed § 528's disclosure requirements under the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard, but we conclude that rational basis review is proper. The disclosure
requirements here, like those in Zauderer, are intended to avoid potentially deceptive advertising.").
170. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) (apply-
ing the deferential review of Zauderer because the statute imposed a disclosure requirement and
because it "is directed at misleading commercial speech").
171. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966 (9th Cir. 2009)
("Compelled disclosures, justified by the need to 'dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or
deception,' are permissible if the 'disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's inter-
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2. Can The Purpose Be "Paternalistic"?
The "paternalism" the Court condemns in the speech restraint cases
involves a three-step ends/means continuum: (1) a government agency
suppresses speech (2) to modify individual buyer/seller transactions (3)
to achieve a public purpose, which is something other than preventing
consumer deception. Steps two and three are commonplace aims of le-
gitimate non-speech regulatory actions. It is the very essence of regula-
tion to restrict the freedom of individual marketplace actors in some in-
stances to serve the democratic government's conception of the public
interest. The many types of public interests served by these actions are
not exclusively, or even primarily, preventing consumer deception.
As noted above, a number of courts have rejected claims by vendors
that Zauderer's rational basis review is limited to disclosure require-
ments that are intended to protect consumers from deception. 172 These
courts have reasoned that the "free flow of information" value that un-
derpins the protection of commercial speech must extend to render a
government's purpose to provide more information to aid fully informed
consumer decision-making legitimate, even if the regulator did not im-
pose the disclosure requirement to correct affirmatively deceptive or
misleading vendor speech. 173 Extended this far, the reasoning remains
consistent with that articulated by the Court in condemning "paternalis-
tic" speech restraints. 174 Many existing disclosure requirements can be
characterized as intended simply to provide additional information,
which will assist consumers in making decisions that reflect their own
rational self-interests and which the consumers would not know was in
their interest without government mandated disclosure. Requirements
that vendors label products as kosher, 175 as containing ingredients to
which certain consumers may have an allergic reaction, 76 or with safe
handling advice 177 fall into this category.
But many disclosure requirements have purposes that extend be-
yond merely facilitating the exercise of each individual consumer's ra-
est in preventing deception of customers."' (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 131-171.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 131-17 1.
174. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (less than strict
judicial review is appropriate when states "require[] the disclosure of beneficial consumer informa-
tion").
175. See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTs. LAW §§ 201-a(l), 201-c(l), invalidated by Commack
Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002) (establishment clause viola-
tion).
176. See, e.g., Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
282, 118 Stat. 905, 905-11 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/FoodAllergensLabeling/GuidanceComplianceRegulator
ytnformation/ucm 106187.htm.
177. See, e.g., Mandatory Safe Handling Statements on Labeling of Raw Meat and Poultry
Products, 9 C.F.R. §§ 317.2, 317.5, 381.125, 381.134 (1994).
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tional self-interest. Often, government regulators impose disclosure re-
quirements for the purpose of modifying the "reactions" that they antici-
pate consumers will have to un-supplemented advertiser information.
78
Regulators require disclosure because of "a fear that people would make
bad decisions" if given only the information provided by the vendors.
179
That is, an explicit government purpose is to change individual product
purchasing behavior to implement a judgment about "what the govern-
ment perceives to be their own good,"'180 or, often, and more specifically,
what the government has determined is in the public good.
Labeling requirements may be part of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that makes clear the consumer behavior modification objective.
Cigarette package labeling requirements exist within a complex structure
of many different federal, state, and local regulations, including direct
marketing restrictions, taxes, and public education efforts aimed at serv-
ing the public interest in reducing demand for a product that results in
high social and economic costs."' An explicit strategy of cigarette regu-
lations is to change public attitudes about the desirability of the prod-
uct-to "denormalize" tobacco use.
182
Similar multi-level and multi-faceted regulatory structures with the
underlying agenda of changing public attitudes and purchasing behavior
exist with respect to other products governments have identified as caus-
ing harms to public health and resulting in high social and economic
costs. 183 While a requirement that food manufacturers label products with
sodium, sugar, or transfat can be characterized as a government effort to
"open the channels of communication," another, more aggressive, pur-
pose is obvious as well. Each requirement is part of a broader strategy to
promote healthy food consumption, not just any food consumption ra-
tional consumers may happen to choose. And the judgment of what con-
stitutes "healthy" food consumption can be controversial. ' 84 Conse-
quently, many existing labeling requirements depend upon government
authority to require disclosure of information because of the "reactions"
178. See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of "False" Is: Falsity and Mis-
leadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 227, 250 & n.107 (2007) (dis-
cussing the "preference-shaping effects" of labeling requirements).
179. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002).
180. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
181. See, e.g., TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO:
IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY (2009), available at http://publichealthlawcenter.org/
topics/tobacco-controU/federal-regulation-tobacco/federa-reguation-tobacco-collection.
182. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing
campaign of California Department of Health Services "to 'denormalize' smoking, by creating a
climate in which smoking would seem less desirable and less socially acceptable.").
183. See, e.g., Penny Starr, First Lady Links Childhood Obesity to National Security in Launch
of 'Let's Move' Campaign, CNSNEwS.COM, Feb. 09, 2010, http://cnsnews.comnewslarticle/61157
(describing elements of anti-obesity campaign).
184. See, e.g., John Tierney, Diet and Fat: A Severe Case of Mistaken Consensus, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2007, at FI (describing controversy about USDA Food Pyramid and advice to eat a low-fat
diet), available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Diet%20and%2OFat.pdf.
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it presumes consumers will have to un-supplemented information and for
the purpose of modifying consumer behavior to serve the government's
determination of the public interest.
185
The Second Circuit's three cases all involve labeling requirements
where a government purpose to modify behavior is mixed with the pur-
pose to inform. In IDFA, the panel invalidated a Vermont requirement
that milk manufacturers disclose use of the hormone rBST. t 86 Vermont
passed the law because its citizens wanted to know the information.'
87
The court held that "consumer curiosity" was not enough to justify im-
posing the disclosure requirement on the producer's commercial
speech. 88 As the dissent pointed out, milk producers vigorously opposed
the labeling requirement because of the reaction they feared consumers
would have to it. 189 The milk producers also successfully argued that the
information provided should have no impact on a reasonable consumer,
because consumers should only be concerned about health effects of the
hormone on the milk product, and that had not been scientifically dem-
onstrated.' 9° That is, milk producers were concerned that consumers
would react irrationally to the information provided at purchase of the
product, despite the fact that the vendors remained free to provide what-
ever contrary information they wanted, at either that moment or in other
advertising. 19 1 Specifically, the milk producers conceded the powerful
persuasive effect of information provided at the product purchase mo-
ment. By requiring that the government provide a particular showing of
harm in order to require disclosure, the majority interpreted the First
Amendment as granting the milk producers a right of "concealment" in
order to present their persuasive product messages in their own way.192
The milk labeling controversy helps make clear that what is at stake on
185. Regulators may also seek to influence producer behavior through imposition of labeling
requirements because of the anticipated consumer behavior modification effect. When threatened
with an upcoming trans fat labeling requirements many food producers abandoned using them to
avoid the anticipated reaction of consumers to the disclosure. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DuTY, RESTRAINT 177 (2000) (describing decision of Kraft Foods to
remove trans fats from Oreo cookies in anticipation of mandatory labeling); Elise Golan, Fred Ku-
chler & Barry Krissoff, Do Food Labels Make a Difference?... Sometimes, AMBER WAVES, Nov.
2007, http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/Scripts/print.asppage=/November07/Features/
FoodLabels.htm.
186. Manufacturers could comply with the law by placing a small blue sticker on their milk, in
conjunction with a sign posted by the retailers indicating that the sticker marked hormone-exposed
milk. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1996).
187. Id. at 75-76 (Leval, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 74 (majority opinion) ("[W]e hold that consumer curiosity alone is not a strong
enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual statement in a commer-
cial context.") (citation omitted).
189. See id. at 80 (Leval, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 73 (majority opinion) ("[Tihe already extensive record in this case contains no
scientific evidence.., that rBST has any impact at all on dairy products.").
191. Id. at 80 (Leval, J., dissenting) ("[The manufacturers] do not wish consumers to know that
their milk products were produced by use of rBST because there are consumers who, for various
reasons, prefer to avoid rBST.").
192. See id. at 74, 80.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
both sides of the argument about the extent of government authority to
impose disclosure requirements is the power to influence to modify con-
sumer behavior, not simply to inform it.
The Second Circuit in Sorrell directly acknowledged the consumer
behavior modification objective of the disclosure requirement.' 93 The
"overall goal" of the requirement that manufacturers label products con-
taining mercury with content and proper disposal information was not
simply to inform consumers so that they could decide upon their own
rational self-interests and pursue them. Rather, it was "plainly" to pursue
the additional public interest in "reduc[ing] the amount of mercury re-
leased into the environment."'' 94 This purpose, the court noted, was "in-
extricably intertwined with the goal of increasing consumer awareness of
the presence of mercury in a variety of products."' 195 Increasing public
awareness through mandated disclosure had the purpose of "encouraging
... changes in consumer behavior."' 96 Although the "change" the court
referred to was in consumers' product disposal behavior, it is not hard to
imagine that the required mercury content disclosures were also for the
purpose of reducing demand for mercury containing products as well.
The court nevertheless explicitly recited the linkage of disclosure re-
quirements, consumer behavior change, and fulfillment of the govern-
ment purpose as appropriate to demonstrate the reasonable ends-means
relationship required by the Zauderer test.1
97
More recently, in reviewing calorie content disclosure requirements
imposed on New York restaurants, the same court found these means
rationally related to the city's purpose "to promote informed consumer
decision-making so as to reduce obesity and the diseases associated with
it.'' 198 Although the court noted that the city was not obliged to produce
evidence to support its decision-making under the rational basis review
applied, it listed much of the evidence the city chose to produce showing
that obesity is a public health problem, that obesity correlates to eating in
restaurants, and that "calorie information is most relevant to obesity pre-
vention."' 99 The court thus concluded that the "calorie disclosure rules
are clearly reasonably related to [the city's] goal of reducing obesity."
2 °




197. Id. ("By encouraging such changes in consumer behavior, the labeling requirement is
rationally related to the state's goal of reducing mercury contamination.").
198. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA), 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir.
2009).
199. Id. at 136 (quoting ThE KEYSTONE FORUM ON AWAY-FROM-HOME FOODS:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PREVENTING WEIGHT GAIN AND OBESITY (2006)), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutritionlReportsResearch/ucm082064.htm.
200. NYSRA, 556 F.3d at 136.
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These cases illustrate that the "purpose" behind modem labeling re-
quirements is more complex than the discussions in the speech restraint
cases may suggest. Regulators mandate disclosure both to provide infor-
mation, in the hope that consumers will modify their purchasing behavior
to align with the public interest, and to persuade them to view the public
interest as their own. The government's means of achieving behavior
modification is what is importantly different between the speech restraint
and speech disclosure cases. The "paternalism" of regulating to modify
consumer behavior to achieve a public interest remains the same.
3. Can the Information Be Selected and Presented to Persuade?
The Court in Zauderer distinguished unconstitutional compulsions
that individuals publicize or recite ideological government messages
from the requirement that the attorney include "purely factual and uncon-
troversial information" with his own commercial speech . Several
courts have evaluated disclosure requirements against this standard,
reaching different conclusions as to whether the disclosure requirement
was unconstitutionally persuasive.
The Seventh Circuit accepted this argument in striking down an Il-
linois statute that required distributors to place a four square inch "18"
label on "sexually explicit" video games, and to post signs and distribute
brochures explaining the rating system. 2 The state's purpose for the
regulation was "shielding children from indecent sexual material and in
assisting parents in protecting their children from that material., 203 The
court rejected the state's contention that the contents of the label and
signage were similar to the required disclosure of mercury content in
lights, which was upheld by the Second Circuit in Sorrell:
With regard to the "18" sticker requirement, this argument seems to
be plainly unsound. The [state statute] requires that the "18" sticker
be placed on games that meet the statute's definition of "sexually ex-
plicit." The State's definition of this term is far more opinion-based
than the question of whether a particular chemical is within any given
product. Even if one assumes that the State's definition of "sexually
explicit" is precise, it is the State's definition-the video game manu-
facturer or retailer may have an entirely different definition of this
term. Yet the requirement that the "18" sticker be attached to all
games meeting the State's definition forces the game-seller to include
this non-factual information in its message that is the game's packag-
ing. The sticker ultimately communicates a subjective and highly
controversial message-that the game's content is sexually explicit.
201. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985).
202. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641,643 (7th Cir. 2006).
203. Id. at 646.
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This is unlike a surgeon general's warning of the carcinogenic prop-
erties of cigarettes, the analogy the State attempts to draw.
204
Because it found the speech to be ideological, the court applied
strict scrutiny to invalidate it as not narrowly tailored. It reached the
same conclusions with respect to the signs and brochures explaining the
rating system, finding in addition that these items unconstitutionally re-
quired sellers to "communicate endorsement of the [Entertainment Soft-
ware Rating Board], a non-governmental third party whose message may
be in conflict with that of any particular retailer. 2 0 5 The court did not
cite or distinguish the Supreme Court's decision in Meese, which upheld
a "propaganda" label on political speech,2°
Outside the context of video game labels, 20 7 courts have found se-
lective disclosure requirements to meet Zauderer's "factual and uncon-
troversial" requirement. For example, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a chal-
lenge by municipal units to an EPA rule that required, as a condition to
receiving a permit to discharge waste into waterways, that they "distrib-
ute educational materials to the community" about the dangers of storm
water runoff.2 °8 The court found that "[i]nforning the public about safe
toxin disposal is non-ideological.,, 209 The Second Circuit in NYSRA spe-
cifically addressed the restaurant association's claim that calorie disclo-
sure was unconstitutionally selective:
NYSRA does not contend that disclosure of calorie information is not
"factual"; it only claims that its member restaurants do not want to
communicate to their customers that calorie amounts should be pri-
oritized among other nutrient amounts, such as those listed in [the]
Nutrition Fact panel. However, the First Amendment does not bar the
204. Id. at 652.
205. Id. at 653.
206. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480-85 (1987); see supra notes 62-64 and accompanying
text. The Ninth Circuit invalidated a similar "18" labeling requirement for violent videos, finding it
inconsistent with "the factual information and deception prevention standards set forth in Zauderer"
after it held that the state could not constitutionally prohibit under 18 year olds from purchasing the
videos. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985)) ("Unless the Act can clearly and legally characterize a video game as 'violent' and not
subject to First Amendment protections, the '18' sticker does not convey factual information.")
(emphasis added).
207. That the product labeled is, itself, speech, muddies the analysis. See, e.g., Am. Amuse-
ment Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576-77 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that video games are
speech). Additionally, ratings systems present an intermediary step between the product information
and the information on the label, which makes the government's selective judgment about the infor-
mation provided more apparent.
208. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 848 (9th Cir. 2003).
209. Id. at 849-50 (analyzing EPA's administrative rules implementing the Clean Water Act
that require small municipal sewer systems that discharge waste to conduct public education efforts
about the effects of sewer discharges.); see also Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114
n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Our decision reaches only required disclosure of factual commercial informa-
tion [about mercury content]."); Conn. Bar Ass'n v. U.S., 394 B.R. 274, 286 n.13 (D. Conn. 2008)
("In contrast [to the cases involving compelled dissemination of ideological speech], the required
disclosures here are all facts about the bankruptcy process.").
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City from compelling such "under-inclusive" factual disclosures,
where.., the City's decision to focus its attention on calorie amounts
is rational.
210
Although they involve selective disclosures arguably crafted, at
least in part, to persuade, all of the disclosure requirements addressed by
the courts thus far have involved information that consumers likely
would not know without the disclosure. In challenging the new cigarette
labels, sellers argue that the graphic, colorful labels are more constitu-
tionally offensive because they present information that consumers al-
ready know or could be brought to know in a far less eye-catching way,
and so are obviously crafted not to inform but to persuade. 21 The district
court disagreed, finding that "the government's goal is not to stigmatize
the use of tobacco products on the industry's dime; it is to ensure that the
health risk message is actually seen by consumers in the first in-
stance. 2 12 The court rejected the cigarette manufacturers' proposed
analogy to video game labeling, describing the message required to be
disclosed on the packages as "objective" and as having "not been contro-
versial for many decades. 21 3 As to the required addition of graphic im-
agery, the court said that it did "not believe that [it] will alter the sub-
stance of such messages, at least as a general rule."2t 4 Interestingly, in an
earlier part of the decision, the court accepted the cigarette manufactur-
ers' challenge to a portion of the statute that banned the use of color or
graphics in their labeling or advertising, finding that symbols and "some
uses of color" communicate information in a different, and potentially
more persuasive, way than the black and white text the statute re-
215quires.
II. THE ABORTION DISCLOSURE CASES
At the same time that it has been reviewing restrictions of commer-
cial speech more rigorously, the Court has been developing a jurispru-
dence of constitutionally permissible disclosure requirements in the con-
text of abortion. By contrast to the tightening of review of government
regulations and the mixed signals that fuel challenges to commercial
speech disclosure requirements, the abortion disclosure jurisprudence is
relatively unambiguous. In this line of cases, firm answers exist - either
in the Court's terse comments or in the lower courts' more lengthy appli-
210. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA), 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted).
211. Commonwealth Brands v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 531.
214. Id. at 532.
215. Id. at 525. The district court invalidated the "ban on color and graphics in labels and
advertising" for tobacco products under the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson, which re-
quire a "direct" and "no more extensive than is necessary" relationship between the end and means.
Id. at 521, 541.
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cations - to what seems like open questions in the commercial speech
line of cases.
A. The Supreme Court's Informed Consent to Abortion Cases
The abortion disclosure cases began immediately after Roe v.
Wade 2 16 established a constitutional right to choose abortion before fetal
viability.217 In the early cases after the Roe v. Wade decision, the Court
addressed the impact of informed consent provisions on a woman's pri-
vacy right, without discussing the impact of the requirements on abortion
providers' free speech rights.2t8 Under Roe's trimester framework, a state
could not impose a regulation that had a "significant impact on the wom-
an's exercise of her [abortion] right" 2 9 during the first three months of
pregnancy, and could not impose such a regulation for the purpose of
protecting fetal life until the third trimester. 22 Employing this analysis,
the Court reasoned that protecting the woman's health was the only pur-
pose that could support a mandatory information disclosure requirement,
and it scrutinized the pieces of information that states selected for disclo-
sure,221 invalidating disclosure requirements that it deemed "not relevant
to [informed] consent ' 222 and "designed to influence the woman's in-
formed choice between abortion or childbirth. 223
224In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a
majority of the Court modified its prior decision in Roe to acknowledge
the existence of a legitimate government interest in protecting fetal life
that attaches at the beginning of the pregnancy, and applied this revision
to uphold disclosure requirements indistinguishable from those it had
invalidated in prior cases.225 The plurality and concurring justices on this
issue wrote separately.226 Only the plurality addressed the abortion pro-
216. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
217. Id. at 164-65.
218. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
490-91 (1983) (upholding a state consent statute which comported with Belotti II); Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti 1/), 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (concluding a state could require parental consent but only if
the state also provides "an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be
obtained"); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 1), 428 U.S. 132, 145 (1976) (explaining that a state consent
statute may not create a "parental veto"); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
69-70 (1976) (striking down a state statute requiring a husband's written consent).
219. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,430 (1983).
220. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977).
221. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 443 (clarifying that a state does not have "unreviewable author-
ity to decide what information a woman must be given before she chooses to have an abortion").
222. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986)
("Under the guise of informed consent, the Act requires the dissemination of information that is not
relevant to such consent, and, thus, it advances no legitimate state interest.").
223. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 444.
224. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
225. Id. at 878.
226. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter announced the judgment of the Court and deliv-
ered a plurality opinion. Id. at 841. Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia and Thomas concurred in the
judgment that the disclosure requirement did not violate the due process clause, but would have
applied rational basis analysis to reach this result. Id. at 967-69.
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viders' Free Speech Clause claim. 227 While preserving the "essence of
the abortion right," the plurality rejected Roe's trimester framework rea-
soning and replaced it with an "undue burden" inquiry that applies to
state regulations imposed from the onset of the pregnancy.228 In deter-
mining that the disclosure requirements at issue did not impose an undue
burden on the abortion right, the plurality explicitly rejected prior Court
holdings that only a purpose to protect women's health could support
required disclosure. It held that states may select information and man-
date disclosure for the purpose of protecting fetal life and "to persuade
her to choose childbirth over abortion.,, 229 In discussing the required dis-
closures that may survive this undue burden analysis, the plurality twice
stated that the disclosures should be "truthful and not misleading., 230
After finding that the disclosure requirements imposed no unconsti-
tutional burden on the prospective abortion consumer, the Casey plurality
briefly addressed the abortion providers' claim that the mandated disclo-
sures violated their Free Speech Clause rights.23' The plurality first rea-
soned that the providers' claim acquired no heightened value because of
its articulation in the context of the protected abortion right. 232 With this
put aside, "[a]ll that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted First
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the
risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. 233
The plurality reasoned:
To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are
implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitu-
tional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the in-
formation mandated by the State here.
234
227. Id. at 884 (concluding that an abortion provider's constitutional right "not to provide
information" extends "only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State").
228. Id. at 876 ("[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the
State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty.").
229. Id. at 878, 882-83 (asserting that governments may require that women considering
abortion receive information about "the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the
fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to her health," and even when the
information provided "expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion").
230. Id. at 882 (prior cases went too far in invalidating disclosure of "truthful, nonmisleading
information").
231. Id. at 884.
232. Id. ("Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may have as a general
matter, in the present context it is derivative of the woman's position. The doctor-patient relation
does not underlie or override the two more general rights under which the abortion right is justified:
the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy. On its own, the doctor-patient
relation here is entitled to the same solicitude it receives in other contexts. Thus, a requirement that a
doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for con-
stitutional purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information
about any medical procedure.").
233. Id.
234. Id. (citations omitted).
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Although not specifically reviewing a disclosure requirement, the
Court later, in Gonzales v. Carhartz35 characterized its holding in Casey
to be that "[t]he government may use its voice and its regulatory author-
ity to show its profound respect for the life within the woman." 23 6 In ad-
dressing the question whether barring a type of procedure imposed an
undue burden on the right to choose abortion, in light of claims that it
was necessary in some circumstances to protect the health of abortion
consumers, it said, "The Court has given state and federal legislatures
wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and
scientific uncertainty.
237
B. Informed Consent in the Lower Courts-Issues and Answers
States have enacted a number of abortion disclosure requirements
since the Court's decision in Casey, and as the Court's commercial
speech and government speech jurisprudences have continued develop-
ing. Many of these "informed consent" provisions both go beyond in-
formation normally required by the informed consent doctrine and can
reasonably be interpreted as designed to persuade women not to choose
abortion.238 Lower courts have addressed the increasing Free Speech
Clause challenges brought by abortion providers to the disclosure re-
quirements, fleshing out Casey's few sentences to identify the standard
of review and analysis that apply to such claims.
1. The Test is Rational Basis
Lower courts have uniformly interpreted Casey to apply a "reason-
able relationship" test to claims by abortion providers that disclosure
requirements violate their free speech rights.239 Several courts have noted
that the level of review would change if states were to require doctors to
provide patients with state mandated "ideology" instead of factual dis-
closures.24° Many courts have noted and grafted onto the Free Speech
235. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
236. Id. at 157.
237. Id. at 163.
238. Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion
Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1609 (2008). According to a recent Guttmacher Institute report
17 states mandate that women be given "counseling" before an abortion that includes information on
at least one of the following: the purported link between abortion and breast cancer (6 states), the
ability of a fetus to feel pain (9 states), long-term mental health consequences for the woman (7
states) or information on the availability of ultrasound (8 states). Commentators argue that at least
some of these provisions should be interpreted to violate the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 1609-12; see
Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV.
939, 1007-09 (2009) (provisions violate the fights of the listener); Robert Post, Informed Consent to
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL L. REV. 939,
959 (2007) (provisions violate the right of the speaker).
239. This tracks the Court's language and brief analysis. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (doctors' speech subject to "reasonable... regulation by the State").
240. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734-35 (8th
Cir. 2008) ("Casey and Gonzales establish that the State cannot compel an individual simply to
speak the State's ideological message ... ").
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Clause test the additional requirement twice articulated by the Casey
plurality in its undue burden analysis that "permissible" disclosure re-
quirements must be "truthful and not misleading.,
241
This phraseology parallels language contained in several different
parts of its commercial speech jurisprudence. Central Hudson's first
prong requires that commercial speech be "lawful activity and not be
misleading" to earn entry into the protected category.242 And, as noted
above, lower courts have interpreted Zauderer to require that the content
of mandated disclosure requirements be "factual and uncontroversial. 243
The Supreme Court plurality did not make any of these connections, and
neither have the lower courts. No court has considered applying the full
tests set out in Central Hudson or Zauderer to state requirements that
doctors deliver state mandated information along with their own speech.
2. The Purpose Can Be "Paternalistic"
As to legitimate purposes that can support mandated disclosure re-
quirements, courts have applied as binding precedent the Casey plural-
ity's reasoning that either a purpose to protect maternal health or to pro-
tect the life of the unborn fetus will suffice.244 Protecting maternal health
is a purpose consistent with furthering the consumer's rational self inter-
est in self protection. Protecting the life of an unborn fetus is a purpose
that asks the abortion consumer to think beyond herself, to consider how
other beings, and one "being" in particular, will be affected by her deci-
sion to undergo the procedure. That is, despite some efforts by the Court
to cast it as a purpose that serves the woman's self interest,245 protecting
the life of the unborn fetus is a public purpose that may well conflict with
the consumer's rational self interest.
As explained above, the "paternalistic approach" that the Court
condemns in the context of commercial speech restraints involves the
combination of (1) restricting speech, (2) to reduce demand, (3) to serve
a public interest, which is something other than ensuring fully informed
and accurate consumer decision-making. 246 In holding that states may
constitutionally mandate disclosure, in a way "which might cause the
241. Id. at 746.
242. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
243. See supra Part I.C.3.
244. See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 495 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he district court con-
cluded that the provisions challenged... bore a reasonable relationship to the state's goal of promot-
ing childbirth over abortion .... [Tlhe district court went on to pronounce that 'were Casey not
binding, I might be inclined to hold that [the statute containing the disclosure requirements] was
passed with an impermissible purpose . . . . However, lower courts are bound by Supreme Court
precedent. I do not see how Casey does not control this question."') (third omission in original).
245. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (stating that informa-
tion about the fetus is relevant to a woman's "psychological well-being," which "is a facet of
health").
246. See supra Part I.C.2.
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woman to choose childbirth over abortion," and which was enacted for
,,247the purpose of "express[ing] a preference for childbirth over abortion,
the Court has held that steps two and three are constitutional when com-
bined with the means of required disclosure in the context of consumer
decision making with respect to the service of abortion.248 Lower courts
uniformly understand and apply this principle.
3. The Information Can Be Selected and Presented to Persuade
The Casey plurality was not ambiguous. 249 The lower courts have
interpreted its words to say that states may pursue their legitimate pur-
pose of protecting fetal life by requiring disclosure of information se-
lected to persuade potential abortion consumers to decide against the
procedure.250 They have also addressed claims by abortion providers that
particular state disclosure requirements go beyond the bounds of permis-
sible state persuasion authorized in Casey, either because they impart
ideology instead of information, or because the information required to
25!be disclosed is untruthful or misleading.
Lower courts have had to address the two prongs of the Casey plu-
rality's reasoning and to reconcile them with the particular statutory pro-
visions under review. These are, first, that the First Amendment would
prohibit a state from mandating that a private individual "simply . . .
speak the State's ideological message ' 252 and second, that the informa-
tional disclosures required by the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey,
even though, at least in part, "designed to persuade [women] to choose
childbirth over abortion," 253 did not do that. Although these courts have
reached different conclusions with respect to the application of Casey's
reasoning to particular types of provisions, they have generally inter-
preted the precedent to allow government regulators a wide range of dis-
cretion both to choose information that abortion providers must present
to potential consumers, and to direct the means of presentation in order
to further the public purpose of reducing demand for a lawful service.
247. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 878 (noting that a state measure may be "designed to persuade [a woman] to
choose childbirth over abortion").
250. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[A
State may] use its regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading
information relevant to a patient's decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also
encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion."); see also Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446,
495 (7th Cir. 1999) (reviewing and approving, in the context of undue burden analysis, the district
court's conclusion that Casey directs that "legislation is based on a permissible purpose if it is rea-
sonably related to promoting childbirth over abortion or protecting maternal health").
251. See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735-36.
252. Id. at 735.
253. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
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In Eubanks v. Schmidt,254 the district court noted that the "possible
ideological component" of the informed consent requirement presented
an "interesting and important enough issue., 255 After reasoning that, ac-
cording to its brief discussion, the Casey plurality must have "believed
these [challenged disclosures] to convey information reasonably related
to informed consent, not ideology," the court further observed that "it is
easy to see why some would disagree.2 56 The court noted that "a statute
requiring every physician to advise women of their right to have an abor-
tion ... might be equally justified as the one here," but concluded that
"[s]imply because a subject is controversial . . . does not make it ideo-
logical. '257 Although "the legislature passed [the statute at issue] to fur-
ther its preference for birth over abortion," the mandated disclosures "do
not overtly trumpet that preference. '2 58 Consequently, the court, like the
Supreme Court, viewed them as "merely providing information.
2 59
The Eubanks court further rejected the abortion providers' claim
that the state statute was invalid because it required providers to pay for
the state-created literature they were also required to distribute. 26 0 Two
other district courts reached the opposite result, reasoning differently as
to both whether a state ideological message was obvious in the disclosure
requirement, and whether abortion providers could constitutionally be
required to pay. In Karlin v. Foust,26 1 the court found that the state statu-
tory requirement that abortion providers distribute "state-printed and
county-compiled materials" was "far more than a simple vehicle for in-
formation distribution.' 262 In its view, the disclosure requirement
"force[d] physicians to associate themselves with the state's anti-abortion
message, a message that is implicit in the information provided even if it
is never stated explicitly. ' '263 Although the court acknowledged that Ca-
sey was binding as to the constitutionality of the distribution require-
ment, it invalidated the additional requirement that the abortion providers
pay for the information. 
264
The district court in Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Ri-
ley265 addressed these questions more recently. In its view:
254. 126 F. Supp. 2d 451 (W.D. Ky. 2000).





260. Id. at 460 ("[l]t is not clear that requiring the physicians to pay for the pamphlets changes
the constitutional analysis to any extent.").
261. 975 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
262. Id. at 1225.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1226. The appellate court did not review the Free Speech Clause part of the holding.
Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
265. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
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The Supreme Court's First Amendment decision in Casey expressly
rejected the notion that a state may require distribution only of ideo-
logically neutral information regarding abortion-that is, information
that not only is truthful and not misleading, but also that does not ex-
press a preference in favor of either childbirth or abortion, because
Pennsylvania's challenged informational materials did express a pre-
ference for childbirth over abortion.2
66
After reviewing Supreme Court precedent with respect to compelled
contributions to ideological and commercial speech,267 the court con-
cluded, like the court in Karlin, that "providers of abortion services con-
stitutionally may be required to distribute the state-prepared materials,
and offer for viewing the state-prepared videotape, advancing policy
positions with which they disagree, i.e., the preference of alternatives to
abortion, but they may not be compelled to finance the production of the
materials and videotape."
268
In the Eighth Circuit, four judicial decisions thus far address South
Dakota's requirement that doctors provide those considering abortion a
writing stating, among other things, "[t]hat the abortion will terminate
the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.' '269 The district
court, which was the first court to review the challenge, granted a pre-
liminary injunction against enforcement of the disclosure requirement,
finding that the abortion providers had established a fair chance of suc-
cess on their claim that the provision unconstitutionally required them to
"espouse the State's ideology. 27° In a divided decision, a circuit court
panel affirmed. 27' The Eighth Circuit reversed the panel in an 8-4 en
banc decision. 72 Judge Gruender, a dissenter in the original panel, wrote
the court's opinion, reasoning that, although "[t]aken in isolation," the
"human being" disclosure requirement "certainly may be read to make a
point in the debate about the ethics of abortion," it must properly be read
to include its narrowing statutory definition. 273 The two judges from the
266. Id. at 1270; see also id. at 1273 n.10 ("Casey distinguished Wooley by saying that the
distribution of an ideological message under the statute at issue in Casey was required only as a part
of the practice of medicine .... ").
267. The Court had not yet decided Johanns, which held that individuals have no First
Amendment right to avoid targeted taxes that fund government speech with which they disagree.
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
268. Summit Med. Ctr., 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
269. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (1)(b) (2009).
270. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D. S.D.
2005) ("Unlike the truthful, non-misleading medical and legal information doctors were required to
disclose in Casey, the South Dakota statute requires abortion doctors to enunciate the State's view-
point on an unsettled medical, philosophical, theological, and scientific issue, that is, whether a fetus
is a human being.").
271. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 725 (2006) (statute's
disclosure provision "forc[es] an abortion provider to recite the state's ideological objections to
abortion").
272. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
273. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735. This "define[s] 'Human being' for the purposes of the informed-
consent-to-abortion statute as 'an individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens, includ-
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panel majority dissented, joined by two other judges, reasoning more
emphatically than they had in their panel opinion that the "human being"
statement "crosses the constitutional line [between permissible factual
disclosures and impermissible ideology] by requiring physicians to
communicate metaphysical ideas unrelated to any legitimate state interest
in regulating the practice of medicine.,
274
The district court on remand granted the state's motion for summary
judgment with respect to the "human being" provision, finding no Free
Speech Clause violation because the statute permitted abortion providers
to explain to patients that the term is biological and not ideological.2 75 It
then addressed whether two other challenged disclosure requirements
were "truthful and not misleading," as the court read Casey to require.
276
Relying upon the state's concession that the required disclosure "[t]hat
the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with th[e] unborn hu-
man being" referred to a legal, rather than a biological, relationship be-
tween the woman and fetus, the court found it to be untruthful, mislead-
ing and thus unconstitutional because such a legal relationship between
born and unborn does not exist as a matter of federal constitutional or
state law. 277 The court also evaluated the statutory requirement that abor-
tion providers disclose "all known medical risks of the procedure . . .
including . . . [an] [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide. 278
Based on a finding that "[d]efendants have produced no evidence ... to
show that it is generally recognized that having an abortion causes an
increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide," the court concluded that
"[b]ecause such a risk is not 'known,' the suicide disclosure language of
the statute is untruthful and misleading.",
279
Other courts have applied the "truthful and not misleading" re-
quirement to abortion disclosure requirements. In Eubanks, as part of its
Free Speech Clause inquiry, the court determined that photographs of
fetal development included in state produced material met this standard,
even though some were over-colored and oversized:
True, some of the fetal development photographs are color enhanced
and other photos are enlarged. Even so, the photographs are neither
misleading nor untruthful. Regardless of their size, photographs do
not become misleading so long as the statutorily required scale al-
lows an average person to determine their actual size. Nor does the
ing the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full
gestation."' Id. at 727 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1).
274. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 743 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
275. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976-77 (D. S.D.
2009).
276. Id. at 977-78. The court seemed to be applying the Free Speech Clause, although some
language suggests that it was considering due process undue burden analysis as well.
277. Id. (first alteration in original).
278. S.D. CODIFIED LAW § 34-23A- 10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2009).
279. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 983.
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color enhancement make an otherwise accurate depiction misleading.
The pictures provide an accurate rendition of the fetus at various
stages of development, as required by the Statute.
2 80
In Karlin v. Foust,28 ' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
a statutory requirement that providers inform women seeking abortions
that medical technology was available "to enable a pregnant woman to
view the image or hear the heartbeat of her unborn child" was not false
and misleading, even though it could not actually detect a fetal heartbeat
in the early stages of pregnancy. 82 In Summit Medical Center of Ala-
bama, Inc. v. Siegelman,283 the district court required the addition of cer-
tain other information to render the state-imposed requirement that pro-
viders inform a woman "that a nonviable unborn child at more than 19
weeks gestation 'may be able to survive' outside the womb" consistent
with Casey's requirement that the disclosures be "truthful and not mis-
leading.'
2s4
In sum, in the context of informed consent to abortion, lower courts
have applied the Casey precedent to uphold a wide range of information
disclosure requirements against Free Speech Clause challenges by ser-
vice providers. More explicitly than in the so-called commercial speech
cases, a number of courts and judges have noticed that governments have
selected the particular pieces of information for required disclosure, and,
in some instances, crafted the means of presentation and disclosure for
the purpose of modifying consumer decision making rather than merely
informing it. In this line of cases, the courts uniformly interpret Supreme
Court precedent to require that the court apply deferential review to dis-
closure requirements imposed on abortion service providers' speech
without respect to whether preventing consumer deception is the gov-
ernment's aim.
M. THE DEFERENTIAL ABORTION "INFORMED CONSENT" ANALYSIS
CONTROLS COMMERCIAL SPEECH DISCLOSURE CASES
Although the Court has never noted the similarity, the commercial
speech and abortion disclosure cases in fact address the same Free
Speech Clause right.285 Whatever signals various combinations of jus-
280. Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451,459 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
281. 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
282. Id. at 491-92 (reasoning that "the information required to be conveyed under the fetal
heartbeat provision is neither false nor misleading because the services are available to all women; it
is simply a question of when such services would render useful results").
283. 227 F.Supp. 2d 1194 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
284. Id. at 1203 (stating that providers "must go beyond a simple mechanical reading of this
provision and provide the woman with the following information: I) a full and complete definition
of the term 'survive' in accordance with the physician's good faith clinical judgment; 2) the nature
of any survival; 3) survival is merely a possibility; and 4) survival will or may be of extremely
limited duration").
285. The right to choose abortion is a constitutionally protected right on the consumer side, and
so the undue burden analysis could perhaps limit what an abortion provider can be compelled to say
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tices may be sending about the continuing vitality of Zauderer and defer-
ential review of commercial speech disclosure requirements, the Court
cannot consistently apply a higher level of scrutiny to disclosure re-
quirements imposed on products and other types of services so long as
the current abortion "informed consent" jurisprudence exists.
Regulatory authority to require disclosures in the contexts of abor-
286tion and other services and product sales stems from the same source.
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, made precisely this point
when dissenting from one of the Court's early decisions applying Roe to
invalidate persuasive disclosure requirements because of the burden they
placed on the abortion right.287 According to the dissent:
The rationale for state efforts to regulate the practice of a profession
or vocation is simple: the government is entitled not to trust members
of a profession to police themselves, and accordingly the legislature
may for the most part impose such restrictions on the practice of a
profession or business as it may find necessary to the protection of
the public. This is precisely the rationale for infringing the profes-
sional freedom of doctors by imposing disclosure requirements upon
them: "Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on par-
ticular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather
than one which physicians may or may not impose upon them-
selves."
288
The Court has repeatedly recognized that lawyer speech to potential
clients, through advertising, is commercial speech.289 Both of the Court's
primary speech disclosure cases involved lawyer speech.290 Lawyers are
professionals and doctors are professionals. Both provide information
about their services that may influence a potential client to buy it. Both
types of speech, like commercial speech more generally, have constitu-
tional value primarily because of the information they provide to poten-
tial consumers. Again, Justice White in his early dissent, convincingly
linked government regulation of the two types of professional speech,
if the requirement that the woman receive the information poses a significant obstacle to the right to
choose the procedure. See Corbin, supra note 238.
286. States have a general police power to protect consumer and other public interests. Con-
gress's authority to regulate interstate commerce allows it to impose disclosure requirements on
sales and services, and includes regulating the abortion procedure. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 166 (2007).
287. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 785 (1986).
288. Id. at 803 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
289. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995); lbanez v. Ha. Dep't of Bus.
and Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994); Peel v. Attorney Registration
& Disciplinary Comm'n of II1., 496 U.S. 91, 99-101, 110-11 (1990); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486
U.S. 466, 468 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 637-38 (1985); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Az., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
290. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) ("The
parties agree, as do we, that the challenged provisions regulate only commercial speech."); Zaud-
erer, 471 U.S. at 629.
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citing Zauderer for the conclusion that the same standard of judicial re-
view should apply to disclosure requirements imposed to regulate all
types of commercial speech:
Were the Court serious about the need for strict scrutiny of regula-
tions that infringe on the "judgment" of medical professionals,
"structure" their relations with their patients, and amount to "state
medicine," there is no telling how many state and federal statutes (not
to mention principles of state tort law) governing the practice of med-
icine might be condemned. And of course, there would be no reason
why a concern for professional freedom could be confined to the
medical profession: nothing in the Constitution indicates a preference
for the liberty of doctors over that of lawyers, accountants, bankers,
or brickmakers. Accordingly, if the State may not "structure" the dia-
logue between doctor and patient, it should also follow that the State
may not, for example, require attorneys to disclose to their clients in-
formation concerning the risks of representing the client in a particu-
lar proceeding. Of course, we upheld such disclosure requirements
only last Term.
291
In Casey, a Court majority adopted Justice White's proposed inter-
pretation of the appropriate scope of government authority to require
doctors to disclose information in connection with the abortion proce-
dure.292 Although none of the justices linked the Free Speech Clause
analysis to its lawyer advertising or commercial speech disclosure cases,
the Third Circuit had explicitly characterized the informed consent pro-
vision at issue as a disclosure requirement imposed on commercial
speech.293 More recently, a few other courts and commentators have
noted that the constitutional questions presented by mandated disclosures
of information are similar, whether it is a professional service or a prod-
uct for sale.2 94 No court or commentator appears to have addressed the
two lines of cases and reasoned that the Constitution requires more def-
erential judicial review of abortion disclosures than of disclosure re-
quirements imposed on other types of commercial speech.295 Because
291. Thomburgh, 476 U.S. at 802-03 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626).
292. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
293. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
294. Conn. Bar Ass'n v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 286 n.13 (D. Conn. 2008) ("Although
Zauderer was decided in the commercial speech context, and Casey in the abortion context, a rea-
sonable relation test was applied in both situations to analyze the constitutionality of factual disclo-
sures by professionals."); Hersh v. United States, 553 F.3d 743, 766 (5th Cir. 2008); Olsen v. Gonza-
les, 350 B.R. 906, 918 (D. Or. 2006) (quoting Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19 (N.D. Tex.
2006)); see also Tushnet, supra note 178, 237 ("We don't generally think of doctor-patient interac-
tions as instances of commercial speech, but the problems of regulating what can be said about a
service provided for money are very similar."); Post, supra note 238, 974-79 (noting the similarity
of the two lines of cases in the context of his argument that certain "informed consent" requirements
should be held to unconstitutionally intrude onto professional speech).
295. If there were to be any difference between the scrutiny applied to disclosure requirements
imposed on pre-abortion speech as opposed to speech preceding other commercial transactions, the
scrutiny with respect to the doctor-patient interchange should be higher. Abortion is a constitution-
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both lines of cases involve the same type of government action taken
with respect to the same category of speech, the analysis that the Court
applies to commercial speech and abortion disclosure requirements must
be the same.
CONCLUSION
In the context of abortion disclosure, the Supreme Court has held
that governments may, through the means of requiring disclosure of in-
formation, pursue purposes other than preventing consumer deception or
even ensuring that the potential abortion consumer receives a free and
unbiased flow of information. The Supreme Court has held that govern-
ments may select information and require its disclosure for the purpose
of persuading potential consumers to eschew the procedure. That is, gov-
ernments may provide information to influence consumer reactions for
the purpose of reducing demand for a lawful product. Additionally, lower
courts have held that governments may present information likely al-
ready known to the consumer in vivid, eye-catching ways that make the
purpose to persuade even more apparent.
All of these holdings provide firm answers to the cigarette manufac-
turers' allegation that graphic labels unconstitutionally compel them to
deliver government speech, as it does to similar challenges that may be
mounted by other types of commercial speakers. The Constitution allows
the government to select and compel the delivery of information in con-
nection with commercial transactions for the purpose of modifying con-
sumer behavior, and, more specifically, for the purpose of persuading
consumers to avoid the purchase entirely. Unless and until the informed
consent to abortion jurisprudence changes, product vendors who argue
that only a government purpose to prevent deception can justify a disclo-
sure requirement imposed on their commercial speech have no case.
ally protected right, which could mean it would add weight to the listener's interest in avoiding
government speech choices. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. And, doctors are professionals, which may
add weight to their interest in avoiding impositions on their patient counseling speech. See Post,
supra note 238, 974-78.
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ABSTRACT
New expressive technologies continue to transform the ways in
which members of the public speak to one another. Not surprisingly,
emerging technologies have changed the ways in which government
speaks as well. Despite substantial shifts in how the government and
other parties actually communicate, however, the Supreme Court to date
has developed its government speech doctrine-which recognizes "gov-
ernment speech" as a defense to First Amendment challenges by plain-
tiffs who claim that the government has impermissibly excluded their
expression based on viewpoint-only in the context of disputes involving
fairly traditional forms of expression. In none of these decisions, more-
over, has the Court required government publicly to identify itself as the
source of a contested message to satisfy the government speech defense
to a First Amendment claim. The Court's failure to condition the gov-
ernment speech defense on the message's transparent identification as
governmental is especially mystifying because the costs of such a re-
quirement are so small when compared to its considerable benefits in
ensuring that government remains politically accountable for its expres-
sive choices.
This Article seeks to start a conversation about how courts-and the
rest of us-might re-think our expectations about government speech in
light of government's increasing reliance on emerging technologies that
have dramatically altered expression's speed, audience, collaborative
nature, and anonymity. It anticipates the next generation of government
speech disputes in which certain associations and entanglements be-
tween government and private speakers complicate the government
speech question. By adding to these challenges, government's increasing
use of newer technologies that vary in their interactivity and transpar-
ency may give the Court additional reason to re-examine its government
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speech jurisprudence. "Government Speech 2.0" thus refers not only to
the next generation of government speech, but also to the possibility that
government's increasing reliance on emerging expressive technologies
may help inspire the next generation of government speech doctrine: one
more appropriately focused on ensuring government's meaningful politi-
cal accountability for its expressive choices.
INTRODUCTION
New expressive technologies continue to transform the ways in
which members of the public speak to one another. Not surprisingly,
emerging technologies have changed the ways in which government
speaks as well. For example, the Obama Administration has instructed
executive agencies to maximize opportunities for using such technolo-
gies to enhance its provision of services to, and its interaction with, the
public.' The White House has an official blog where it discusses policy
and embeds YouTube videos.2 The State Department runs a social net-
work site that facilitates discussions about cultural exchange programs;
3
it also maintains an embassy in Second Life designed to "inform, influ-
ence, and engage the world.' 4 The Federal Emergency Management
Agency allows its YouTube subscribers to learn about its operations in
communities across America and comment on its disaster response and
recovery.5 The Center for Disease Control provides alerts to the public
through social media sites like Facebook and Twitter.6 The Pentagon
uses these tools to "spread the military's message, 7 and the Army's
website includes a virtual recruiter.
8
State and local governments also increasingly rely on networked
technologies to communicate with the public. To cite just a few exam-
ples, the city of Portland, Oregon publishes its crime statistics on its
"Crimemapper" website, and the Kansas State Highway Patrol similarly
1. See, e.g., Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) (exhort-
ing executive departments and agencies to "use innovative tools, methods, and systems to cooperate
among themselves, across all levels of Government, and with nonprofit organizations, businesses,
and individuals in the private sector"); see also Press Release, White House Press Secretary, White
House Announces Open Government Website, Initiative (May 21, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/White-House-Announces-Open-Govemment-Website-
Initiative/ (announcing plan for engaging public through White House blog, wiki, and website).
2. The White House Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
3. ExchangesConnect, http://connect.state.gov (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
4. Victor E. Riche, Presentation to the U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Government 2.0: Pri-
vacy and Best Practices Workshop (June 22, 2009); L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Age: From
Wikinomics to Government 2.0, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2008, at A 13.
5. The Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA's YouTube Channel,
http://www.youtube.comluser/fema?blend= I &ob=4 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
6. See Chris Snyder, Government Agencies Make Friends with New Media, Epicenter (Mar.
25, 2009), http://www.wired.comlepicenter/2009103/govemment-agenl.
7. Gregory S. Williams, Pentagon Using Social Network Sites to Recruit, Medianews (May
4, 2009), http://www.mail-archive.commedianews@etskywarn.net/msg03766.html.
8. Id.
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posts information about traffic accidents, injuries, and fatalities online.
9
The Governor of California sends messages to followers and responds to
their suggestions via Twitter.'
0
For a sense of what we might shortly expect, consider the following
scenario posed by Dan Froomkin:
Imagine a White House Web site where the home page isn't just a
static collection of transcripts and press releases, but a window into
the roiling intellectual foment of the West Wing. Imagine a White
House Web site where staffers maintain blogs in which they write
about who they are and what they are working on; where some meet-
ings are streamed in live video; where the president's daily calendar
is posted online; where major policy proposals have public collabora-
tive workspaces, or wikis; where progress towards campaign prom-
ises is tracked on a daily basis; and where anyone can sign up for
customized updates by e-mail, text message, RSS feed, Twitter, or
the social network of their choice. 
1
Despite these substantial shifts in how the government and other
parties actually communicate, however, the Supreme Court to date has
developed its "recently minted"' 2 government speech doctrine only in the
context of disputes involving fairly traditional forms of expression: the
spoken'3 and written' 4 word, advertisements in print and electronic
form,' 5 and public monuments. 16 This doctrine recognizes "government
speech" as a defense to First Amendment challenges by plaintiffs who
claim that the government has impermissibly excluded their expression
based on viewpoint. In none of these decisions has the Court required
government to identify itself publicly as the source of a contested mes-
9. Daniel Castro & Robert Atkinson, The Next Wave of E-Government, State Tech,
http://www.statetechmag.comlevents/updates/the-next-wave-of-e-government.html (last visited May
19,2010).
10. See Emily Montandon, Do Twitter and Other Social Networks Shield Anonymous Com-
plainers on Topics like Health Care Reform?, GOV'T TECH., Nov. 2, 2009, at 6.
11. Dan Froomkin, It's Time for a Wiki White House, Nieman Watchdog Nov. 25, 2008,
http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgrounddid=00307.
For more extensive discussion of the benefits as well as the dangers of government's use of Web 2.0
and similar expressive technologies, see Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0's Promise
With Robust Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (describing govern-
ment's increasing use of social network sites and urging government to treat Facebook, Twitter, and
similar sites "as one-way mirrors, where individuals can see government's activities and engage in
policy discussions but where government cannot use, collect, or distribute individuals' social media
information").
12. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
13. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 202-03 (1991) (health care providers' discussions
with patients at family planning clinics).
14. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413-14, 425-26 (2006) (prosecutor's memoran-
dum criticizing the police).
15. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (television and print
campaign promoting beef products).
16. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (monuments donated by private party for display by
government in public park).
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sage to satisfy the government speech defense to a First Amendment
claim.
The Court's current approach thus fails to recognize that govern-
ment expression's value springs primarily from its capacity to inform the
public of its government's principles and priorities. The public can assess
government's positions only when the public can tell that the government
is speaking. The Court's failure to condition the government speech de-
fense on the message's transparent identification as governmental is es-
pecially mystifying because the costs of such a requirement are so small
when compared to its considerable benefits in ensuring that government
remains politically accountable for its expressive choices. Deference to
government, more than any other principle, seems to explain the Court's
decisions.
The Court's government speech doctrine-already slow to de-
velop--has yet to grapple with the constitutional significance of gov-
ernment's increasing use of Web 2.0 technologies and other substantial
developments that may obscure government's political accountability for
its expressive choices. This Article seeks to start a conversation about
how courts-and the rest of us-might re-think our expectations about
government speech in light of government's increasing reliance on
emerging technologies that have dramatically altered expression's speed,
audience, collaborative nature,
1 7 and anonymity.' 8
To this end, Part I describes the brief history of government speech
as a matter of constitutional law, critiquing the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence in this area as too often failing to recognize that government
expression's constitutional value turns on its ability to enhance, rather
than frustrate, government's accountability to its electorate. It then an-
ticipates the next generation of government speech disputes and predicts
that emerging challenges might-and, indeed, should-create pressure
on the Court to reconsider its current doctrine. More specifically, it de-
scribes how certain associations and entanglements between government
and private speakers complicate the government speech question. Gov-
ernment's increasing use of newer technologies that vary in their interac-
tivity and transparency will only add to these challenges, and thus may
give the Court additional reason to re-examine its government speech
jurisprudence.
17. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459,
1504 ("[The Internet as a tool of mass communication [has] become only better, quicker, and more
empowering for the ordinary individual.... [Oirdinary people [are enabled] to participate in the
marketplace of ideas, potentially reaching audiences never imaginable before.").
18. See, e.g., Carlisle George & Jackie Scerri, Web 2.0 and User-Generated Content: Legal
Challenges in the New Frontier, J. INFO. L. & TECH (2007), http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/
law/elj/jiht2007_2/george-scerri/georgesceri.pdf ("Discovering the identity of an online publisher
... can sometimes be difficult.... [T]here may be situations where an IP address cannot be traced to




Part II first identifies a typology of the different information-age
technologies that the government now uses to communicate with the
public. It then recommends adjustments to the government speech doc-
trine that would require government to identify itself affirmatively as the
source of contested expression as a condition of claiming the government
speech defense to First Amendment challenges. Because this principle is
equally true for both offline and online communicative technologies, the
form of expressive technology should not affect this analysis.' 9 "Gov-
ernment Speech 2.0" thus refers not only to the next generation of gov-
ernment speech, but also to the possibility that government's increasing
reliance on emerging expressive technologies may help inspire the next
generation of government speech doctrine: one more appropriately fo-
cused on ensuring government's meaningful political accountability for
its expressive choices.
19. For a sampling of views on the longstanding question of whether First Amendment doc-
trine should vary according to the type of expressive technologies involved, see Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 891 (2010) ("We must decline to draw, and then redraw,
constitutional lines based on the particular media or technology used to disseminate political speech
from a particular speaker."); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997) (describing the Court's
"special justifications for the regulation of the broadcast media that are not applicable to other
speakers" and concluding that there is "no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny
that should be applied" to the Interet); Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User
Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media,
104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1633-34 (1995) (calling for fundamental change in First Amendment doctrine
in response to the "revolutionary" nature of emerging expressive technologies); Anne Wells Brans-
comb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyber-
spaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1647 (1995) ("The critical question is whether 'new wine can be
poured successfully into an old bottle,' or whether new legal norms must be devised for the govern-
ance of the Networld.") (citation omitted); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., Converging
First Amendment Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1720
(1995) (urging courts to discard the notion of special rules for broadcasters and instead realize "that
traditional First Amendment principles-not yet another set of unique rules-are quite well suited to
guide and constrain public regulation of these new technologies"); Lawrence Lessig, The Path of
Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1743 (1995) (discussing the debate over whether "this new space,
cyberspace, [should] be regulated by analogy to the regulation of other space, not quite cyber, or
should we give up analogy and start anew"); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis,
85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1167 (1999) ("Reno's one rule for the entire Internet may begin to lose its
luster and perhaps feel ridiculous. The great variation among Internet applications is hard to fit into
one First Amendment box.").
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PART I: THE SUPREME COURT'S BRIEF AND CHECKERED HISTORY WITH
GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Because government must speak to govern effectively, 20 it has en-
gaged in expressive activity since its inception .2  The U.S. Supreme
Court did not recognize "government speech" as a constitutional law
doctrine, however, until quite recently. In a series of decisions beginning
in 1991 with Rust v. Sullivan,22 the Court has, in fits and starts, sketched
out its emerging doctrine, which insulates the government's own speech
from First Amendment challenges by plaintiffs who seek to alter or join
that expression. 23 Political accountability mechanisms such as voting and
lobbying then provide the sole recourse for those displeased by their
government's expressive choices.24
A. The Doctrine's Beginnings
The Supreme Court identifies Rust v. Sullivan as the beginning of
its government speech jurisprudence. 25  After considering a First
20. See 2 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 723 (1947)
("Now it is evident that government must itself talk and write and even listen."); THOMAS I.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 698 (1970) ("Participation by the government
in the system of freedom of expression is an essential feature of any democratic society. It enables
the government to inform, explain, and persuade-measures especially crucial in a society that
attempts to govern itself with a minimum use of force. Government participation also greatly en-
riches the system; it provides the facts, ideas, and expertise not available from other sources.");
Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Fo-
rum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1825 (1987) ("[fIt is probably not too outlandish an exaggeration to
conclude that government organizations would grind to a halt were the Court seriously to prohibit
viewpoint discrimination in the internal management of speech.").
21. See generally JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND (1977); MARK G. YUDOF,
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).
22. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
23. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (explaining that the
government's own speech is "exempt" from free speech clause scrutiny); Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) ("The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation
of private speech; it does not regulate government speech. A government entity has the right to
,speak for itself.' Indeed it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this
freedom.") (citations omitted).
24. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)
("When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular
idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the
citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.");
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is the
very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view on (in modem times, at least)
innumerable subjects-which is the main reason we have decided to elect those who run the gov-
ernment, rather than save money by making their posts hereditary."). Note, however, that constitu-
tional constraints other than the free speech clause may also apply to government's own expression.
See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("For even if the Free Speech Clause
neither restricts nor protects government speech, government speakers are bound by the Constitu-
tion's other proscriptions, including those supplied by the Establishment and Equal Protection
Clauses.").
25. See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) ("The Court in Rust did
not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have
explained Rust on this understanding."). Some Justices earlier signaled their growing recognition of
the doctrine's possibility. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
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Amendment challenge to federal regulations that barred federally funded
family planning clinics from engaging in abortion counseling, refer-
ral, or other expression related to abortion, the majority found no
constitutional violation:
To hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the
basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to
advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing
those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render
numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect. When
Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to en-
courage other countries to adopt democratic principles ... it was not
constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing
lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.
2 6
The dissent, in contrast, characterized the regulations as the gov-
ernment's impermissibly viewpoint-based regulation of doctor-patient
speech: "[T]he majority upholds direct regulation of dialogue between a
pregnant woman and her physician when that regulation has both the
purpose and the effect of manipulating her decision as to the continuance
of her pregnancy."
27
Nowhere in Rust does the term "government speech" appear. In a
series of First Amendment disputes over the next decade in which gov-
ernment did not claim the contested speech as its own, however, the
Court contrasted what it characterized as the government's role as speak-
er in Rust from its role as a funder of private speech in other contexts.
First, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia,28 the Court cited Rust in distinguishing the government's own
speech from a government program that provided financial support for
private speech in the form of student organizations' publications:
[I]n Rust v. Sullivan, we upheld the government's prohibition on
abortion-related advice applicable to recipients of federal funds for
family planning counseling .... When the government disburses pub-
lic funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may
take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is nei-
ther garbled nor distorted by the grantee.29
94, 140 n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Government is not restrained by the First Amendment
from controlling its own expression."); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990) (noting
that "[ihf every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view
with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those
in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed").
26. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
27. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
28. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
29. Id. at 833; see also id. ("When the University determines the content of the education it
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content
20101
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Similarly, in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin Sys-
tem v. Southworth,3 ° the Court again relied on Rust in distinguishing the
government's own speech from government programs that instead en-
courage diverse private speech, such as a public university's fund for
extracurricular student speech:
Our decision ought not be taken to imply that in other instances the
University, its agents or employees or-of particular importance-its
faculty, are subject to the First Amendment analysis which controls
in this case. Where the University speaks, either in its own name
through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its
diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different.
The Court has not held, or suggested, that when the government
speaks the rules we have discussed come into play. When the gov-
ernment speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to ad-
vance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate
and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects,
newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary
position.
3'
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,32 the Court offered more de-
tail in identifying Rust as the genesis of its government speech doctrine,
once again distinguishing government speech from government pro-
grams intended to fund private speech:
The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that
the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to
governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases,
however, we have explained Rust on this understanding. We have
said that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in in-
of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its
own message.").
30. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
31. Id. at 234-35 (citations omitted). Justice Souter further explained this distinction in his
dissenting opinion in Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, where he distinguished government as
patron of private art from government as speaker and buyer:
[T]he government is of course entitled to engage in viewpoint discrimination: if the Food
and Drug Administration launches an advertising campaign on the subject of smoking, it
may condemn the habit without also having to show a cowboy taking a puff on the oppo-
site page; and if the Secretary of Defense wishes to buy a portrait to decorate the Penta-
gon, he is free to prefer George Washington over George the Third.
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 610-11 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 611 ("The Government freely admits, however, that it neither speaks through the expres-
sion subsidized by the NEA, nor buys anything for itself with its NEA grants."). Although the Finley
majority did not characterize the NEA grants program as the government's own speech, it concluded
that different and more deferential rules may apply to arts funding decisions that require government
to assess quality in allocating scarce resources from those that apply to government programs that
"indiscriminately" encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. See id. at 586 ("In the
context of arts funding, in contrast to many other subsidies, the Government does not indiscrimi-
nately 'encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.' The NEA's mandate is to make es-
thetic judgments, and the inherently content-based 'excellence' threshold for NEA support sets it
apart from the subsidy at issue in Rosenberger ....") (citation omitted).
32. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
[Vol. 87:4
GOVERNMENT SPEECH 2.0
stances in which the government is itself the speaker, or instances,
like Rust, in which the government "used private speakers to transmit
specific information pertaining to its own program."
' 33
In contrast, as the Court observed, the Legal Services program:
was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a govern-
mental message. Congress funded LSC grantees to provide attorneys
to represent the interests of indigent clients. . . .The LSC lawyer,
however, speaks on the behalf of his or her private, indigent cli-
ent .... The advice from the attorney to the client and the advocacy
by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as governmental
speech even under a generous understanding of the concept. In this
vital respect this suit is distinguishable from Rust.
34
Firmly rooting the origins of the Court's government speech doc-
trine in Rust, these later decisions also cast additional light on what is,
and is not, government speech. The Court suggested in dicta, for exam-
ple, that a public university's curricular decisions and faculty speech
constitute government's own expression,35 as does military recruiters'
speech36 and the speech of a lawyer who represents the government.
37
B. A Simple Question Remains Unanswered
The Court next characterized contested expression as "government
speech" in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association,38 where it con-
sidered a First Amendment challenge to a generic beef promotion cam-
paign implemented by the Department of Agriculture and funded by tax-
es targeted at beef producers. 39 A number of beef producers objected to
the government's requirement that they fund the program because they
felt that the campaign undermined their efforts to promote their own spe-
33. Id. at 541 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833) (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 542-43.
35. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 ("In the instant case, the speech is not that of the Univer-
sity or its agents. It is not, furthermore, speech by an instructor or a professor in the academic con-
text, where principles applicable to government speech would have to be considered.").
36. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 n. 4
(2006) ("The military recruiters' speech is clearly Government speech.").
37. See Velazquez 531 U.S. at 542 ("The attorney defending the decision to deny benefits
will deliver the government's message in the litigation. The LSC lawyer, however, speaks on the
behalf of his or her private, indigent client."). The Court's characterization of government editors'
and public libraries' selection decisions has been more opaque, emphasizing such decisions' expres-
sive character, but falling short of characterizing them as government speech entirely exempt from
speech clause scrutiny. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998)
("When a public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of its
programming, it engages in speech activity. Although programming decisions often involve the
compilation of the speech of third parties, the decisions nonetheless constitute communicative acts.")
(citations omitted); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 209 n.4 (2003) ("A library's
decision to use filtering software is a collection decision, not a restraint on private speech.").
38. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
39. Id. at 562.
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cialty beef products.4a The ads bore only the attribution, "Funded by
America's Beef Producers,"' generating a dispute over whether reason-
able onlookers would understand the speech as the government' s.
42
All of the Justices agreed that private speakers can be compelled to
pay for government speech with which they disagree, emphasizing that
an effective government requires that taxpayers frequently fund govern-
ment speech with which they quarrel.43 The majority and dissent differed
vigorously, however, on the question whether government must identify
itself as the source of that speech in order successfully to assert the gov-
ernment speech defense to the plaintiffs' free speech claim. Their dis-
agreement largely turned on their varying assessments of the demands of
meaningful political accountability.
The Johanns majority found that government had no affirmative du-
ty to make clear its role as the message's source as a condition of claim-
ing the government speech defense. Instead, it highlighted two factors as
key to its characterization of the advertisements as government speech
exempt from free speech clause scrutiny: whether the government estab-
lished the overall message to be communicated, and whether the gov-
ernment approved, and thus controlled, the message ultimately dissemi-
nated.44 It thus found the promotional campaign to be government speech
based simply on the government's formal authorization and control of
the message at the time of its creation:
[T]he beef advertisements are subject to political safeguards more
than adequate to set them apart from private messages. The program
is authorized and the basic message prescribed by federal statute, and
specific requirements for the promotions' content are imposed by
federal regulations promulgated after notice and comment. The Sec-
retary of Agriculture, a politically accountable official, oversees the
program, appoints and dismisses the key personnel, and retains abso-
lute veto power over the advertisements' content, right down to the
wording. And Congress, of course, retains oversight authority, not to
40. Id. at 556.
41. Id. at 555.
42. Compare id. at 566 ("We have only the funding tagline itself, a trademarked term that,
standing alone, is not sufficiently specific to convince a reasonable factfinder that any particular beef
producer, or all beef producers, would be tarred with the content of each trademarked ad."), with id.
at 577-78 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[R]eaders would most naturally think that ads urging people to
have beef for dinner were placed and paid for by the beef producers who stand to profit when beef is
on the table. No one hearing a commercial for Pepsi or Levi's thinks Uncle Sam is the man talking
behind the curtain. Why would a person reading a beef ad think Uncle Sam was trying to make him
eat more steak?").
43. See id. at 562 (majority opinion); id. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The first point of
certainty is the need to recognize the legitimacy of government's power to speak despite objections
by dissenters whose taxes or other exactions necessarily go in some measure to putting the offensive
message forward to be heard. To govern, government has to say something, and a First Amendment
heckler's veto of any forced contribution to raising the government's voice in the 'marketplace of
ideas' would be out of the question.").
44. Id. at 562 (majority opinion).
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mention the ability to reform the program at any time. No more is re-
quired.
45
In contrast, dissenting Justice Souter would have required the gov-
ernment affirmatively to disclose its authorship to ensure that political
accountability remains a meaningful check on the government's com-
pelled subsidies of such speech:
It means nothing that Government officials control the message if
that fact is never required to be made apparent to those who get the
message, let alone if it is affirmatively concealed from them. The po-
litical accountability of the officials with control is insufficient, in
other words, just because those officials are allowed to use their con-
trol (and in fact are deliberately using it) to conceal their role from
the voters with the power to hold them accountable. Unless the puta-
tive government speech appears to be coming from the government,
its governmental origin cannot possibly justify the burden on the
First Amendment interests of the dissenters targeted to pay for it.
46
Indeed, nowhere did the Johanns majority respond to Justice Sou-
ter's simple and key question: why not require government to identify
itself as the message's source--especially because labeling the familiar
"Beef, It's What's for Dinner" ads as "A Message of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture" rather than with the misleading "Funded by Amer-
ica's Beef Producers" demands very little from the government as a prac-
tical matter while providing considerable value in ensuring political ac-
countability. As Justice Souter stated:
Notably, the Court nowhere addresses how, or even whether, the
benefits of allowing government to mislead taxpayers by concealing
its sponsorship of expression outweigh the additional imposition on
First Amendment rights that results from it. Indeed, the Court de-
scribes no benefits from its approach and gives no reason to think
First Amendment doctrine should accommodate the Government's
subterfuge.47
This remains the great unanswered question in the Court's govern-
ment speech doctrine. This doctrine recognizes the inevitability of gov-
ernment speech: government must express itself to govern effectively.
Such government expression, moreover, serves valuable First Amend-
ment interests in enabling members of the public to identify and assess
their governments' priorities and thus inform their participation in self-
governance. But because government has no individual autonomy inter-
45. Id. at 563--64.
46. Id. at 578-79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 579 n.8; see also id. ('The Court merely observes that no precedent requires the
Government to show its hand when it seeks to defend a targeted assessment by claiming government
speech. That is of course to be expected, since the government-speech doctrine is so new.
(citation omitted).
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est in self-expression, 8 government's expressive interests do not include
an interest in speaking without identifying itself as the speaker. If a mes-
sage's governmental source is obscured, moreover, political accountabil-
ity mechanisms provide no meaningful safeguard.
Recall that the majority in Rust displayed a similar disinterest in re-
quiring government to reveal itself as the speaker as a condition of claim-
ing the government speech defense, as the contested regulations there did
not insist on the disclosure of the expression's governmental origins.49
Instead, the doctors, nurses, and other clinic employees who provided the
counseling were advised to respond to abortion-related requests simply
by stating that "the project does not consider abortion an appropriate
method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for
abortion." 50 Because patients may view health professionals as more
credible than the government on these matters, some may have been mis-
led into evaluating the counseling differently than they would have if the
51speakers had made clear its governmental source.
As in Johanns, the Rust majority also displayed a reluctance to con-
clude that listeners will mistakenly attribute what is actually the govern-
ment's own speech to a private party, noting only that nothing in the reg-
ulations "require[d] a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he
does not in fact hold. . . . [A] doctor's silence with regard to abortion
cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the
doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her." 52 Re-
sisting any requirement that the government affirmatively identify itself
as the source of contested expression as a condition of claiming the gov-
ernment speech defense, the Court in Rust thus started down a troubling
path that it continues to follow to this day.
48. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 809,
816 (2010) ("[G]ovemment is a speaker that enjoys no individual liberty or free will, and whose
need to express itself is limited by a different constitutional role and duty."). In contrast, the Court
has recognized the First Amendment value of anonymous speech by private actors. See, e.g., McIn-
tyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 336, 357 (1995) (striking down state ban on the
distribution of unsigned political leaflets).
49. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180 (1991) (explaining that employees of clinics receiving
federal funding were "expressly prohibited from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion provider,
even upon specific request.").
50. Id. (citation omitted). Although the regulations did not require that the govemment be
identified as the message's source, the majority observed that "[niothing in [the Title X regulations]
requires a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold." Id. at 200.
51. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1394-96 (2001) (arguing that patients could mistakenly attribute the
government's views to their doctors); Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 174
(1996) (same).
52. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
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C. A Doctrine Increasingly Untethered From Its Theoretical Founda-
tions
The Court compounded this flaw in Garcetti v. Ceballos,53 where it
dramatically expanded government's ability to claim speech as its own.
There the Court considered a First Amendment challenge by a prosecutor
disciplined for his internal memorandum that criticized a police depart-
ment affidavit as including serious misrepresentations.54 Citing earlier
cases in which it had distinguished government's own speech from that
of private parties, the Court held that "[riestricting speech that owes its
existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citi-
zen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created. ' 5 The Court thus created a
bright-line rule that essentially treats public employees' speech delivered
pursuant to their official duties as the government's own speech that it
has bought with a salary and thus may control free from First Amend-
ment scrutiny.56 Justice Souter's dissent, in contrast, resisted the major-
ity's bright-line rule as "portend[ing] a bloated notion of controllable
government speech. 57
As discussed extensively elsewhere,58 Garcetti empowers the gov-
ernment to punish public employees simply for doing their jobs when
those workers have been hired to flag hazards and improprieties. For this
reason, Garcetti has had the most real-world impact of the Court's gov-
ernment speech decisions to date, as lower courts now routinely rely on it
to dispose of the constitutional claims of government workers fired after
making job-required reports of illegal or dangerous conditions despite
the great value of such speech to the public. 59 The outcomes in these
cases now turn not on the public's interest in the expression, nor on any
injury to the government employer, but instead simply on whether the
contested speech falls within the plaintiff's job duties.
53. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
54. Id. at 413-14.
55. Id. at 421-22 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995) ("[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own
it is entitled to say what it wishes.")).
56. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22. The Garcetti majority left open the possibility that
public educators' speech that raises issues of academic freedom might be subject to a different
standard. Id. at 425 ("We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we con-
duct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching.").
57. Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
58. Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control of Its Work-
ers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009) (arguing that the First Amend-
ment should be understood to permit government to claim as its own-and thus control as govern-
ment speech free from First Amendment scrutiny-only the speech of public employees that it has
specifically hired to deliver a particular viewpoint that is transparently governmental in origin and
thus open to the public's meaningful credibility and accountability check).
59. See id. at 14-15 (canvassing examples).
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Consider, as just one example, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hup-
pert v. City of Pittsburg.60 The court there applied Garcetti to hold that
the First Amendment does not protect police officers from punishment
based on their truthful testimony before a grand jury investigating possi-
ble police department corruption because such testimony occurs pursuant
to their official duties and is thus subject to their government employer's
control.6'
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Fairley v. Andrews62 further dem-
onstrates the point. There the plaintiff prison guards alleged that they had
suffered threats and assaults because of their reports that other guards
regularly beat prisoners without justification.63 After Garcetti, Judge
Easterbrook concluded, the First Amendment offers the plaintiffs no pro-
tection because their jobs required them to flag prisoner maltreatment:
"Since the General Orders require guards to report misconduct by their
colleagues, the guards' reports are not part of the freedom of speech-
and how the sheriff responds is a question for statutes, regulations, and
wise management rather than the Constitution." 64 Just as unsuccessful
were the plaintiffs' efforts to escape Garcetti by arguing that their jobs
actually-although unofficially-required a code of silence, which they
broke with their reports of misconduct:
Garcetti applies to job requirements that limit, as well as those that
require, speech. Suppose the Jail put a guard in charge of maintaining
a bulletin board, instructing him to post only materials that relate to
workplace safety. If the guard puts up something on a different topic,
or fails to put up anything, the management may discipline the guard
without encountering an objection under the first amendment ....
And Garcetti can't be limited to 'good' workplace requirements ....
The purported code of silence is a ban on filing complaints about
guard-on-inmate violence. Such a policy might be foolish; it might
expose the County to other lawsuits; but it does not offend the first
amendment .... 65
In short, Garcetti operates to the detriment of public employees who
challenge government corruption or otherwise speak out on matters of
significant public interest. It thus illustrates the absurd results generated
by the Court's doctrine-a doctrine now increasingly unmoored from its
60. 574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009).
61. Id. at 708-09. The circuits are currently split on this issue. The Third Circuit held that the
First Amendment still protects police officers' truthful testimony even after Garcetti on the grounds
that such testimony is their duty as citizens as well as police officers. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City,
532 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[The act of offering truthful testimony is the responsibility of
every citizen, and the First Amendment protection associated with fulfilling that duty of citizenship
is not vitiated by one's status as a public employee.").
62. 578 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2009).
63. Id. at 520-21.
64. Id. at 522.
65. Id. at 523 (citations omitted).
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theoretical underpinnings, as it fails to recognize the constitutional value
of government speech as rooted entirely in its ability to enhance, rather
than frustrate, government's accountability to its electorate.
D. Finally, An Easy Government Speech Case-But Questions Remain
This brings us to Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 66 the first case in
which the Court was unanimous in characterizing contested speech as the
government's. The City of Pleasant Grove's Pioneer Park contained "15
permanent displays, at least 11 of which were donated by private" parties
and which included "an historic granary, a wishing well, the City's first
fire station, a September 1 1 monument, and a Ten Commandments mo-
nument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1971. " 67 Summum, a
religious organization, requested permission to donate and erect a stone
monument in the park similar in size to the Ten Commandments monu-
ment but instead featuring the Seven Aphorisms of Summum (a series of
statements that Summum adherents believe that God gave to Moses).68
The City denied the request, claiming that it had made the expressive
choice to accept only monuments that either directly related to the town's
history or were donated by groups with longstanding ties to the commu-
nity.69 The plaintiffs asserted that the various park monuments instead
represented the expression of the private speakers who donated them.7 °
Government and private parties thus both lay expressive claim to the
same speech. When the City denied its request, Summum sued, alleging
that the City's rejection of its monument violated the U.S. Constitution's
free speech clause.71
A unanimous Court found this easily characterized as government
speech: "There may be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a
government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum
for private speech, but this case does not present such a situation. Perma-
66. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
67. Id. at 1129.
68. Id. at 1129-30.
69. Id. at 1130.
70. See id. at 1131.
71. Id. Summum also alleged that the City violated the Free Speech and Establishment Claus-
es of the Utah Constitution. Complaint In 31-39, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, No.
2:05CV00638 DB, 2005 WL 2918243, (D. Utah July 29, 2005). However, neither of these claims
were raised on appeal. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1048 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007).
Although the plaintiff had a number of strategic motivations, this decision can be explained in large
part by the fact that prevailing on an establishment clause claim would result in the removal of the
Ten Commandments monument, rather than requiring the inclusion of Summum's monument. See
Bernadette Meyler, Summum and the Establishment Clause, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 95, 95
(2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edulawreview/colloquy/2009/32/LRCol2009n32Meyler.pdf;
Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 73 (2009),
http://www.law.northwestem.eduAawreview/colloquy/2009/30/LRCo]12009n3OTebbe.pdf.
Although the Court thus considered only the free speech clause claim, the potential establishment
clause issues proved distracting to many. Indeed, Justice Scalia concurred separately to emphasize
his view that the city's display of the Ten Commandments did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139-40 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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nent monuments displayed on public property typically represent gov-
ernment speech. 72  Although the Justices continued to divide over
whether government must affirmatively identify itself as a message's
source to claim the government speech defense, all agreed that the ex-
pression at issue satisfied their various tests for government speech.
Justice Alito's majority opinion, for example, relied on a number of
rationales in characterizing the contested speech as the government's. At
times, he focused on the Johanns "establishment and control" factors:
[T]he City has 'effectively controlled' the messages sent by the mo-
numents in the Park by exercising 'final approval authority' over
their selection. The City has selected those monuments that it wants
to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that it
wishes to project to all who frequent the Park; it has taken ownership
of most of the monuments in the Park, including the Ten Command-
ments monument that is the focus of respondent's concern; and the
City has now expressly set forth the criteria it will use in making fu-
ture selections.
73
The majority, however, also noted that observers would likely at-
tribute the expression to the city, 74 thus satisfying the test preferred by a
number of the concurring justices.75 More specifically, the majority noted
that historical context,76 longstanding government practice, 77 and the
monuments' location on the city's own property78 served as cues 79 that
72. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132.
73. Id. at 1134 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 560-61 (2005))
(citation omitted).
74. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 ("[T]he City took ownership of that monument and put it on
permanent display in a park that it owns and manages and that is linked to the City's identity. All
rights previously possessed by the monument's donor have been relinquished. The City's actions
provided a more dramatic form of adoption than the sort of formal endorsement that respondent
would demand, unmistakably signifying to all Park visitors that the City intends the monument to
speak on its behalf.").
75. See id. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he best approach that occurs to me is to ask
whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the expression to be govern-
ment speech, as distinct from private speech the government chooses to oblige by allowing the
monument to be placed on public land.").
76. See id. at 1132-33 (majority opinion) ("Governments have long used monuments to speak
to the public. Since ancient times, kings, emperors, and other rulers have erected statues of them-
selves to remind their subjects of their authority and power. Triumphal arches, columns, and other
monuments have been built to commemorate military victories and sacrifices and other events of
civic importance.").
77. See id. at 1133 ("We think it is fair to say that throughout our Nation's history, the general
government practice with respect to donated monuments has been one of selective receptivity.").
78. See id. ("Just as government-commissioned and government-financed monuments speak
for the government, so do privately financed and donated monuments that the government accepts
and displays to the public on government land. It certainly is not common for property owners to
open up their property for the installation of permanent monuments that convey a message with
which they do not wish to be associated. And because property owners typically do not permit the
construction of such monuments on their land, persons who observe donated monuments routinely-
and reasonably-interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner's behalf. In this
context, there is little chance that observers will fail to appreciate the identity of the speaker.").
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signaled the expression's governmental source to onlookers. 80 In so do-
ing, however, the majority again failed to tie its rationale to any discus-
sion of the value of government speech in informing the public about its
government in a way that enhances political accountability, even as it
acknowledged-but declined to address-the "legitimate concern that
the government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring
certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint."
8'
Perhaps Summum was unanimous because the objectionable conse-
quences of a contrary ruling were so clear as a pragmatic matter. 82 New
York City, as just one example, would otherwise face a choice of declin-
ing France's offer of the Statue of Liberty or instead accepting it so long
as it accepted all other offers of statues of a similar size and nature.83 To
be sure, pragmatism often drives the Court's First Amendment doc-
trine.84 It has done so very inconsistently, however, in the government
79. See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression's Source,
88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 607-09 (2008) (describing how onlookers use a variety of "source cues" to
determine a message's origins).
80. Although concurring Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer made clear their
resistance to a bright-line rule that public monuments always constitute government speech, they
agreed that, under these particular circumstances, reasonable observers would understand the mo-
numents to reflect the city's own expression. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) ("Nor is it likely, given the near certainty that observers will associate permanent displays with
the governmental property owner, that the government will be able to avoid political accountability
for the views that it endorses or expresses through this means."); id. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring)
("And although the government should lose when the character of the speech is at issue and its
governmental nature has not been made clear, I also agree with the Court that the city need not
satisfy the particular formality urged by Summum .. ") (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 1134 (majority opinion); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the Right, Perhaps
Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG 2d 413, 426-27 (2009) (expressing concern that Summum will
permit governments to adopt demonstrations as their own on the basis of viewpoint and thus engage
in "blatantly unconstitutional form[s] of viewpoint discrimination.... Perhaps a distinction could be
drawn between permanent monuments, as in Summum, and transitory speech, such as demonstra-
tions. It is impossible to explain, though, why this is a distinction that would matter under the First
Amendment.").
82. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 ("Requiring all of these jurisdictions [that have accepted
monuments without such formal declarations] to go back and proclaim formally that they adopt all
of these monuments as their own expressive vehicles would be a pointless exercise that the Constitu-
tion does not mandate."); id. at 1138 (describing how government entities required to maintain
viewpoint neutrality in their selection of donated monuments must either "'brace themselves for an
influx of clutter' or face the pressure to remove longstanding and cherished monuments") (citation
omitted).
83. See id. at 1137-38. For a powerful example of the pragmatic effects of a ruling to the
contrary, see Mary Jean Dolan, Why Monuments are Government Speech: The Hard Case of Pleas-
ant Grove City v. Summum, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 10 & n.18 (2008) (detailing efforts by opponents
of gay rights to donate a monument to hate crime victim Matthew Shepard to the city of Laramie,
proclaiming that Matthew "[e]ntered hell October 12, 1998, in defiance of God's Warning").
84. See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 411, 415 (1992) ("Pragmatism further advocates solutions to First Amendment prob-
lems through careful, contextual, pragmatic reasoning."); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus
Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 739 (2002) ("[Tlhe constitutional
law of free speech seems on the whole, though certainly not in every respect, to be a product of the
judges' (mainly they are United States Supreme Court Justices) trying to reach results that are rea-
sonable in light of their consequences."); Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and
the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech 10 (Chapman Univ. Sch. of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-36, 2009), available at
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speech context. For example, the Johanns majority's refusal to require
the disclosure of expression's governmental origins as a condition of
claiming the defense makes no pragmatic sense, in that such transpar-
ency demands very little from the government as a practical matter while
providing considerable value in ensuring meaningful political account-
ability. And although the Garcetti decision is fueled by pragmatic con-
85cerns related to public agency governance, it also imposes disastrous
pragmatic consequences with respect to public access to government
workers' reports of corruption and threats to health and safety.86 The
Court's government speech doctrine thus seems unmoored not only from
a principled commitment to the role of government speech in enhancing
government's accountability to the public, but also from pragmatic con-
cerns as well. The majority simply appears to defer to the government, as
it has yet to deny government's claim to contested speech as its own.
87
Rather than simply acquiesce to government's claim to speech as its
own, the Court should instead require a government entity seeking to
claim the government speech defense to establish that it expressly
claimed the speech as its own when it authorized the communication and
that onlookers understood the speech to be the government's at the time
of its delivery, thus maximizing the public's ability to engage in mean-
ingful political accountability measures as well as in undeceived assess-
ments of the message's credibility.88 This is a relatively easy problem to
solve, both doctrinally and technologically, should the Court have the
will to do so. The next Subpart explores the possibility that emerging
government speech challenges will place additional pressure on the
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1481478## ("[In First Amendment jurispru-
dence, pragmatic balancing is inescapable."). But see Eugene Volokh, Pragmatism v. Ideology in
Free Speech Cases, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 33, 34 (2004) (discussing "the weakness of the turn from
principle to pragmatism"); R. George Wright, Pragmatism and Freedom of Speech, 80 N.D. L. REV.
103, 104 (2004) (stating that pragmatic approaches "ultimately tend to drain the life from our most
adequate and circumstantially appropriate moral vocabularies and cannot properly account for virtu-
ally all the class free speech values, aims, and purposes").
85. See Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Preroga-
tive, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 38 (2008).
86. See Norton, supra note 58, at 14-15, 30-34.
87. In the four decisions characterized to date by the Court as involving competing govern-
mental and private claims to the same speech-Rust, Johanns, Garcetti, and Summum-the Court
characterized contested speech as the government's own speech so that government could control its
content free from First Amendment scrutiny.
88. See Norton, supra note 79, at 599; see also id. ("[Giovernment can establish its entitle-
ment to the government speech defense only when it establishes itself as the source of that expres-
sion both as aformal and as a functional matter. In other words, government must expressly claim
the speech as its own when it authorizes or creates a communication and onlookers must understand
the message to be the government's at the time of its delivery.") (emphasis added). For other com-
mentators' thoughtful discussion of these and related issues, see, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & Wil-
liam G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2001); Caroline Mala
Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605
(2008); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who's Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005).
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Court to reconsider and perhaps refine its approach to government
speech disputes.
E. What's Next: Increasing Pressure for Doctrinal Change
Because the Supreme Court has yet to articulate a clear rule for
parsing government from private speech-much less one that insists on
meaningful political accountability to check the government's expressive
choices-lower courts continue to indicate frustration with the Court's
doctrine in this area. Indeed, a number of circuit courts of appeal have
declined to take the easy bait offered by the Court simply to defer to
government claims to contested speech as its own. Moreover, they ap-
pear reluctant to embrace the Court's focus on government's establish-
ment and control of contested expression largely because of its troubling
implications that the more government controls speech, the more speech
it will be permitted to control-a proposition that seems inimical to First
Amendment values.
89
For example, several circuit courts continue to apply a four-factor
test for parsing government from private speech-a test cobbled together
before the Court's more recent government speech cases. Under this ap-
proach, courts examine the purpose of the contested program, the degree
of editorial control exercised by public or private entities, the identity of
the "literal" speaker, and whether public or private entities bear "ultimate
responsibility" for the expression.90 Although circuit courts long failed to
identify the theoretical justification underlying this test,91 they now more
helpfully explain these factors as proxies for determining a reasonable
onlooker's attribution of the speech to the government or private parties,
and thus for the public's meaningful ability to hold the government ac-
countable for its expression.
Consider, more specifically, the ongoing controversy over whether
certain specialty license plates-such as those featuring the message
"Choose Life"-reflect the speech of the state (and thus entirely within
the government's control) or of the car owners (and thus subject to First
89. See Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 337 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dissent-
ing) ("The majority's position has the potential of permitting a governmental entity to engage in
viewpoint discrimination in its own governmentally-owned channels so long as the governmental
entity can cast its actions as its own speech after the fact. What is to stop a governmental entity from
applying the doctrine to a parade? Or official events? It is nearly impossible to concoct examples of
viewpoint discrimination on government channels that cannot otherwise be repackaged ex post as
government speech."') (citations omitted).
90. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 792-800 (4th Cir. 2004)
(applying a four-factor test to conclude that specialty license plates were better characterized as
private, rather than governmental speech; thus, the First Amendment did not permit government to
exclude messages based on viewpoint); see also Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132,
1141-44 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying a four-factor test to conclude that a specific holiday display on
public property constituted government speech; thus, Plaintiff had no First Amendment right to add
to the display).
91. See Norton, supra note 79, at 597-99.
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Amendment protections). 92 Such disputes continue to trouble lower
courts, which increasingly suggest the need for a government speech
doctrine that attends to government's meaningful accountability to the
public for its expressive choices. Indeed, a number of circuit courts
largely ignore the "establishment and control" factors emphasized by the
Supreme Court majority in Johanns,93 preferring instead a test that ap-
pears more akin to Justice Souter's dissent in Johanns and his concurring
opinion in Summum 94 that focuses on the perceptions of reasonable on-
lookers. The Seventh Circuit, for example, applied a four-factor test,
urging that it "be distilled (and simplified) by focusing on the following
inquiry: Under all the circumstances, would a reasonable person consider
the speaker to be the government or a private party?, 95 The court then
concluded that onlookers would attribute specialty license plate messages
to private, rather than public, speakers.
96
More recently, the Eighth Circuit summarily distinguished the Su-
preme Court's decision in Summum 97 and instead emphasized: "Our
analysis boils down to one key question: whether, under all the circum-
stances, a reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the
speaker to be the government or a private party."98 In "concluding that a
reasonable and fully informed observer would consider the speaker to be
the organization that sponsors and the vehicle owner who displays the
specialty license plate," 99 it thus joined the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits in stressing the importance of government's transparent identifi-
cation of speech as its own to ensure the government's meaningful po-
litical accountability for its expressive choices.' °° Only the Sixth Circuit
92. Adam Liptak, Is That Plate Speaking For the Driver Or the State?, N.Y. TIMES, April 28,
2009, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28bar.html ("[Tihe volume of
litigation on this question and the doctrinal free-for-all it has given rise to in the lower courts have
convinced many legal scholars that the court must soon step in.").
93. See Scott W. Gaylord, Licensing Facially Religious Government Speech: Summum's
Impact on the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 315 (discussing
lower courts' resistance to the Supreme Court's emphasis on establishment and control in Summum
and Johanns).
94. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1142 (Souter, J., concurring)
("[T]he best approach that occurs to me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully informed observer
would understand the expression to be government speech, as distinct from private speech the gov-
ernment chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on public land.").
95. Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
59 (2009).
96. Id. at 863-64.
97. Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 868 n.3 (8th Cir. 2009) ("We deal here with a much
different issue [than that in Summum]: whether specialty license plates on privately-owned vehicles
communicate government speech. Unlike monuments displayed in public parks, specialty license
plates that advertise the name or motto of a private organization facilitate expressive conduct on the
part of the organization and its supporters, not the government.").
98. Id. at 867.
99. Id.
100. See White, 547 F.3d at 863; Ariz. Life Coalition Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964-65
(9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56 (2008); Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361
F.3d 786, 795-96 (4th Cir. 2004) ("he government speech doctrine was not intended to authorize
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has yet applied the Johanns establishment and control factors to conclude
that "Choose Life" specialty plates are the government's own speech
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.'
0'
As the foregoing illustrates, the most difficult government speech
cases generally involve some forms of collaboration or interaction be-
tween government and private speakers in contexts that create doubt
about the source of contested expression.102 These controversies will
likely increase in number with government's growing use of Web 2.0
networked technologies that facilitate interactivity and collaboration at
speeds and scales heretofore unimagined.10 3 Emerging challenges involv-
ing government's use of contemporary expressive technologies may thus
put additional pressure on the Court to reconsider its resistance to a re-
quirement that the government affirmatively identify itself as the source
of contested expression as a condition of claiming the government
speech defense. °" The next Part explores the contexts in which such dis-
putes may arise, and offers suggestions for their resolution.
cloaked advocacy that allows the State to promote an idea without being accountable to the political
process.").
101. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 548 U.S. 906 (2006). For a discussion of circumstances under which specialty license plates
might accurately be characterized as the government's own speech, see Helen Norton, Shining a
Light on Democracy's Dark Lagoon, 61 S. CAR. L. REV. 535, 537-42 (2010).
102. Similar disputes involve determinations of whether the government's decision to accept
and recognize services from some private entities and not others reflects the government's own
expressive act, or whether such discretionary recognition is better understood as viewpoint-based
discrimination against private speakers. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, In Missouri, a Free Speech Fight
Over a Highway Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2009, at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.con2009/06/21/us/2highway.html (describing controversy over neo-Nazi
groups' efforts to adopt a stretch of state highway with recognition in a state adopt-a-highway sign);
Posting of Robert Mackey & Ashley Southall to The Lede Blog, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com
2009/03/311kfc-and-peta-vie-to-fix-potholes/ (March 31, 2009, 4:58 EST) (describing Louisville's
willingness to accept pothole paving funded by and featuring advertising of Kentucky Fried Chicken
but rejecting similar offer by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals).
103. As discussed more extensively infra, at least one circuit court judge has resisted the appli-
cation of the Court's current approach to disputes involving government's use of networked tech-
nologies. See Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 337-38 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J.,
dissenting) ("What is lacking in this 'recently minted' area of the law are any limiting principles.
The majority extends the discrimination-as-govemment-speech doctrine to links on a government
website.... [l]n the present case the majority extends the doctrine to a situation where, in my view,
it was not clear that the government was engaging in speech at the time it was acting, and only
justified its actions after the fact.") (citations omitted).
104. That the Court has now recognized the great instrumental value of requiring the disclosure
of a message's author in the campaign finance context further suggests the possibility that it may be
open to the possibility of such a requirement in the government speech context as well. See Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) ("The First Amendment protects politi-
cal speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate
entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.").
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PART 11: A NEW GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE FOR THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SPEECH
A. A Typology of Emerging Expressive Technologies Used by Govern-
ment
In our information age, governmental use of networked technolo-
gies to express its views is as valuable as it is necessary. Today, the effi-
cacy of government expression depends upon government's use of net-
worked technologies, such as websites, links, social network sites, blogs,
virtual worlds, video-sharing sites, and other online platforms. 0 5 The
public spends much of its time online and often expects government to
interact with it through a variety of social media.'0 6 Through its online
expression, government provides the public with valuable information
about government opinions. Not only might members of the public find
these views helpful in developing their own positions, but they also learn
much more about their elected officials' values and priorities. This helps
inform the public's views on whether those officials should be re-elected
or replaced.
In recognition of this reality, governments increasingly embrace a
wide variety of networked technologies to communicate with the public.
These include the static communicative technologies of Web 1.0 as well
as more interactive platforms characteristic of Web 2.0.107 By mapping
such technologies' transparency and interactivity, 10 8 this section offers a
typology that may be helpful in identifying when government speaks for
itself and when it instead should be understood as providing a forum for
others' speech-determinations that trigger very different First Amend-
ment consequences.
105. For a thoughtful discussion of the value of such speech, see Mary Jean Dolan, The Special
Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 132-34 (2004).
106. Pew Internet & American Life Project recently reported that "37% of social network site
users expect... updates" from the Obama Administration via social network sites and 34% expect
to hear from the Administration via email. AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE
PROJECr MEMO, POST-ELECrION VOTER ENGAGEMENT 1 (2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/-/
media//Files/Reports/2008/PIP VoterEngagement2008.pdf.pdf; see also AARON SMITH, THE
INTERNET'S ROLE IN CAMPAIGN 2008 (2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/
2009/The_lnternetsRole in Campaign_2008.pdf (documenting the public's avid involvement in
the 2008 campaign).
107. See, e.g., Tim O'Reilly, Web 2.0: A Compact Definition, http://radar.oreilly.coml2005/10/
web-20-compact-definition.html (Oct. 1, 2005) ("Web 2.0 is the network as platform, spanning all
connected devices; Web 2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages of
that platform: delivering software as a continually-updated service that gets better the more people
use it, consuming and remixing data from multiple sources, including individual users, while provid-
ing their own data and services in a form that allows remixing by others, creating network effects
through an 'architecture of participation,' and going beyond the page metaphor of Web 1.0 to deliver
rich use experiences.").
108. As Timothy Wu observes, Internet "applications can and do vary dramatically. To the
user, the Internet comes in many incarnations-email, the World Wide Web, ICQ, and more. A
singular model of Internet usage has become too small to capture the dramatic diversity of today's
Internet." Wu, supra note 19, at 1163.
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1. Transparent Non-Interactive Technologies
Governments use the Internet and related technologies to express
themselves in a wide range of non-interactive ways. All or parts of most
governmental websites provide the public with information authored
solely by the government with no means for the public to contribute
ideas. Certain government blogs do the same, informing the public about
policy and recent news without permitting anyone to comment on
posts.' °9 Government officials use micro blogging services such as Twit-
ter to provide information to interested readers, who cannot respond di-
rectly to governmental Tweets directly," 0 and agencies similarly send
text messages to interested members of the public."'
Consider some examples. The Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) website provides the public with a plethora of information about
its work and policies.' 2 It provides hyperlinks 3 to other websites and
allows readers to subscribe to its news feeds and receive emails concern-
ing updates to the site. 14 It does not, however, permit the public to com-
ment on posted stories or to interact with DHS officials online. The web-
site features the DHS's views only.
The White House website similarly publishes a dizzying array of in-
formation, from the membership of Federal advisory committees to the
names of everyone who visits the White House offices. 15 It hosts live
webcasts of the President's speeches.' 16 It sponsors eight blogs, including
the Open Government Blog, the Office of Public Engagement Blog, and
the White House Blog." 7 While the blogs update the public on news,
policy discussions, and other matters, nearly all omit a comment func-
109. Steve Towns, Four Questions for Beth Noveck, GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY, July 2009,
at 12, available at http://digitalmag.govtech.comIGT/GTMag_JulO9.pdf.
110. Interview by Scott Simon with Justin Cohen, U.S. State Dep't (Oct. 17, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.npr.orgltemplates/transcriptltranscript.phpstoryld=113876776). Twitter
"[ulsers ... can create . . . account[s] to send messages of up to 140 characters to other Twitter
subscribers." Helle C. Dale, Public Diplomacy 2.0: Where the U.S. Government Meets "New Me-
dia," BACKGROUNDER (The Heritage Found.), Dec. 8, 2009, at 9. "Tweets are usually received as
text messages on cell phones, often directing followers to lengthier content viewable on the sender's
Twitter Web page." Id.
111. See Dale, supra note 110, at 4 (explaining that State Department sent out text messages of
President Obama's speech in Cairo to U.S. and non-U.S. citizens); id. at 9 ("The Food and Drug
Administration, for instance, issues food recalls via Twitter.").
112. See Department of Homeland Security, About the Department, http://www.dhs.gov/
xabout/index.shtm (last visited June 1, 2010).
113. A hyperlink is a "reference to a document that the reader can directly follow" via the
World Wide Web. Wikipedia, Hyperlink, http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilHyperlink (last visited June 1,
2010).
114. Department of Homeland Security, Preparedness, Response & Recovery,
http://www.dhs.gov/files/prepresprecovery.shtm (last visited June 1, 2010).
115. The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov (last visited June 1, 2010).
116. Dale, supra note I 10, at 4.
117. See, e.g., The White House Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog (last visited June 1,
2010).
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tion." 8 The website thus does not permit public interaction, and the on-
line messages are clearly the White House's alone.
Such non-interactive Web 1.0 technologies-which constitute the
majority of online government speech-permit readers to identify a mes-
sage's governmental source. Governmental websites and blogs use the
".gov" top-level domain name, which is available only to governmental
entities and thus makes clear the government's authorship of the online
expression." 9 When governments use micro-blogging services such as
Twitter, they use "verified" accounts, which authenticate that they ema-
nate from government.1 20 Such technologies' transparency is enhanced
both because they offer the technical means for clearly identifying the
message's governmental source and because their non-interactive nature
avoids the complications in identifying expression's source often created
when multiple speakers participate.
2. Transparent Interactive Technologies
Governments also employ various Web 2.0 platforms that allow the
public to interact with them. Government officials and agencies use mi-
cro blogging services that permit government users to send messages to
subscribers while allowing subscribers to respond to government users'
posts. Government officials and agencies also interact with the public
through social network sites,121 exchanging information through wall
postings, photographs, videos, and the like. 22 They host blogs that per-
mit the public to post comments. 23 They sponsor channels on video-
sharing sites such as YouTube where they post videos and invite sub-
118. The White House-sponsored Office of Science and Technology policy has a blog that has
comments, thus falling in the moderately interactive/highly transparent category.
119. Wikipedia, .gov, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.gov (last visited June 1, 2010) (explaining
that the domain name "[.]gov is a sponsored top-level domain (sTLD) in the Domain Name System
of the Internet. The name is derived from government, indicating its restricted use by government
entities in the United States"). The General Services Administration (GSA), an independent agency
of the United States federal government, administers the .gov domain name. Id.
120. For instance, Governor Schwarzenegger's Twitter account includes his picture and ex-
plains that it is a verified account, which links to the Governor's official .gov website. Gov. Schwar-
zenegger (Schwarzenegger) on Twitter, http://twitter.com/Schwarzenegger?utm_medium=email&
utm_source=follow&utm-campaign=twitter2008O331162631 (last visited June 1, 2010). This is not
to suggest that Twitter accounts can never be spoofed, but instead that the public can have some
assurance that the government is indeed speaking.
121. Dale, supra note 110, at 7 (explaining that the top five government Facebook pages fre-
quented by the public are The White House, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, U.S. Centers for Dis-
ease Control, and the State Department).
122. Citron, supra note 11, at 6.
123. As defined by Wikipedia:
A blog... is a type of website or part of a website. Blogs are usually maintained by an
individual with regular entries of commentary, descriptions of events, or other material
such as graphics or video. Entries are commonly displayed in reverse-chronological or-
der .... The ability of readers to leave comments in an interactive format is an important
part of many blogs.
Wikipedia, Blog, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilBlog (last visited June 1,2010).
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scribers to comment on those videos and post their own content. They
use virtual worlds like Second Life to interact with the public.
124
Although these platforms are interactive, they facilitate transpar-
ency in two important ways: they identify the government as the speaker,
and, at the same time, they verify the identities of government speakers
First, the various sites' architecture clearly signals that expression
has been authored by the government. A social network profile, for in-
stance, appears like a virtual office (or home), where one can click vari-
ous pages to gain access to a governmental subscriber's photographs,
wall postings, videos, and the like. When perusing a government agen-
cy's Facebook Fan Page, 125 one can view the agency's videos, join live
chats with a government official, and see links to websites that the agen-
cy endorses. If government fans or friends post comments, videos, or
photographs, fans' or friends' names and icon-sized images 1 6 appear
alongside their messages.12 7 Given the design of such social network
sites, blogs, and video-sharing sites, readers can easily identify the gov-
ernment as the author of its wall musings, videos, posts, photographs,
and links.
Second, these platforms either purport to verify or actually do au-
thenticate the identity of government speakers.' 2 8 Third-party platforms
build identity verification into their design for sites used by government
actors. For instance, a government actor's Twitter account explicitly
notes that the governmental author of the micro blogging site had been
"verified," providing links to the government party's official website
124. U.S. Department of Commerce, Earth System Research Laboratory, Outreach at ESRL,
http:llwww.esrl.noaa.gov/outreachl (last visited June 1, 2010) (explaining that National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration officials interact with the public on a virtual island in Second Life).
125. Facebook permits government officials, agencies, and corporations to set up fan sites,
which permit "fans" to see the content on a government speaker's page but prevents government
subscribers from seeing its fans' profiles. In contrast, other social network sites, such as MySpace,
allow government users to generate "friends," which permits them to see everything included on a
friend's profile. Although this capacity has profound implications for privacy, it does not affect the
government speech issues that we address here. See Citron, supra note 11, at 5-7.
126. In using the term "name" here, we refer to the name or identity provided by the person
writing the comment. The name may reflect their true identity or may be a pseudonym.
127. Similarly, government agencies using video-sharing sites, such as YouTube, employ
channels that make clear that the videos have been posted by the government agency as host. Much
like Facebook and MySpace, a government user's video channel is its virtual room with videos
posted under its profile. If subscribers comment on the government user's videos or post videos of
their own, their name and image appear alongside those expressions. To be sure, the identity of those
subscribers typically cannot be verified as many write anonymously or under pseudonyms. But
discussion of the potential need for and value of verifying the identity of subscribers is beyond the
scope of this Article, which focuses on whether the governmental host's identity is clear and verifi-
able, and that appears to be the case.
128. We use the term "verify" to mean that the social network user, blogger, or video-sharing
site holds itself out as governmental in ways that third party services suggest is true. We, of course,
acknowledge that an impersonator could set up a video-sharing site or social network site in the
government's name. Our discussion focuses on government's actual use of Web 2.0 platforms and
its significance for free speech doctrine and theory. We leave the broader concerns about impersona-
tion for another day.
2010]
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(i.e., one with a .gov domain name). Facebook explains that when or-
ganizations, such as government agencies, create "Fan Pages," they do so
as official representatives of the organization. 129 Although third-party
platforms like Twitter and Facebook do not necessarily check to see
whether those setting up the accounts actually hail from government,
they at least signal to the public that those creating the sites hold them-
selves out as government speakers. Moreover, government blogs actually
verify their governmental character by using a .gov domain name. In
either case, readers can identify the speakers as governmental. 30
Consider these examples. The White House's Facebook Fan Page
permits "two-way interaction between the government and its citizens"
through online comments, live chats, and message threads.' 31 It asks
fans: "Watch & Discuss through Facebook at 1:30: Obama Awards Na-
tional Medals of Science and National Medals of Technology and Inno-
vation."' 32 It has twenty-seven videos of official White House business
on its Video page; its eight photo albums permit fans to peruse pictures
of the President and his family. 33 When fans comment on postings, post
videos, or engage in live chats, their Facebook pictures appear next to
their communications. Facebook provides visual cues as to the identity of
speakers, helping readers distinguish between the White House's post-
ings and those of its fans. Furthermore, the White House's Fan Page veri-
fies its governmental nature. It states: "This is the White House page on
Facebook. Comments posted on and messages received through White
House pages are subject to the Presidential Records Act and may be
archived. Learn more at WhiteHouse.gov/privacy."'
' 34
The Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) maintains a blog
called The TSA Blog.135 Five TSA employees run the site, posting on
various issues related to air safety. They post under their blogging
names, making clear that their posts reflect TSA-sanctioned ideas. The
TSA Blog has a page introducing its bloggers and the names under which
129. Facebook, Create a Page, http://www.facebook.com/pages/create.php (last visited June 1,
2010). Fan Pages created on behalf of government agencies list their "Type" of Fan Page as "Gov-
ernmental" or "Politician."
130. This is not necessarily true of a blog's commentators or a social network site's friends,
whose identities have not been authenticated in some manner.
131. Posting of Saul Hansell to Bits Blog, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com2009/03/05/the-
nations-new-chief-information-officer-speaks/ (Mar. 5, 2009, 2:57 PM).
132. Facebook, The White House, http://www.facebook.con/WhiteHouse (Oct. 7, 2009, 11:19
EST).
133. Facebook, The White House, The White House's Videos, http://www.facebook.coml
WhiteHouse#!IWhiteHouse?v=app_2392950137 (last visited June 1, 2010); see also Facebook, The
White House, The White House's Albums, http://www.facebook.com/WhiteHouse#VWhiteHouse
?v=photos (last visited June 1, 2010).
134. Facebook, The White House, http://www.facebook.com/WhiteHouse (last visited June 1,
2010).
135. The TSA Blog, http://blog.tsa.gov (last visited June 1, 2010).
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they write.136 The official who runs the site writes his posts under the
following byline: "Blogger Bob, TSA Blog Team."' 3 7 The tag "TSA
Blog Team" follows the postings of the rest of the TSA bloggers,
38
When the TSA Blog features guest bloggers, their names and designation
as "Guest TSA Blogger" appear underneath their posts. 139 When indi-
viduals comment on a TSA blogger's posts, their names (real or imag-
ined) sit alongside their comments."4° Given these design features, the
blog provides clear signals about the identities of governmental au-
thors. 14 1 And because only official TSA bloggers are identified as such
on the website, readers can easily differentiate between official posts and
unsanctioned comments from private individuals. Much like governmen-
tal social network sites, the TSA Blog remains transparent about the gov-
ernmental source of its expression despite its interactivity.
3. Opaque Interactive Technologies
Governments also increasingly use interactive platforms where gov-
ernment speakers' identities may be both difficult to discern and to au-
thenticate. Web 2.0 platforms, such as wikis, permit users to develop
content collectively and often anonymously. As Wikipedia explains of its
efforts: "Anyone with internet access can write and make changes to
Wikipedia articles . . . .Users can contribute anonymously, under a
pseudonym, or with their real identity .... ,,42 Wikis routinely refuse to
verify the identity of contributors. Indeed, Wikipedia explicitly discour-
ages contributors from using their real names "for safety reasons."'
' 43
Wikis do, however, record a history of edits and contributions by au-
136. The TSA Blog, Meet Our Bloggers, http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/011meet-our-
bloggers_29.html (Jan. 30, 2008).
137. See, e.g., Posting of Blogger Bob to the TSA Blog, http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/02/four-year-
old-boy-in-philly-told-to.html (Feb. 22, 2010).
138. See, e.g., The TSA Blog, Meet Our Bloggers, http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/01/meet-our-
bloggers_29.html (Jan. 30, 2008).
139. See, e.g., Posting of John Daly to The TSA Blog, http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/02/tsa-haiti-
evacuation-effort-federal.html (Feb. 4, 2010).
140. The TSA Blog moderates comments under the following policy:
The purpose of this blog is to facilitate an ongoing dialogue on innovations in security,
technology and the checkpoint screening process. We encourage your comments; your
ideas and concerns are important to ensure that a broad range of travelers are active and
informed participants in the discussion. TSA reserves the right to modify this policy at
any time. This is a moderated blog. That means all comments will be reviewed before
posting. In addition, we expect that participants will treat each other, as well as our
agency and our employees, with respect. We will not post comments that contain vulgar
or abusive language; personal attacks of any kind; or offensive terms that target specific
ethnic or racial groups. We will not post comments that are spam, are clearly "off topic"
or that promote services or products. Comments that make unsupported accusations will
also not be posted.
The TSA Blog, Comment Policy, http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/I0/comment-policy.html (Jan. 30, 2008).
141. The blog does not verify the identity of its commentators as non-governmental actors.
Because the commentators typically write anonymously or via pseudonyms, the identities of those
commentators are neither clear nor verified.
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thors, even though those authors' identities are not verified. 44 Govern-
ments' use of interactive technologies built along this model would not
reliably indicate to readers whether and when speech emanates from
government participants.
Consider some examples of government's use of opaque interactive
technologies. At the 2007 National Environmental Information Sympo-
sium, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) unveiled a wiki de-
voted to pooling collective knowledge on issues related to the Puget
Sound, such as "Puget Sound species and the web of life," the "quality of
human life sustained by a healthy Puget Sound," and the protection and
restoration of Puget Sound habitat. 45 EPA invited symposium partici-
pants and their "networks of knowledgeable people" to participate in the
online collaboration, which took place over a 48-hour period. 146 It ex-
plained that "[tlogether, we can explore what works and what doesn't
work in accessing environmental information.' 47
The symposium's wiki project sought participants from state gov-
ernments, local governments, Indian tribes, and industry. 48 To partici-
pate, individuals needed to provide names and email addresses. It is un-
clear if the EPA checked to make sure that those names and email ad-
dresses were true. 149 If so, particular entries and edits could not be attrib-
uted to particular speakers, at least not in any authenticated way. As
EPA's Chief Information Officer Molly O'Neill explained, the wiki gen-
erated "175 good contributions."'
50
Similarly, in 2007, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) launched a program called Peer to Patent, which uses collabo-
rative software to facilitate participation in patent applications.' 5 ' The
project allows individuals (who participate in groups) to discuss and pro-
vide intelligence on selected patent applications. 152 Aided by collabora-
tive software, participants evaluate patent applications, discuss their in-
144. The emerging Googlewave platform shares some similarities with wiki technology. On
the one hand, Gmail users need only pick an email account name and password and Google does not
authenticate their identity in any way. On the other, when Googlewave participants collaborate on a
document, they own their work. When someone is editing something, the reader sees their edits
shaded in a bright color; their names are affixed next to their edits. Readers may thus perhaps more
easily identify the speaker on Googlewave than on Wikipedia's history page.
145. PugetSoundMashup, Main Page, http://pugetsound.epageo.org/index.php5?title=
Main-Page (last visited June 1, 2010).
146. See id.
147. Id.




151. BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: How TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE
GOVERNMENT BEIrER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL 73 (2009).
152. Id. at 74.
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dependent research, and evaluate each others' work.153 At the end of the
process, participants submit their findings to the USPTO examiner.
54
Individuals join this endeavor by registering on the Peer to Patent
website. Registration requires that individuals provide names and email
addresses. 55 As Beth Noveck explains, "though [individuals'] informa-
tion is not authenticated (a participant need not provide a credit card to
corroborate his identity and may use a pseudonym to preserve anonym-
ity), a first name and last name rather than only a 'handle' are required in
an effort to elevate the level of discourse."' 56 Although the project identi-
fied the content provider's name, its design left readers unable to know
with certainty the actual identity of the speakers who participate, even
though those speakers may have reputational incentives to use their ac-
tual names. The Peer to Patent site thus provided no way for the audi-
ence to differentiate governmental speakers from non-governmental
ones.
B. Doctrinal Implications of Government's Use of Transparent Tech-
nologies
As Government 2.0 proceeds apace, private parties' free speech
clause claims will increasingly require courts to determine when gov-
ernment is speaking for itself and when it simply provides a means for
individuals to express themselves. To that end, courts must assess gov-
ernment's purpose and context in using online platforms to determine if
contested expression is its own, and thus exempt from free speech clause
scrutiny.
This should be a relatively simple task when government expressly
identifies postings, links, videos, photographs, and other expression as
evincing and supporting its own positions. Transparent technologies-
both non-interactive and interactive-fall in this category as they provide
the means for the audience to identify governmental speakers.
57
Consider, for example, Page v. Lexington County School District
One.5 8 There, a public school board passed a resolution expressing its
opposition to pending school voucher legislation, and authorized public
communication of that position on the school district's website as well as
in emails and letters to parents and school employees. 59 Voucher propo-
153. Id. at 83.
154. Id. at 78.
155. Id. at 73.
156. Id.
157. For a more detailed discussion of how speakers can expressly identify themselves as the
source of a message, see Norton, supra note 79, at 604-406.
158. 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008).
159. Id. at 278-79.
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nent Randall Page then requested, among other things, that the district
permit him to post his pro-voucher materials on its website.'
60
When the district rejected his request, he filed a First Amendment
suit, alleging (among other things) that the board's decision to link its
website to private organizations that shared the district's opposition to
the legislation had opened up its website as a type of forum for private
parties' speech from which he could not be excluded on the basis of
viewpoint. 161 The Fourth Circuit rejected Mr. Page's claim, agreeing with
the school district that the government speech doctrine permits it to
communicate its own viewpoint through websites (and other means)
without any obligation to allow others to alter that expression.,
62
The facts in Page should make for a relatively easy decision be-
cause the design and context of the government's website made clear to
onlookers the government's viewpoint and its identity as source of that
particular viewpoint.163 So long as the government speaker makes clear
that it links to other speakers' websites to support communication of its
own position, those links should not transform our understanding of the
government's website as communicating anything other than the gov-
ernment's own views. For example, we might think of websites and hy-
perlinks as electronic versions of the bulletin board in Downs v. Los An-
geles Unified School District.64 There, after a school district established
a bulletin board inviting faculty and staff submissions to promote its
celebration of Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month, a teacher sought to
post materials on that bulletin board questioning the morality of homo-
sexuality.' 65 When the district refused his request, he filed suit and ar-
gued that the refusal constituted viewpoint discrimination impermissible
under the First Amendment.' 66 The Ninth Circuit held that the school
district's choice to dedicate its bulletin board to a celebration of tolerance
and diversity reflected the government's own speech that it was entirely
free to control. 
167
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Page, moreover, a posting on a
school district's website reflects a situation very different from that in
160. Id. at 277.
161. Id. at 277-78.
162. Id. at 285 ("The School District included every link to other websites on its own initiative,
and it did so only insofar as the link would buttress its own message. It thus retained sole control
over its message.").
163. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit relied primarily on the school board's "establishment"
and "control" of the message. See id. at 281-85. But the court also attended to the government's
transparent claim to the expression as its own. See id. at 284 ("[Tihe School District continuously
and unambiguously communicated a consistent message-its opposition to the Put Parents in Charge
Act-and its providing references to others who shared that position was consistent with and sup-
ported the message, much as would a bibliography, a citation, or a footnote.").
164. 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000).
165. Id. at 1005-06.




which a government agency uses interactive technologies for the express
purpose of facilitating public discussion on a topic. Government could
enable such discussions through live chats, chat rooms, or other plat-
forms designed to facilitate the ventilation of private views.1 68 There,
First Amendment principles bar government from excluding or censoring
participants on the basis of viewpoint.169 This would be true if, for exam-
ple, a government agency deleted an individual's comments on its blog
based on the person's policy preferences. Nor, of course, could the gov-
ernment prevent private speakers from starting their own websites ex-
pressing their contrary views.
To be sure, determining if the government is speaking for itself or if
it is instead censoring viewpoints is sometimes difficult. For example,
when a government formalizes its linking policy only after denying a
hyperlink requested by a government critic, its actions may create doubt
as to whether the government's website policy is driven by an interest in
communicating its own message or instead by a desire to muffle private
parties' dissent.170 For this reason, the government speech doctrine
should creative incentives for government to identify itself as the source
of a particular message by requiring such transparency as a condition of
claiming the defense.
Consider the facts in Sutliffe v. Epping School District. 17 The or-
ganizational plaintiff there described itself as "a perennial thorn in [the
Town's] side" that had been "engaged in a longstanding effort to curb
what it [saw] as 'profligate spending' by the Town and its school dis-
trict." 172 The plaintiff filed a First Amendment claim after the town re-
jected its request to include its hyperlink on the town's website, arguing
(as in Page) that the town's decision to link to certain other private web-
sites created a designated public forum from which the plaintiff could not
be excluded on the basis of viewpoint.
173
There, the town had long owned and maintained a website that pro-
vided information on various town boards and commissions, town meet-
ings, and other government activities. The town's Board of Selectmen
determined which materials-including which hyperlinks to other web-
168. See Page, 531 F.3d at 284-85; see also Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 334-
35 (1st Cir. 2009) ("It is possible there may be cases in which a government entity might open its
website to private speech in such a way that its decisions on which links to allow on its website
would be more aptly analyzed as government regulation of private speech.").
169. Aden Fine, ACLU, Presentation at the U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security: Government 2.0:
Privacy and Best Practices (June 23, 2009).
170. For an example of the latter, see R. Johan Conrod, Linking Public Websites to the Public
Forum, 87 VA. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (2001) (describing a Virginia city as "remov[ing] an online
newspaper's link to its official city website because it was unhappy with critical coverage it had
received in the newspaper" while links to other newspapers and other media were allowed to re-
main).
171. 584 F.3d 314 (lst Cir. 2009).
172. Id. at 318 (first alteration in original).
173. See id. at 324.
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sites-would appear on the website. 174 It had no written or other formal
policy to guide or explain its linking decisions.175 The town argued, how-
ever, that its practice in making such decisions "was always to 'provide
information to the citizenry of the Town on Town business.' The only
links that were permitted were ones that 'would promote providing in-
formation about the Town,' and any links that were 'political or advo-
cate[d] for certain candidates' were not allowed."'' 76 After rejecting the
plaintiffs request, the town then established, for the first time, a written
policy that limited hyperlinks on its website to sites either operated by
other government agencies or that described "'events and programs that
are coordinated and/or sponsored by the Town of Epping."1
77
Focusing primarily on the town's establishment of the website and
its control over the choice of hyperlinks to be included,1 78 the federal
appellate court held that the town's decision reflected government's own
expression free from First Amendment scrutiny:
[I]n this case, the Town engaged in government speech by establish-
ing a town website and then selecting which hyperlinks to place on
its website. The Town created a website to convey information about
the Town to its citizens and the outside world and, by choosing only
certain hyperlinks to place on that website, communicated an impor-
tant message about itself. 1
79
But here the government's lack of a clear website policy invites
suspicion that the town's rejection of a linking request by a longtime and
vocal critic might be motivated by distaste for dissent, rather than by a
sincere interest in protecting its own message from distortion.' 80 Dissent-
ing Judge Torruella, for example, expressed concern that the town's gov-
ernment speech defense might be a subterfuge manufactured after the
fact to justify what was really viewpoint discrimination against a private
speaker. Distinguishing Page as a case in which "it was clear that the
government was engaging in its own speech activity, ' 88' he contrasted
Sutliffe as a case in which:
[T]he majority extends the doctrine to a situation where, in my view,
it was not clear that the government was engaging in speech at the
174. Id. at 331. These included hyperlinks to the websites of '"governmental agencies and
certain civic organizations,' such as the New Hampshire Municipal Association, the Epping Middle
High School, and the Exeter Area Chamber of Commerce" as well as to the website for "Speak Up,
Epping!," an event endorsed and supported by the town. Id. at 322.
175. Seeid. at 322.
176. Id. (alteration in original).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 331.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 340 n.20 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (noting that counsel for the town at oral
argument "struggled to justify the Town's inclusion of a Chamber of Commerce link on the Town's
website, but not the plaintiffs' website").
181. See id. at 337.
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time it was acting, and only justified its actions after the fact. The
majority's position has the potential of permitting a governmental en-
tity to engage in viewpoint discrimination in its own governmentally-
owned channels so long as the governmental entity can cast its ac-
tions as its own speech after the fact.1
82
He urged instead that the inquiry focus on whether the public would
understand the choice of hyperlinks to reflect the government's own ex-
pression.'
83
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cooke-
ville' 84 presents a similarly challenging situation. The plaintiff-"a self-
appointed eye on government corruption for the City"' 85---claimed that
the city's refusal to add a hyperlink to his website constituted impermis-
sible viewpoint discrimination. For several years, the city's website in-
cluded a "local links" page, to which local businesses were invited to add
a link.186 At the time of the plaintiff's request, the City had "no stated
policy on who could be linked" to the city's website, and had linked to a
number of for-profit and non-profit entities based on decisions made by
the city's computer operations manager.187 That manager recognized the
controversial nature of the plaintiff's request for a hyperlink, and for the
first time referred such a request to the city manager. The city manager
initially decided to limit hyperlinks to non-profit organizations, but then
(after the plaintiff informed him of his plans to convert to nonprofit sta-
tus) decided to limit links to those organizations that "promote the eco-
nomic welfare, industry, commerce, and tourism" of the city.
188
In a decision that preceded the Supreme Court's more detailed gov-
ernment speech decisions in Johanns and Summum by several years, the
Putnam court never considered the possibility of government speech
(and apparently the city did not raise such a defense). Characterizing the
city's website as a nonpublic forum,' 89 the court denied the city's motion
for summary judgment on whether its decision to exclude the plaintiff
from such a forum was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. 90 A jury later
182. Id.
183. Id. at 338 n.16 ("In my view, the better course is to adopt the test proposed by Justice
Souter in his concurrence to Summum .... Justice Souter's test has the benefit of preventing ex post
rationalization of viewpoint discrimination as government speech to avoid First Amendment scru-
tiny. Rather, the actions of the government would be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable
observer, and, as I note below, it is an open question whether a reasonable observer would construe
the Town's actions as government speech, as opposed to the designation of a public forum or simple
run-of-the-mill viewpoint discrimination.").
184. (Putnam 1), 221 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2000).
185. Id. at 838; see also Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville (Putnam 11), 76 F. App'x 607,
610-11 (6th Cir. 2003).
186. Putnam 11, 76 F. App'x at 610.
187. Putnam 1, 221 F.3d at 841; see also Putnam 11, 76 F. App'x at 610-11.
188. Putnam 11, 76 F. App'x at 610-11.
189. Putnam 1, 221 F.3d at 845.
190. Id. at 846.
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ruled for the city, concluding that the plaintiff did not meet the defen-
dant's newly-established eligibility requirements for receiving a hyper-
link in that his website did not promote economic development and tour-
ism.
191
Sutliffe and Putnam illustrate the Internet-age dangers of undue def-
erence to government's claims that speech is its own. Certainly govern-
ment should be able to control its own transparently-chosen messages on
its website (or elsewhere), as in Page. But governments' lack of trans-
parency in Sutliffe and Putnam invites the "legitimate concern that the
government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring
certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint."', 92 By insisting
that the government be clear about when it is speaking, on the one hand,
and when it intends instead to create an opportunity for private speech on
the other, courts can generate a principled and relatively easy solution
from both a doctrinal and a technical perspective.
These problems can generally be solved by government's design
choices. Government, in other words, can and should decide whether it
plans to claim the speech as its own and affirmatively signal its author-
ship, or disclaim the speech and prepare to comply with traditional First
Amendment principles. It can generally do so cheaply and easily.
Indeed, some government actors already have done so as a matter of
policy. As an example, USA.gov, an interagency initiative administered
by the U.S. General Services Administration, has developed policies for
federal agency websites that require transparent identification of gov-
ernment websites as the government's own speech:
Showing U.S. government sponsorship is one of the requirements for
managing your agency's website .... You should clearly display the
name of your agency or organization on every web page to show visi-
tors who sponsors the website. Be sure it's clear on every page that
the site is maintained by the U.S. government .... By clearly display-
ing your agency's name and sponsorship on every page of your web-
site, you're clearly telling the public that your agency is accountable
for the website's content.
1 93
At the same time, governments at all levels can-and should-be
equally transparent in disclaiming certain speech as its own. As a specific
example:
191. See Putnam 1!, 76 F. App'x at 609 (declining to overturn the jury's verdict that the plain-
tiff did not meet the defendant's eligibility requirements for receiving a hyperlink).
192. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009).
193. USA.gov, Showing U.S. Sponsorship, http://www.usa.gov/webcontent/getting-started/
naning/sponsorship.shtmil (last visited June 1, 2010); see also Department of Energy, Non-
Government Domains, http://cio.energy.gov/services/682.htm (last visited June 1, 2010) ("This
requirement recognizes the proper performance of agency functions includes an obligation for clear
and unambiguous public notification of the agency's involvement in or sponsorship of its informa-
tion dissemination products including public websites.").
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USA.gov can add a link to any government website that is publicly
available unless directed not to by the agency that owns the site ....
In rare instances, USA.gov links to websites that are not government-
owned or government-sponsored if these websites provide govern-
ment information and/or services in a way that is not available on an
official government website .... The U.S. government ... neither
endorses nor guarantees in any way the external organizations, ser-
vices, advice, or products included in these website links. Further-
more, the U.S. government neither controls nor guarantees the accu-
racy, relevance, timeliness or completeness of the information con-
tained in non-government website links.
194
This policy makes clear the communicative function served by the gov-
ernment's linking decisions in these specific contexts: to provide infor-
mation in a way that does not express government's views.'
9 5
As described above, courts have sometimes been befuddled by the
significance of government's links to third-party sites in the government
speech context. The technology should not, however, make the issue a
difficult one. Indeed, links may serve the same expressive function as the
government speaker's citation to a supportive reference in a policy paper.
Instead, the challenge is whether the context of the link (or embedded
YouTube video and the like) makes clear that the government has used
online technologies to project its own views.
Government can, and should, make its purpose transparent. The Of-
fice of Management and Budget, for example, has set forth policies re-
quiring federal agencies to establish and enforce agency-wide linking
practices:
You must also post a clear and comprehensive linking policy that ex-
plains your agency's criteria for choosing external sites .... Linking
to other websites is valuable since it brings additional visitors to
those sites and can provide additional information and resources to
your visitors. However, you need to have clear and fair criteria for
deciding which links to use, particularly when another website owner
asks you to link to them or trade links.
196
194. USA.gov, Linking Policy, http://www.usa.gov/About/LinkingPolicy.shtml (last visited
June 1, 2010).
195. If the government is not itself speaking, recall that traditional First Amendment principles
then apply. For a discussion of how government might sell its choice of hyperlinks as a form of
advertising, thus producing a revenue stream, see Pearson Liddell, Jr. et al., Government-Owned
Web Sites and Free Enterprise: First Amendment Implications, 10 No. 4 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2006).
Government's sale of advertising space in brick-and-mortar facilities has been variously character-
ized as a designated public forum, a limited public forum, or a nonpublic forum. See Irene Segal
Ayers, What Rudy Hasn't Taken Credit For: First Amendment Limits on Regulation of Advertising
on Government Property, 42 ARIz. L. REV. 607, 608 (2000) (discussing split in authority addressing
government efforts to regulate transit advertising); Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited
Public Forum, 33 NOVA L. REV. 299, 338-43 (2009) (discussing mixed results in transit-advertising
cases).
196. USA.gov, Establishing a Linking Policy, http://www.usa.gov/webcontent/managing-
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Consider, too, the TSA Blog that provides information related to the
TSA's mission and then invites members of the public to comment on
the agency's activities. The TSA's own postings are clearly identified as
government speech, and TSA retains complete power to control the ex-
pression of its own views. Postings by government employees appear
beneath their names and affiliation with the TSA Blog, making clear that
the TSA is the source of the expression.
Where it enables public comments, however, TSA has created a
designated public forum for the expression of private views, and has lim-
ited discussion to TSA matters. For instance, the TSA Blog explains that
this feature's purpose is to "facilitate an ongoing dialogue on innovations
in security, technology and the checkpoint screening process."' 197 The
First Amendment does not permit TSA to edit comments based on view-
point-for example, by deleting posts critical of the government's efforts
on those topics. The Court's limited public forum doctrine, however,
does permit TSA to regulate public comments that fall outside the limits
of the forum-by deleting posts on health care reform, or the World Se-
ries, or any other matter unrelated to TSA activities. 98 As the TSA Blog
explains, the TSA reviews all comments prior to posting and "will not
post comments that are spam, are clearly 'off topic' or that promote ser-
vices or products."'
99
The TSA Blog demonstrates networked technologies' great poten-
tial for facilitating government's identification of itself as speaker as
opposed to its decision to fashion a forum for private speech. Both non-
interactive and interactive technologies generally offer cheap and easy
means to identify government's own speech and that of private speakers
engaged in a public forum. Significantly, digital technologies are often
designed in ways that nudge government speakers to claim their expres-
sion. This is a great benefit of Government 2.0: networked technologies
offer an inexpensive way to get government's message to the public and
to garner its feedback while clarifying when government is speaking.
In short, government should, and inexpensively can, take care to en-
sure that the public knows whether and when the government intends to
content/organizing/links/policy.shtml (last visited June 1, 2010) (emphasis added).
197. The TSA Blog, http:/Iblog.tsa.gov/ (last visited June 1, 2010).
198. Some courts and commentators have urged that public forum doctrine additionally be
understood to permit government to regulate private speech in various forums that is vulgar, odious,
or otherwise particularly obnoxious. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 833 (2010); Paul D. Wilson & Jennifer K. Alcarez, But it's My Turn to Speak! When Can
Unruly Speakers at Public Hearings Be Forced to Leave or Be Quiet?, 41 URB. LAW. 579, 585-87
(2009) (discussing decisions in which courts did or did not permit regulation on such grounds).
199. The TSA Blog, Comment Policy, http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/1Ol/comment-policy.html (last
visited June 1, 2010). It also "expect[s] that all participants will treat each other, as well as our
agency and employees, with respect" and will "not post comments that contain vulgar or abusive




use its website to express itself or if it instead intends to create a desig-
nated public forum for the expression of ideas generally (or a limited
public forum for expression on certain topics, or perhaps a nonpublic
forum). Government should thus keep in mind-and plan for-this key
question when designing policies for the use of websites, linking, and 2.0
platforms: Do we (government) seek to engage in our own expressive
conduct? Or are we providing some sort of opportunity for private
speech?
As Jack Balkin thoughtfully explains, design choices are crucial to
the protection of free speech values in the twenty-first century. 2°° Gov-
ernment should thus coordinate with technologists to ensure that its on-
line presence explicitly informs the public when the hosted communica-
tions are its own. Governments can forestall subterfuge concerns by de-
liberating over, and establishing, a transparent policy that explains when
it intends its website, blog, or social network site to express its own
views and when it instead intends to create a public, designated, limited,
or nonpublic forum.
201
C. Doctrinal Implications and Challenges of Government's Use of Opa-
que Technologies
Government's increasing use of certain interactive technologies cre-
ates opportunities for greater government transparency and fewer
anonymous bureaucrats, as government officials increasingly communi-
cate with the public by blog, YouTube, or podcasts that transparently
indicate their governmental source.02 On the other hand, government's
reliance on technologies that obscure speakers' identity carries the poten-
tial to frustrate government speech values by undermining the transpar-
ency, and thus the accountability, of government speech. This vulnerabil-
ity is most notably true of opaque interactive technologies that can hin-
der or prevent verification of the government as a message's source-
e.g., when the government participates in anonymous or unauthenticated
200. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427,
443-44 (2009) ("In the digital age, judicial protection of First Amendment rights will remain quite
important; but if I am correct about the trajectory of future policy debates, our attention will increas-
ingly shift to questions of design-both of institutions and technology-that are largely beyond
judicial competence. The key players in ensuring free speech values in the digital age will be legisla-
tures, administrative agencies, and technologists.").
201. Although the rules for assessing government's permissible regulation of private speech
vary with the forum designation, in none of them may government discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45-46 (1983).
202. See Business 3.0, Obama's Transparent and Connected Government, http://mybusiness-
network.blogspot.com12009/01/transparent-and-connected-government.html (Jan. 6, 2009, 6:16
AM). Indeed, similar parallels have emerged in the field of journalism, where previously faceless
and often unreachable columnists and reporters are now readily accessible via e-mail, frequent
blogging, etc. See Lili Levi, A New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons from the Schiavo Coverage,
61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665, 690 (2007) ("[B]logs sponsored by daily newspapers... serve as fora for
interactive discussions between journalists, editors, and the public.").
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collaboration, such as the Peer to Patent groups and the Puget Sound
wiki.
20 3
In our view, a commitment to the values appropriately protected by
the government speech doctrine would preclude government from claim-
ing the government speech defense when it participates in opaque inter-
active technologies without clearly identifying itself as the speaker. Such
a doctrinal adjustment should encourage government to be more trans-
parent when it is speaking and less likely to regulate based on viewpoint
when it is not.2°
Consider, as just one example, government's use of wiki technolo-
gies.2 °5 As Jason Miller and Hannah Murray emphasize, "Wikipedia's
greatest weakness-that anybody can edit an article-is also its greatest
strength., 20 6 This is because wikis and other opaque interactive technolo-
gies provide a cheap and easy way to facilitate peer production, a process
by which often-anonymous individuals, whose actions are not coordi-
nated either by managers or by market price signals, jointly produce in-
207formation. Peer production facilitates collaboration among radically
diverse groups.20 8 Such diversity has enabled Wikipedia's accuracy to
rival that of the Encyclopedia Brittanica.2°9 As social media scholar Clay
Shirky explains, Wikipedia is "the product not of collectivism but of
unending argumentation. The articles grow not from harmonious thought
but from constant scrutiny and emendation. 2 t°
203. See supra notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
204. To be sure, many other transparency-forcing mechanisms remain available that we also
support. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, tit. VI, § 626, 117
Stat. 11, 470 (2003) (prohibiting expenditure of federal funds to pay third parties to engage in gov-
emnment propaganda efforts without disclosing the messages' governmental source); Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, Bush, Obama and Beyond-Observations on the Prospect for Fact Checking Executive
Department Threat Claims Before the Use of Force (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Denver University Law Review) (discussing possible means for encouraging greater ac-
countability by Article 11 speakers on national security issues).
205. The National Institute for Health (NIH), for example, is "encouraging its scientists and
science writers to edit and even initiate Wikipedia articles in their fields" in response to the reality
that many individuals turn to the web for health-related information. Ibby Caputo, NIH Staffers Get
Into the Wiki World, WASH. POST, July 28, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072701912.html.
206. Jason C. Miller & Hannah B. Murray, Wikipedia in Court: When and How Citing Wikipe-
dia and Other Consensus Websites is Appropriate, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
207. Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information,
52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1256 (2003).
208. See YOCHIm BENKLER, T14E WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODuCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 232 (2006).
209. See CLAY SHtRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS 141 (2008).
210. Id. at 139. To be sure, diverse groups may sometimes produce better information and
decisions than even experts. Nonetheless, Wikipedia shows that anonymous crowds can also be
destructive. Consider journalist John Seigenthaler, Sr.'s struggles. In 2005, Seigenthaler discovered
that one or more persons had created a Wikipedia biography for him that included false accusations
of his involvement in the Kennedy assassination. Id. at 138. The entry was edited to strike out the
false material, but by that time the false material had circulated for over half a year and thus "much
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No matter how effective opaque interactive technologies like wikis
may be, however, they may prevent readers from identifying speakers'
actual identity.21' Government's use of such technologies is troubling if
government officials participate without identifying themselves: uniden-
tified authors prevent readers from using a message's governmental
source as a cue to its credibility.
21 2
Moreover, opaque interactive technologies also create possibilities
for a type of deception known as "sock puppeting"-the creation of a
"fake online identity to praise, defend or create the illusion of support for
one's self, allies or company. '213 When online collaborations guarantee
anonymity, interested individuals, including government actors, can rig
the "crowd," ensuring the prominence of a particular view. To use an
example from the private sector, John Mackey, the former chief execu-
tive of Whole Foods Market, used a fictional identity on the Yahoo mes-
sage boards for eight years to assail competition and promote his super-
market chain's stock.214
Indeed, Gia Lee has documented government's efforts in more tra-
ditional expressive contexts to shape and thus manipulate public opinion
by attributing government views to private actors-perceived as more
credible or less self-interested on certain issues-through means such as
government-produced "news" segments or op-eds distributed to and
printed or aired by the media without acknowledgment of their govern-
mental source.2 15 As another example, recall the government's produc-
tion of beef advertisements accompanied only by the label "Funded by
America's Beef Producers.' ' 16 Government's participation in opaque
of the damage had been done." Id. Wikipedia now invokes editorial control to combat vandalism,
often locking pages and editing. Id.
211. Although in this Article we focus on the dangers of anonymous government speech,
private parties' use of emerging technologies to engage in anonymous cyber harassment and similar
behavior may inflict substantial harms of a very different type. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber
Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 61 (2009) (describing use of internet technologies to threaten,
defame, and harass women and other members of subordinated groups).
212. See Norton, supra note 79, at 592 (recounting evidence from cognitive psychology and
related fields indicating that onlookers often use a message's source as a heuristic for evaluating its
quality); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 946 n.47 (2010) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting ARISTOTLE, POETICS 43-44 (M. Heath
trans., Penguin Books 1996) ("In evaluating any utterance or action, one must take into account not
just the moral qualities of what is actually done or said, but also the identity of the agent or speaker,
the addressee, the occasion, the means, and the motive.").
213. Brad Stone & Matt Richtel, The Hand that Controls the Sock Puppet Could Get Slapped,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.conl2007/07/16/technology/l 6blog
.html?_-r- I &oref=slogin.
214. Id. Mr. Mackey used the online handle "Rahodeb" (an anagram of his wife's name, Deb-
orah). Id.
215. See Lee, supra note 88, at 990.
216. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 577-78 (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[R]eaders would most naturally think that ads urging people to have beef for dinner were placed
and paid for by the beef producers who stand to profit when beef is on the table. No one hearing a
commercial for Pepsi or Levi's thinks Uncle Sam is the man talking behind the curtain. Why would
a person reading a beef ad think Uncle Sam was trying to make him eat more steak?"). Although
unwilling to require government affirmatively to identify itself as the author of the message as a
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interactive technologies substantially increases opportunities for such
manipulation at the expense of government accountability, as sock pup-
petry powerfully demonstrates how government might manipulate opa-
217que interactive technologies in unaccountable ways.
The sock puppetry concern provides further justification for insist-
ing that government clearly identify itself as a message's source if it
wishes to claim the government speech defense. Government thus should
not be allowed to claim the government speech defense when it partici-
pates in anonymous wikis and other opaque technologies that prevent its
identification as speaker. For example, the government speech defense
should not be available to a governmental body that anonymously edits
wiki entries to tone down criticism of the government's agenda because
such speech is not transparently governmental. Indeed, such governmen-
tal censoring of private speech based on viewpoint violates the First
Amendment.
Even though participation in such technologies is typically anony-
mous, government can often choose to participate transparently in wikis.
In a particularly promising development, perhaps one made in response
to their prior efforts,218 the EPA issued "Interim Guidance Representing
EPA Online Using Social Media" on January 26, 2010.219 In its Interim
Guidance document, the EPA addressed the manner in which EPA em-
ployees and contractors working for the agency represent the agency
online. As the guidance document explains, the "line between public
and private, personal and professional can sometimes get blurred in
online social networks." 221 As a result, employees and contractors must
remember that they are participating in their official capacity, not their
personal one.222 Under the heading "Be transparent and honest," the
guidance document instructs:
condition of claiming the government speech defense, the Supreme Court noted in Johanns the
possibility of a different outcome if there were evidence that viewers actually misunderstood the
message to be attributed to private parties-although it seemed quite unwilling to find such evi-
dence:
Whether the individual respondents who are beef producers would be associated with
speech labeled as coming from 'America's Beef Producers' is a question on which the
trial record is altogether silent. We have only the funding tagline itself, a trademarked
term that, standing alone, is not sufficiently specific to convince a reasonable factfinder
that any particular beef producer, or all beef producers, would be tarred with the content
of each trademarked ad.
Id. at 566 (majority opinion); see also Greene, supra note 198, at 834-836.
217. For thoughtful discussion of the possibility that government may sometimes act as "ven-
triloquist," deliberately masking its role as a message's source in order to enhance the message's
credibility, see Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 49-52 (2000).
218. See supra notes 145-148 and accompanying text (describing EPA's Puget Sound project).







Do not comment or edit anonymously. Because you are working in
your official EPA capacity, you can make reference to your EPA po-
sition and title. If you are a contractor, name your company and be
clear that you are a contractor working on behalf of EPA and not an
EPA employee.
223
It notes that in writing posts or commenting on non-EPA blogs or in
editing a non-EPA wiki, employees and contractors must identify their
EPA affiliation by identifying their title and by using their work email
address. 24 Here the government has taken clear responsibility for its
expression. This enables meaningful political accountability, and pro-
vides valuable information to the public consistent with the purposes of
the government speech doctrine.
Some may object that such a transparency-forcing doctrine un-
wisely discourages government from contributing to wikis and related
opaque technologies that facilitate the production of valuable and more
accurate information precisely because they permit anonymous contribu-
tions. That argument might be persuasive if we value government speech
as simply a means to the end of information accuracy. Although govern-
ment speech may further the discovery of truth and dissemination of
225knowledge, its primary importance lies in another key First Amend-
ment value: facilitating democratic self-governance. In other words,
"valuable" government speech in this context does not necessarily mean
good, wise, or accurate speech. 26
In our view, government expression is valuable primarily because it
gives the public more information with which to assess their government.
For this reason, government speech is most valuable and least dangerous
to the public-thus meriting exemption from First Amendment scru-
tiny-only when members of the public can identify the government as a
message's source, thus enabling them to more accurately assess the mes-
sage's credibility and to take accountability measures as appropriate.
This is true even if-and perhaps especially if-the public finds the gov-
ernment's expression inaccurate or disagreeable. In short, the account-




225. For a discussion of the primary values to be served by the First Amendment, see Thomas
1. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980)
("Over the years, we have come to view freedom of expression as essential to: (I) individual self-
fulfillment; (2) the advance of knowledge and the discovery of truth; (3) participation in decision-
making by all members of society; and (4) maintenance of the proper balance between stability and
change.").
226. For a different view, see Bezanson, supra note 48 (characterizing government speech as
constitutionally valuable only when it is cognitive and reasoned, rather than aesthetic or emotional).
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Of course, the more successful the government is at non-transparent
behavior, the less likely we will learn of such activity. But sometimes we
do find out-thanks to whistleblowers, intrepid public watchdogs, the
227government's own indiscretion, or some other means. In any event,
such a doctrinal change may more generally shape the norms for, and
expectations of, government actors when they think through how and
when they speak in social media contexts. Law has an expressive charac-
ter aside from its coercive one. 28 It creates a public set of meanings and
shared understandings between the state and the public. 22 9 It signals ap-
propriate behavior, creating and sustaining norms. 230 Law also clarifies
government's commitments: "Because law creates and shapes social
mores, it has an important cultural impact that differs from its more di-
rect coercive effects. 231
Reconsidering the government speech doctrine could change the
way that government actors conduct themselves online. By emphasizing
the importance of transparency in government expression, it could make
clear to government actors that their online activities play a crucially
important role in government's larger effort in creating an informed and
responsive citizenry.
Doctrinal change can also influence the efforts of government offi-
cials. It might convince government decision-makers to adopt clear poli-
cies regarding government expression and private speech on their own
blogs, websites, and social network sites. It might press them to do the
same for employees using non-governmental social media in the manner
that EPA did in its Interim Guidance document. It could convince gov-
ernment officials to devote resources to training personnel about the
proper use of social media and means to enhance government transpar-
ency online.
227. See Lee, supra note 88, at 983-88 (describing exposure of several instances of govern-
ment's covert efforts to disseminate its policy agenda through nontransparent means); William E.
Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453,
1461 (2008) (describing "the importance of leaks in the democratic dialogue"); Mary-Rose Papan-
drea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND.
L.J. 233, 233 (2008) (describing the government's communication of information to the public
through leaks); Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, General Counsel, U.S. Government Accountability
Office, to Senators Frank R. Lautenberg & Edward M. Kennedy (Sept. 30, 2005) (on file with Den-
ver University Law Review) (describing Bush Administration Department of Education's violation
of the covert propaganda ban by contracting with columnist Armstrong Williams "to comment
regularly on the No Child Left Behind Act without assuring that the Department's role was disclosed
to the targeted audiences.").
228. Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3
& n.10 (2000); see generally Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 407-414 (2009) (exploring law's expressive value in
addressing cyber gender harassment).
229. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1571 (2000).
230. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022
(1996).
231. Citron, supra note 228, at 407.
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Law's insistence upon transparency in the government speech doc-
trine would have a positive impact upon the public. Because individuals
would see government making clear its policies and claiming its expres-
sion, the public would see the government owning its own words without
subterfuge. By enhancing the public's faith in government, individuals
might be encouraged to participate in policy discussions. Indeed, Presi-
dent Obama ordered executive agencies and departments to use innova-
tive technologies precisely to invigorate public participation and collabo-
ration.
CONCLUSION
This Article seeks to start a conversation about whether our expec-
tations of government speech, and of government,232 should remain the
same in light of changes in the way that government speaks. For now, we
raise more questions than we answer. And those questions are many.
For example, emerging technologies generate new controversies
about government's responsibility for the accessibility of its expression.
In other words, how understandable must government expression be, and
to what segment of the population? Considering this question requires
that we weigh the availability (volume) of government speech against its
accessibility (quality). Some take the view that the more government
speech the better, and that government efforts to manage its raw data and
other expression for quality or readability unacceptably slow the speed
and reduce the volume of information received by the public.2 33 Others,
in contrast, urge government to invest in greater accessibility and read-
234ability of its data and other expression.
Note too that we may need to reconsider certain understandings of
government speech. For example, in light of the dangers of closed source
232. For a thoughtful discussion of how the controversy over government speech reflects a
controversy over the appropriate role of government more generally, see Steven D. Smith, Why is
Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the Unnoticed Problem, and the Big
Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945 (2010). For an equally thoughtful response, see Alan Chen, Right
Labels, Wrong Categories: Some Comments on Steven D. Smith's Why is Government Speech
Problematic?, 87 DENY. U. L. REV. ONLINE (2010), http://denverlawreview.org/storage/Chen-Right
Labels.pdf.
233. David Robinson, Harlan Yu, William P. Zeller, & Edward W. Felten, Government Data
and the Invisible Hand, II YALE J.L. & TECH. 160, 160 (2009) ("If President Barack Obama's new
administration really wants to embrace the potential of Internet-enabled government transparency, it
should follow a counter-intuitive but ultimately compelling strategy: reduce the federal role in pre-
senting important government information to citizens. Today, government bodies consider their own
Web sites to be a higher priority than technical infrastructures that open up their data for others to
use. We argue that this understanding is a mistake. It would be preferable for government to under-
stand providing reusable data, rather than providing Web sites, as the core of its online publishing
responsibility.").
234. Jerry Brito, Hack, Mash, & Peer: Crowdsourcing Government Transparency, 9 COLUM.
SC1. & TECH. L. REV. 119 (2008) ("In order to hold government accountable for its actions, citizens
must know what those actions are. To that end, they must insist that government act openly and
transparently to the greatest extent possible. In the twenty-first century, this entails making its data
available online and easy to access.").
2010]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
code when used by government programmers, should we consider gov-
ernment code a form of government speech-or instead as simply gov-
ernment decision-making, rather than expression, for which it remains
constitutionally accountable?
235
This Article begins this conversation with a focus on ensuring that
government remains meaningfully politically accountable to the public
for its expressive choices, regardless of the form of communicative tech-
nology involved. It thus urges the revision of government speech doc-
trine to require that government make clear when it is speaking as a con-
dition of asserting the government speech defense. This requires gov-
ernment to make deliberate and transparent choices when designing web-
sites and engaging in other newer technologies to identify itself as a mes-
sage's source when it seeks to speak, and to disclaim or otherwise make
clear when it instead intends to create an expressive opportunity for oth-
ers.
To be sure, the Court's reluctance to require such transparency sig-
nals the possibility that it will respond to such challenges with continuing
deference to government in the face of what might seem to it as difficult
technological problems in identifying expression's source. In addition to
advancing key First Amendment interests in facilitating democratic self-
governance, however, revising the government speech doctrine as pro-
posed here may help generate some technological benefits as well. If the
government speech doctrine is understood to bar government from using
opaque technologies (at least as a condition of claiming the government
speech defense), then we might see increased investments in technolo-
gies that would enhance transparency for expressive vehicles. Indeed,
many are already working on identification technologies that facilitate
communication with individuals whose identities have been authenti-
cated.236
Ideally, technological innovation would foster greater transparency
in several ways. It would permit us to confirm when government speaks
and to prevent government from masking its identity as that of a private
speaker. It would also permit us to discern when some other speaker is
actually masquerading as the government. 7 And it would permit us to
235. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355
(2008); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 1249, 1250 (2008)
(urging that such government systems ought to be transparent to the public to promote accuracy,
security, and privacy, among other values).
236. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark Infringement by Im-
personation of Markholders, 58 BuFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (describing fake posts and other
techniques by imposters seeking to create confusion about the source of information about particular
corporate brands).
237. Note, for example, that some individuals with no governmental affiliation may create
official-looking platforms, such as social network profiles, that purport to convey governmental




demarcate particular portions and contributions of mixed public and pri-
vate speech-as in wikis-and to link them directly and transparently to
government contributors.
This is not to say that we have unfailing faith that this will happen.
But as Paul Schwartz observed in a different context: "One of the ex-
traordinary aspects of the Internet . . .is its rapid rate of change. It is
commonplace that each year online represents the equivalent of seven
years of change in the normal, offline world. ' 38 Technical solutions that
facilitate the transparency of government expression may be around the
corner.
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What Justice Stevens describes as "the recently minted government
speech doctrine"' is the site of some difficult and well-known doctrinal
problems. When is government speaking, as opposed to regulating?
Should subsidies with restrictions attached be treated as government
speech or as content-based regulations of private speech? What constitu-
tional difference should it make if government is viewed as the speaker,
subsidizer, or regulator? What constitutional restrictions, if any, should
limit government as the speaker?
Some of these doctrinal difficulties were on display in the recent
case of Pleasant Grove v. Summum. 2 Did monuments placed or rejected
from placement in a Pleasant Grove city park represent government
speech, or private speech? If they were private speech, wasn't the city
engaging in forbidden content discrimination by accepting a Ten Com-
mandments monument while rejecting a monument inscribed with the
Seven Aphorisms of the less familiar Summum religion? Conversely, if
the monuments were government speech, wasn't there at least a serious
question about whether Pleasant Grove violated the establishment clause
by putting up the Ten Commandments monument?
3
Some people may have come to the government speech conference4
with the expectation of hearing solutions to these sorts of doctrinal prob-
lems. And it's possible that they will find some solutions-but not from
me, I'm afraid. I'm frankly doubtful that satisfactory solutions exist, and
in any case I have none to offer. So instead of proposing solutions, I want
to step back and ask (in what I fear will be a somewhat speculative and
t Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank Larry Alexan-
der, Michael Perry, and participants in the 2010 Ira C. Rothgerber Conference on government speech
(especially Alan Chen and Abner Greene) for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
2. See id. at 1131 (majority opinion).
3. Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia both noted the issue. Id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); id. at 1139-40 (Scalia, J., concurring).
4. 17t' Annual Ira C. Rothgerber Conference co-hosted by the Byron R. White Center for the
Study of American Constitutional Law and the Denver University Law Review. The conference,
which focused on government speech, was held in Denver, Colorado on January 22.
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meandering inquiry): Why does government speech seem to be the source
of such difficult constitutional problems?
Why ask why? Well, it might be that at least some of these problems
are unnecessary-false conflicts, as they say in Conflicts of Law. For
me, the inquiry grows out of an assumption that understanding is intrin-
sically a good thing; so understanding our situation is a good thing. Part
of understanding our situation is understanding how or why we have
come to have the problems we have, even if that understanding doesn't
immediately eliminate the problems.
In any case, that is the question I want to ask: Why is government
speech problematic?
I suggest that some of the difficulties arise from a commitment to
government neutrality that is fundamentally misconceived. Our commit-
ment to neutrality is in fact a source of serious difficulties, but it doesn't
need to be: we could simply relinquish the commitment (at least in the-
ory).
Even if we did that, however, the difficulties associated with gov-
ernment speech would not disappear. That is because in part those diffi-
culties grow out of a different problem-one from which the fixation on
neutrality may serve to distract attention-that is less often noticed but is
very real. I will call this the problem of institutional capture. This prob-
lem is hardly unique to government, but it affects government, and once
noticed, suggests a possible explanation for some constitutional difficul-
ties that government speech can generate.
Indeed, reflection on the problem of institutional capture points us
to the larger difficulty-what I call the "big problem"-that I believe
underlies controversies about government speech. The big problem is,
basically, the collapse of any working consensus about the proper do-
main and functions of government. Controversies about government
speech, I'll suggest, are actually symptoms of this larger problem.
I. THE UNNECESSARY PROBLEM: NEUTRALITY
Many of the problems associated with government speech are
caused in part by ostensible constitutional obligations of governmental
neutrality. These obligations are misconceived; we can and should banish
them by disavowing the misplaced commitment to neutrality. So neutral-
ity is, or at least could and should be, a non-problem. In this section I'll
try to explain this view.
A. Neutrality vs. Government Speech
A familiar modern conception associates liberal government with
"neutrality." Liberal thinkers vary in what they think government must
be neutral towards or about. The narrowest claim, perhaps, affirmed by
all but a few outliers (like myself), is that government must be neutral
[Vol. 87:4
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toward "religion" (whatever that is).5 Others give the neutrality principle
a much broader scope. For example, prominent thinkers like John Rawls
and Ronald Dworkin sometimes say that government must be neutral
with respect to "the good," or the "good life," or with respect to "com-
prehensive doctrines." 6 A revered judicial pronouncement, if read closely
and analytically (as, fortunately, it hardly ever is), implies that the zone
of neutrality should cover "politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion."7
Commitments to neutrality inevitably influence and infiltrate under-
standings of freedom of speech, and of government speech. Thus, if gov-
ernment is obligated to be neutral within some domain, then a logical
(albeit untenable) implication would be that government should refrain
from making pronouncements or taking sides within that domain. In this
vein, one prominent scholar purports to find in the free speech cases an
"anti-orthodoxy" principle. 8 Although he applies this principle mostly to
governmental efforts to restrict expression by private speakers, he also
seems to contemplate that the principle might limit government expres-
sion as well 9 (as indeed "an anti-orthodoxy" principle worthy of the title
seemingly should). Another scholar argues that the Constitution, by im-
plication, contains a "political establishment clause" that prohibits gov-
5. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of
Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1986) ("In my view, the estab-
lishment clause absolutely disables the government from taking a position for or against relig-
ion.... The government must have no opinion because it is not the government's role to have an
opinion."). Michael Perry elaborates on the theme:
No matter how much some persons might prefer one or more religions, government may
not take any action based on the view that the preferred religion or religions are, as relig-
ion, better along one or another dimension of value than one or more other religions or
than no religion at all. So, for example, government may not take any action based on the
view that Christianity, or Roman Catholicism, or the Fifth Street Baptist Church, is, as a
religion or church, closer to the truth than one or more other religions or churches or than
no religion at all-or, if not necessarily closer to the truth, at least a more authentic re-
flection of the religious history and culture of the American people.... Similarly, no
matter how much some persons might prefer one or more religious practices, government
may not take any action based on the view that the preferred practice or practices are, as
religious practice ... , better-truer or more efficacious spiritually, for example, or more
authentically American-than one or more other religious or nonreligious practices or
than no religious practice at all.
MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 15 (1997).
6. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191-92 (1985); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 190-95 (expanded ed. 2005).
7. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
8. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 818-22 (2001).
9. Thus, Rubenfeld suggests that his anti-orthodoxy principle would forbid government to
"declare the truth about.., how many gods there are." Id. at 819. And he indicates, perhaps some-
what ambiguously, that "the law has no power to tell anyone what to think." Id. at 821. In a similar
vein, another theorist argues that "evaluative neutrality" by government toward the ideas communi-
cated through speech "is central to our understanding of freedom of expression." LARRY
ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 177-78 (2005). However, Alexander
goes on to argue that evaluative neutrality is impossible: he thus finds the commitment to freedom of
expression-and liberalism generally-deeply paradoxical. See id. at 147-81.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ernment from advocating political viewpoints, much in the way that the
establishment clause is thought to prohibit religious speech.' °
Similar ideas pop up in the Court's opinions themselves. Justice
Brennan explained in a curious case that public school officials cannot
remove books from the school library "simply because they dislike the
ideas contained in those books"' '-as if the selection of books under
conditions of limited funds and limited space did not routinely and inevi-
tably entail non-neutral evaluations of the ideas such books contain. Per-
haps the most celebrated expression of this sort of "neutrality" or "an-
ti-orthodoxy" aspiration occurred in the case I already alluded to-in
Justice Jackson's magnificent, celebrated, utterly implausible declaration
that "[ilf there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citi-
zens to confess by word or act their faith therein."'1
2
Notice that Jackson used the conjunction "or" rather than "and." He
asserted that government officials, high or petty, are prohibited not sim-
ply from coercively imposing orthodoxies on a broad range of matters,
but also from "prescrib[ing]" them.' 3 But "orthodoxy" is a term that de-
rives from Greek and simply means "right opinion."' 4 To assert X is nec-
essarily to assert that X is true, and thus that it is the right opinion. There-
fore, to declare that "democracy is good and communism and fascism are
bad" (or that "smoking is bad," or that "global warming is a serious prob-
lem") is to say that these propositions are true, and hence the right opin-
ion. And to assert that an idea is true and the right opinion is surely to
"prescribe" it. Consequently, a scrupulous adherence to Jackson's cele-
brated dictum would have the consequence of prohibiting a large chunk
of governmental speech-maybe even most of it.
No one favors such an impossible prohibition (pleasant though the
vision may be).' 5 Therefore, at the cost of rendering Jackson's statement
internally redundant and stripping its more inspirational phrases of their
10. See Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment
Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1979).
11. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872
(1982).
12. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added). For my criticisms of the pronouncement, see
Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 628 (2003). See also
ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 176-81.
13. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
14. PAUL TILLICH, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT: FROM ITS JUDAIC AND HELLENISTIC
ORIGINS TO EXISTENTIALISM 305 (Carl E. Braaten ed., 1967).
15. In his comment on Professor Randall Bezanson's paper in this symposium, The Manner of
Government Speech, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 809 (2010), Professor Robert Nagel suggests that one
unintended but happy consequence of the rigorous implementation of Bezanson's proposal would be
that "a blessed silence would descend upon the land." Robert F. Nagel, A Comment on "The Manner
of Government Speech", 87 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 85 (2010),
http://denverlawreview.org/storage/Nagel-BezansonComment.pdf. Neither Nagel nor Bezanson
actually expects this surmise to be realized, however.
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significance, we may avoid its untenable implications by reading "pre-
scribe" to mean something like issuing prescriptions backed by coercion.
Still, that isn't what Jackson said, and his pronouncement looms in the
background, evincing the appeal of "anti-orthodoxy" neutrality, and
ready to cast a pall of suspicion on governmental speech of any moment.
But these are isolated pronouncements. The aspiration to neutrality
is more systematically manifest in the reigning doctrinal approach to
free-speech protection, under which the most serious evil that a censori-
ous government can commit is thought to be "viewpoint discrimina-
tion."'16 Officially, to be sure, the "no viewpoint discrimination" doctrine
does not apply when governments are speaking; the doctrine holds only
that governments must be viewpoint neutral when they regulate or re-
strict speech by nongovernmental actors. 17 Indeed, it is plausible to view
the development of the "government speech doctrine" in large part as an
effort to relieve government of the suffocating demands of the prohibi-
tion on viewpoint discrimination.' 8 The convergence of these doctrines
can accordingly make the constitutionality of a practice turn on whether
government is speaking or regulating, as in the Summum 19 case. Particu-
larly when the challenged practice involves the conditional funding of
expression by non-govermmental speakers, though, this line can be hard
to draw.20 This difficulty is one of the most conspicuous constitutional
problems currently presented by government speech.2'
One major reason the line is hard to administer, I submit, is that the
line itself makes little sense in terms of the obligation of neutrality that
inspires the "no viewpoint discrimination" doctrine in the first place. If
government is supposed to be neutral-in other words, neutral toward
"the good," or toward "comprehensive doctrines," or toward "politics,
16. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest form .... ").
17. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009).
18. Once again, the Summum case illustrates this "escape valve" function of the government
speech doctrine. However, the doctrine also serves to provide an escape valve from other sometimes
inconvenient doctrines, such as the Abood doctrine, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
260 (1977); see also infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text, forbidding some compulsory contri-
bution provisions which have been understood to require compelled affirmations by unwilling
speakers. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 558-59 (2005). This issue is
discussed in more detail in Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 833, 834-839
(2010).
19. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132-34.
20. The problem manifests itself in the difficulty of reconciling cases like Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1991), in which the Court upheld a restriction forbidding recipients of federal
health care funding from engaging in abortion counseling, with cases like Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995), in which the Court struck down a
University of Virginia policy prohibiting funding for speakers and newspapers from being allocated
to religious speakers or media. For a discussion of the difficulties, see ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at
87-88.
21. Scholars have struggled to make the distinction operable. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Subsi-
dized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998).
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nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion"-then government
violates that obligation as surely by speaking in favor of one view in a
22controversy as by regulating the expression of views by others.
The underlying difficulty can be seen by reference to what is proba-
bly the most common rationale given for the "no viewpoint discrimina-
tion" doctrine. That rationale holds that non-neutral regulation is objec-
tionable because it distorts public discussion and skews the marketplace
of ideas.23 Speakers are supposed to engage in fair, level-playing-field
combat,24 with the Miltonian hope that true ideas will prevail. 25 If gov-
ernment restricts some viewpoints, then the game seems rigged and the
marketplace is prevented from producing the right outcome.26
On this rationale, though, government speech presents a major em-
barrassment. After all, government is likely to be the biggest, loudest,
best-funded speaker on the block-by far. In public schools, for exam-
ple, government gets to speak to captive audiences; it speaks to them for
hours and days on end at the formative period in life-childhood-when
people are most susceptible to indoctrination. No other speaker comes
close to enjoying those discursive advantages. So if government uses its
booming voice to favor one view over others, it is hard to say that the
playing field is level.27 Indeed, the "skewing" or "distorting" effect might
22. This assertion might provoke the objection, suggested by Professor Chen in his comments
on this paper, that viewpoint discrimination in governmental expression is in one crucial respect
unlike viewpoint discrimination in governmental regulation because the latter kind of censorship
eliminates some ideas from the marketplace, and thereby makes them unavailable for consideration
and possible acceptance. See Alan Chen, Right Labels, Wrong Categories: Some Comments on
Steven D. Smith's "Why is Government Speech Problematic?", 87 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 78
(2010), http://www.denverlawreview.org/storage/Chen RightLabels.pdf. But in fact much viewpoint
discriminatory regulation affects only the time, place, and manner of expression. Such regulation
disadvantages some ideas relative to others, to be sure, but it does not remove any ideas from the
intellectual or conversational marketplace. Geoffrey Stone describes these as "modest viewpoint-
based restrictions." Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 200 (1983).
23. Geoffrey Stone, a leading proponent of the content neutrality approach, explains that a
non-neutral speech regulation "distorts public debate." Id. at 198. "This is so, not because such a law
restricts 'a lot' of speech, but because by effectively excising a specific message from public debate,
it mutilates 'the thinking process of the community'...." Id.
24. Cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (condemning viewpoint
discriminatory ordinance because "St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules").
25. One of the most often quoted statements in the free speech tradition is from Milton:
And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in
the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her
and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and open encoun-
ter.
JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OTHER
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN MILTON 3, 45 (1999).
26. For an argument that government speech can distort the marketplace of ideas, see Kamen-
shine, supra note 9, at 1105-06.
27. Cf Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone, Epilogue to ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 311, 313 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (observ-
ing that "the massive presence of government in the society presents extraordinary opportunities for
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be vastly more powerful than if government simply imposed a few mod-
erate viewpoint-based regulations (many of which would burden but not
eliminate the expression of disfavored views).28
In short, government speech stands in stark tension with the aspira-
tion to neutrality. Sanford Levinson explains:
This image of the state as ... benignly neutral ... is quite naive,
not least because it almost wholly fails to pay adequate attention to
the fact that the state is often an active participant in the intellectual
marketplace. The easiest examples, of course, involve presidents giv-
ing major policy addresses or teachers using state-mandated text-
books within the public school system. Both regularly articulate,
clothed in the full symbolic and actual authority of the state, highly
contestable-and completely unneutral-views on important political
and cultural matters. The danger facing those who disagree with the
state's views comes, most often, not from any plausible fear of clas-
sic censorship ... but, rather, from being drowned out of the market-
place by the often superior resources of the state.
2 9
B. Banishing the Problem?
In sum, one reason why the "government-speech versus private-
speech" question can seem so troublesome, especially in cases of gov-
ernment-funded expression, is that the question is an effort to apply a
distinction that makes little sense in terms of the principal rationale that
has generated this part of free speech doctrine. More generally, the fact
of government speech-and in the political world we inhabit, govern-
ments inevitably and incessantly speak and on all sorts of matters-
stands in tension with the notion that liberal governments must be neutral
toward "the good," or toward "politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion." So long as that tension persists, government speech
is likely to present intractable problems. Put simply, the liberal commit-
ment to neutrality, carried to its logical conclusion, implies that govern-
ments basically shouldn't speak on important and controversial matters.
Governments do and must speak on such matters, but such speech is in-
herently problematic.
There is, however, a straightforward remedy for this particular prob-
lem: we could simply acknowledge that the neutrality conception of lib-
it to distort the marketplace of ideas"). For a painstaking analysis demonstrating the difficulty, see
ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 82-102.
28. A robust enough Miltonian confidence might be undaunted by these disadvantages. Strict-
ly speaking, Milton did not say that the competition needed to be fair but only "free and open," and
that truth needed to be "in the field." See MILTON supra note 24, at 45. Like David, if it is allowed to
compete, truth can perhaps vanquish Goliath-like falsehoods. Maybe. But the view is remarkable for
its optimism.
29. SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES
79-80 (1998).
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eralism is and always was misconceived.3° Instead of the aggressively
timid, insistently noncommittal liberalism of thinkers like Dworkin and
Rawls, 31 we might embrace the more robust, classical liberalism associ-
ated in different versions with people like Mill 32 and Madison.33 This
more robust liberalism does not purport to be agnostic on matters of truth
or the good life. On the contrary, it actively asserts-asserts as true (and
thus, if you like, as "right opinion," or "orthodox")-a vision of the good
life and the good society, but one committed to values such as the pursuit
of truth, freedom of thought and expression, and tolerance of competing
viewpoints. 34 A constitutional regime should promote freedom and toler-
ance not because the regime is noncommittal about truth or the good but,
on the contrary, because the regime takes it as true that such values are
important human goods.35 And the government in such a regime should
be permitted, even encouraged, to say as much. In short, under this more
robust liberal conception, there is nothing inherently problematic about
government speech, even on matters about which citizens energetically
disagree.
So, by renouncing the misconceived commitment to neutrality,
would we thereby have dissolved the constitutional problems that afflict
government speech? Hardly. Renouncing neutrality might dissolve some
problems. For example, the problem in the Summum case I highlighted at
the outset of this article would be eliminated, or at least reduced. Sup-
pose we were to conclude (as we might or might not) that once the obli-
gation of neutrality is lifted, the free speech doctrine prohibiting view-
point discrimination should likewise be abandoned. In that case, and de-
pending on what free speech doctrine were to develop in place of the
current doctrine, it might be that Pleasant Grove could freely accept one
monument and not another--even if the monuments were considered
private speech. Or it might be that we would retain the prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination-not because government is obligated to be
neutral but simply as a useful device for detecting and preventing some
kinds of undesirable censorship. 36 In that case, if we think the monu-
30. For an argument to this effect, see Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 18-22 (2000).
31. See George Rutherglen, Private Law and Public Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. 1503, 1504
(2006).
32. See David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty-seven Variations on a Theme by
Holmes), 48 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1025 (1996).
33. See William H. Pryor, Jr., Madison's Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the
Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist Court, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1169-72 (2002).
34. See Steven D. Smith, Educating for Liberalism, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1043-46
(2009).
35. 1 have discussed these alternatives in more detail elsewhere. See id.; Steven D. Smith,
Toleration and Liberal Commitments, in NOMOS XLVIII: TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS 243, 243-71
(Melissa S. Williams & Jeremy Waldron eds., 2008); Steven D. Smith, Recovering (from) Enlight-
enment?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1263, 1283-87 (2004).
36. It is possible, for example, to understand the central free speech commitment not in terms
of a commitment to neutrality, or to a level-playing-field marketplace of ideas, but rather in terms of
a prohibition on governmental suppression of ideas (subject, no doubt, to various qualifications, as in
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ments are best classified as government speech, then there should be no
problem in letting the city accept one religious monument but not an-
other. In doing this, the city would not be acting in a religiously neutral
manner, to be sure; but if the obligation of neutrality were removed, that
departure from neutrality would not be a problem.
I expect this conclusion to provoke objections, because even people
who are skeptical about a general obligation of governmental neutrality
still believe that government must be neutral in matters of religion and
that religious expression by government is therefore problematic.37 So I
need to say something about this view. In addition, even if abandoning
the neutrality conception could eliminate the problems presented in cases
like Summum, government speech would still present other difficulties.
For example, the large problem of how to treat message-restrictive or
content-restrictive government subsidies of private speakers would con-
tinue to plague us.
So in carrying the inquiry further, a natural next point of investiga-
tion is the one I just noted-the issue of governmental religious speech.
My hope is that by thinking about why religious speech seems problem-
atic, we can gain some insights into the source of the difficulties about
government speech generally.
C. Is Religious Speech Special?
Even theorists who do not embrace the general prescription that
government must be neutral with respect to "the good" or "the good life"
often insist on some such neutrality in matters of "religion."38 And the
Justices-all of them, it seems-agree. 39 Indeed, the ostensible obliga-
tion of religious neutrality has given rise to the only concrete, enforce-
able (albeit sporadic), constitutional limit on governmental speech. Thus,
under the so-called "no endorsement" doctrine (the status of which seems
somewhat precarious at present4°), government is constitutionally forbid-
den to do or say things that endorse or disapprove of religion.4 1
the standard categories of unprotected speech). By this understanding, viewpoint discriminatory
restrictions might nevertheless be disfavored-not so much because government has deviated from
neutrality or skewed the marketplace, but rather because the discrimination evidences a purpose to
suppress.
37. In this vein, Abner Greene argues vigorously against a general requirement of neutrality.
See Greene, supra note 29, at 18-22. "Government may, and should, use its speech powers to ad-
vance specific conceptions of the good, even if those conceptions are contested, controversial, or
seen as favoring a particular viewpoint." Id. at 5. Nonetheless, Greene "carves out an exception for
government religious speech," which he would forbid. Id.
38. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 194-95.
39. Thus, in the recent Ten Commandments cases, the Justices disagreed strenuously about
what religious neutrality entails, but they did not seem to disagree about whether government is
supposed to be neutral towards religion. See, e.g., McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844,
860-62 (2005).
40. In the most obvious recent opportunity for application of the "no endorsement" doctrine-
namely, the Ten Commandments decisions-the Supreme Court referred to rationales from the "no
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But once we have abandoned any general obligation of governmen-
tal neutrality toward "the good," or toward "comprehensive doctrines,"
why should the obligation be retained for religion? Why should religious
speech by government be especially problematic? The common and easy
answer, of course, is "because the Constitution says so." But in fact, the
Constitution does not say so- not in its literal terms, at least. Nor, until
fairly recently, was the Constitution thought by almost anyone to prohibit
religious expression by government: there is in fact a long and revered
tradition of such expression, extending to pronouncements like the Dec-
laration of Independence, Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom, and Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address (as well as inaugural
42addresses by every other President, including President Obama).4 No
doubt we can now read the Constitution to prohibit such expression if we
want to, but why should we want to?
Some of the most familiar responses seem less than compelling. Re-
ligious speech by government may be divisive, yes, but a great deal of
what governments say is divisive. 43 Religion is core to some people's
identity, but so are race, ethnicity, language, and politics.44 Religious
assertions are not provable by ordinary empirical methods, but then a
great deal that government speakers say is not provable.45
A common opinion suggests that although government speakers say
plenty of profoundly controversial and unprovable things on matters of
economics, politics, foreign policy, and other subjects, those statements
are permissible because government has to address those sorts of mat-
ters. Neutrality in those domains is impossible. Conversely, government
doesn't need to say anything about religion, so there is no justification
for deviating from neutrality in this area.46 There are various objections
to this argument, but for now, I will mention only one: genuine neutrality
is as impossible in this area as in others.47 In a nation of many and di-
verse religions, much that government does and says inevitably will con-
tradict the religious beliefs held by some, perhaps many, Americans.
endorsement" cases but did not explicitly apply the "no endorsement" doctrine. See id. at 857; Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684-87 (2005).
41. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
42. See Steven D. Smith, Justice Douglas, Justice O'Connor, and George Orwell: Does the
Constitution Compel Us to Disown Our Past? 2-3 (San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-
17, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=728663 (elaborating on religious references in presi-
dential speeches).
43. For criticism of the divisiveness rationale, see Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and
the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1723 (2006).
44. For more detailed discussion, see Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Free-
dom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 202-04 (1991).
45. For a helpful discussion of this issue, see Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the
Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 773 (1993).
46. In this vein, Douglas Laycock asserts that "[t]he government must have no opinion [about
religion] because it is not the government's role to have an opinion." Laycock, supra note 4, at 8.
47. 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONsTrruTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND
FAIRNESS 60 (2008).
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In this vein, though he strongly supports governmental neutrality
regarding religion, Kent Greenawalt concedes that:
[M]any laws and policies, as well as ethical principles taught in pub-
lic schools, inevitably imply that religious doctrines that are diamet-
rically opposed to the laws, policies, and ethical principles are mis-
taken. A government that maintains strong military forces and en-
gages in armed conflict implies that pacifist religions are in error; one
that forbids racial discrimination implies that religions based on ra-
cial inequality are misguided.
48
Perhaps the most conspicuous instances involve the teaching of evo-
lution in the public schools. To be sure, the theory of evolution is not
incompatible with "religion" (if there is such a thing), but it is starkly at
odds with some religious beliefs held by some Americans-namely,
those who believe in biblical literalism and six-day creationism. It may
be that in teaching evolution, schools are not motivated by a desire to
undermine those religions.49 Nonetheless, the contradiction between what
the schools teach and what these religions believe is obvious (which of
course is one reason why the teaching of evolution continues to provoke
heated controversy in some locales).50
To be sure, government speech that contradicts some widely-held
religious beliefs may not affirmatively endorse any particular religion or
religion generally. From this observation, some might go on to conclude
that government must and therefore may contradict some religious be-
liefs, but government need not and should not favor any religious be-
liefs-at least not directly and specifically.51 Still, it would be a very
peculiar version of neutrality that forbids government to favor particular
views or positions, but permits government to contradict and oppose
other potentially competing views and positions. Would anyone accept a
church's profession of "neutrality" in a Presidential election, for exam-
ple, if the church refrained from instructing its members to vote for the
Republican candidate but urged them to vote against the Democratic
candidate? Such a slanted, one-way constraint is simply not "neutrality"
in any meaningful sense.
Nonetheless, the commitment to governmental neutrality in matters
of religion seems deeply entrenched. One reason may be that it is easy to
imagine religious declarations that governments conceivably might make
48. Id.
49. Or perhaps they are so motivated, at least implicitly. Doesn't the goal of inculcating (what
one believes to be) truth entail or include the goal of dispelling (what one believes to be) correspond-
ing falsehoods?
50. For a recent, much publicized instance, see Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F.
Supp. 2d 707, 708-09 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
51. Cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 46, at 61 ("Although the state unavoidably carries out
actions that imply that certain religious doctrines about social justice and order are unsound, never,
or rarely, need its policies imply the correctness of any particular religious understanding.").
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(even if it is unlikely that governments in this country today would actu-
ally make them) that seem deeply problematic, even to people (like my-
self) who do not believe the Constitution does or should contain any gen-
eral prohibition on governmental endorsement of religion.52 Suppose, for
example, that following ancient precedent, Congress were to pass a reso-
lution declaring that the Athanasian version of the doctrine of the Trinity
is true and the Arian version is false. Even if the resolution were purely
advisory, leaving all citizens free to agree or disagree or pay no attention
at all, such speech would plainly be inappropriate. Wouldn't it? But why,
exactly?
In our current discursive climate, it is natural to explain the inap-
propriateness by supposing that there must be some government obliga-
tion to be neutral in matters of religion and that sectarian expressions of
the kind I have imagined would violate that obligation. This neutrality-
centered explanation makes it difficult to say that such highly sectarian
expressions are inappropriate without also condemning more generic
religious expressions such as those in the national motto and the Pledge
of Allegiance. (Even though many people-Justice O'Connor is a lead-
ing example-evidently wish there were some good basis for a distinc-
tion, and therefore resort to transparently flimsy rationalizations to save
the more generic expressions. 53) By contrast, I want to suggest that there
is a different explanation for our intuitions regarding such sectarian
statements. This explanation is worth considering, I hope, in part because
it points us to a different and real-though less often noticed-problem
that affects not only governmental religious speech but the regime of free
speech more generally.
HI. THE UNNOTICED PROBLEM: INSTITUTIONAL CAPTURE
In order to develop this alternative explanation, it will be helpful to
momentarily step back from considering speech by government specifi-
cally. Instead, we might think about a problem that attends speech by
multi-person organizations or associations generally.
A. An Example: People Watching Birds
Imagine a hypothetical association, the Birdwatchers' Society of
America (BSA), which has been formed to promote and facilitate bird-
watching. The BSA has a national, five-person executive board. It spon-
sors a website and disseminates written materials, including a magazine
with stories, tips, and beautiful photos of birds. The organization also
sponsors local chapters throughout the country in which members organ-
ize field trips and activities, exchange information and experiences, and
52. For my objections to the endorsement doctrine, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Percep-
tions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 266 (1987).
53. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
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learn about birds and techniques for observing them. In order to support
these activities, the BSA charges yearly dues. United by a fascination
with birds, thousands of people from all walks of life-lawyers, teachers,
plumbers, tinkers, tailors, cabinet makers, and many others-join the
organization, pay the dues, and participate in the activities.
In a presidential election year, without advance notice to the mem-
bership, the BSA's executive board votes 3-2 to make a public declara-
tion that the organization endorses and supports the Democratic Party's
candidate for President. This declaration comes as a surprise to many of
the association's members, and they are even more startled when, a few
months later, the executive board publicizes a resolution (again adopted
by a 3-2 vote) expressing enthusiasm for Gaia philosophy and spiritual-
ity. The resolution declares that unlike more archaic and oppressive bib-
lical religions such as Christianity and Judaism, which teach the duty of
"subduing" and "exercising dominion" over the earth, Gaia joyously and
devoutly celebrates the spirit within nature and thereby promotes envi-
ronmental harmony.
Many BSA members object to these declarations, and they commu-
nicate their dissatisfaction both publicly and within the organization. The
dissenters say the BSA includes and represents members of diverse po-
litical and religious persuasions, or of none; consequently, the organiza-
tion should not be in the business of endorsing political parties and reli-
gious positions that many of its members do not support. But the execu-
tive board defends its decisions, arguing that in each instance its state-
ments are in harmony with and supportive of the values and purposes of
the association. In addition, the board points out that membership in the
organization is entirely voluntary; members who are sufficiently of-
fended by the controversial affirmations are perfectly free to withdraw
from the association.
Is the board right? It is true that the controversial statements can be
understood to be related-albeit in an indirect and contestable way-to
the values that inform the association. It is true as well that members who
are dissatisfied are free to drop out of the association. But that observa-
tion points to a problem with the board's statements. Is it fair, or is it
desirable, measured by the association's own values and purposes, for
members who share a common passion for birdwatching to be put to the
choice of tacitly standing behind political and religious opinions which
they find objectionable, or else to withdraw from the organization?
What has happened, the critics argue, is that a group of board mem-
bers has in effect captured a legitimate and valuable association and used
it to further their own partisan political, religious, and philosophical
agendas. They have thereby disserved the association by making contin-
ued participation at least uncomfortable for some members, and perhaps
forcing these members to withdraw their participation and support.
Moreover, these injuries-to the members and to the association itself-
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are unjustified, because even if the board's statements can be related to
the association's central values, the relationship is distant and highly
debatable, and most importantly, the statements are clearly not necessary
to further those association purposes which the members agree upon and
which have brought them together in a mutual enterprise devoted to
birdwatching, not religion or politics.
I have tried to give a relatively stark example. But there is room for
disagreement even here, and in many other cases the judgments would be
more difficult. Suppose, for example, that Congress is contemplating the
repeal of environmental legislation, and the repeal is likely to reduce the
numbers of birds and bird species. Now BSA opposition to such legisla-
tion will be more obviously and directly related to the organization's
central purposes. Or suppose the birdwatching group was originally
founded by a group of Gaia devotees. Now the connection between
birdwatching and the tenets and values of Gaia might be an essential and
understood basis for the organization. That basis might persist in the as-
sociation's self-understanding, even if people who are not Gaia devotees
are later permitted to join the organization.
I will return to consider these complexities later. For now, the im-
portant point is that associations can be captured by factions within them
to express messages and promote positions extraneous to the associa-
tions' central purposes. Such commandeering, however, is not only inju-
rious to an association and unfair to dissenting members. As I will show,
it can be subversive of free speech values as well.
B. Institutional Capture and Free Speech
So, what is so bad about the sort of commandeering that our hypo-
thetical case has illustrated? Some of the evils have already been noticed:
the practice is unfair and oppressive to dissenting members. Those mem-
bers have, after all, contributed time, effort, and money to the association
on the assumption that it exists to serve purposes that they support. If the
association then turns to promoting specific beliefs or causes that these
members do not support, and did not understand to be within the associa-
tion's reason for being, they have cause to feel deceived and exploited.
It is easy enough as well to appreciate how institutional capture has
the potential to weaken an association. Some members may withdraw
altogether, and others may remain while feeling less allegiance and more
distrust than they previously experienced. As a result, these disaffected
members may be less willing to contribute their time, money, and ener-
gies to the institution. In this way, a faction that commandeers an organi-
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zation to promote its agenda can be like a virus that takes over a host for
its own purposes but in the long run weakens or destroys the host.
54
Although institutional capture can cause these general injuries, it
can also damage more specifically speech-related values in several ways.
In the first place, the sorts of expressions that result from institutional
capture are likely to be misleading. They suggest that the association as a
whole stands behind the captive association's message when in fact this
may not be true. To be sure, observers no doubt understand that with any
large and diverse organization, it is unlikely that any particular view en-
joys unanimous support. Still, a statement by an organization is typically
taken as representing at least a sort of consensus or dominant view; but
when capture occurs, that representation may be false.
Indeed, most likely it is precisely to gain the advantage of such a
representation-an advantage based on deception-that the faction
makes the effort to capture the organization for its expressive purposes.
In our hypothetical case, for example, the three board members and any
others who shared their views could have issued the contested statements
for themselves; but such statements would likely lack the impact that a
statement emanating from a respected national association has. Although
it carries more weight, however, the statement by the association is fun-
damentally misleading if, in fact, it does not represent a consensus within
the organization.
Closely related to this harm is a sort of allocative distortion of re-
sources that is brought to bear upon the marketplace of ideas. A state-
ment resulting from institutional capture not only misleads by misrepre-
senting the views of dissenting members (who may be numerous, or even
a majority); it in effect appropriates their resources and uses those re-
sources to promote messages that they may not want to support. This
harm is distinct, and might be present even if all of the members happen
to agree with the statements that result from commandeering.
Suppose, for example, that all of the members of BSA support the
Democratic Party. Even so, they may not want to contribute financially
or otherwise to its presidential candidate, and they may think it is no
business of the organization to make political endorsements. By placing
54. The undermining of associations is no trivial matter. Tocqueville observed that Americans
had a penchant for voluntary associations, and that in comparison with people in less democratic
nations, Americans seemed to be especially adept at what he called the "skill of association." 2
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1840), reprinted in ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE
DEMOCRACY N AMERICA AND TWO ESSAYS ON AMERICA 493, 600 (Gerald E. Bevan trans., 2003).
And he regarded this capacity for association to be vital to democracy; indeed, "if [men living in
democratic countries] failed to acquire the practice of association in their day-to-day lives, civiliza-
tion itself would be in danger." Id. at 597. If Tocqueville was right, then practices that would under-
mine willingness to participate in and contribute to associations are not a negligible concern. And
although the matter and the causal connections are no doubt complex, some observers today perceive
a decline in Americans' propensity to associate. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 27 (2000).
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the prestige and authority of the organization behind this message-
prestige and authority which are the product of the time, effort, and mon-
ey that members have invested in the organization-the commandeering
faction effectively seizes those resources and puts them to a communica-
tive use that the investors themselves do not favor.
The allocative harm is similar in kind to the harm that would result
if the organization were legally authorized to levy a tax on, say, the sale
of birdseed, and then to use the money to buy advertising for its mes-
sages. In my hypothetical case, of course, the tax is being paid by mem-
bers of the BSA itself. But since by hypothesis many of those members
do not believe the organization should be promoting the messages in
question, and since the board accordingly is in effect seizing these mem-
bers' past contributions of time and money and diverting such resources
to expression without the contributors' consent, the effect is similar: re-
sources are being seized and used to support expression that the owners
of the resources do not want to support. That sort of misallocation will
naturally have an effect on the marketplace of ideas-the same sort of
distorting or "skewing" effect that proponents of viewpoint neutrality in
speech regulation often worry about.55
These harms to free speech values-the misleading nature of the
communications that result from institutional capture, and the misalloca-
tion of resources and consequent distortion of the marketplace that such
commandeering involves-point to a third harm. The Supreme Court has
indicated that compelling a person to affirm something that he or she
does not believe or does not choose to affirm is a serious violation of
First Amendment values.56 And in cases like Keller v. State Bar of Cali-
fornia57 and Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,8 the Court has ruled
as well that if an organization such as a state bar association or a labor
union uses a member's dues to promote political views that are not close-
ly related to the organization's purpose, this practice can amount to a
constitutionally-forbidden compelled affirmation. Speech that results
from organizational commandeering can thus bring about this particu-
larly objectionable sort of harm.59 To be sure, insofar as the BSA is a
purely private organization in which membership is entirely voluntary,
its members would likely not have a legally cognizable claim under the
Keller and Abood line of decisions. Even so, the underlying harm to free
55. See Kamenshine, supra note 9, at 1105-06.
56. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713-14 (1977). For an analysis questioning
this view, see Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006).
57. 496 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1990).
58. 431 U.S. 209, 235-37 (1977).
59. This harm is related, obviously, to the first harm I have discussed-namely, the mislead-
ing nature of the communications. But that harm is inflicted on recipients of the misleading speech
and, arguably, on the marketplace of ideas generally. By contrast, the harm of compelled affirmation
is suffered by the unwilling speaker-namely, the member whose contributions are used to support a
message he does not support.
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speech values is similar. It is easy enough to say, and it is in some sense
true, that a member who does not agree with what the BSA is saying can
drop out of the association. But dropping out might entail significant
costs-loss of regular association with long-time friends, loss of connec-
tion to an activity that a person deeply values, possibly even loss of con-
nections and experiences vital to certain types of professions. Such costs
may be even more obvious and severe for other types of associations -
academic, legal, or medical professional associations, for example. In
theory, no one is required to belong to such associations, and so any con-
tributions people make may be deemed "voluntary." But in fact many
people have no realistic choice but to remain in such associations, and to
make the required contributions: their ability to continue in their occupa-
tions may depend on such affiliation. In such instances, the "compelled
affirmation" logic of Keller and Abood has great force, even if the courts
will not, and probably should not, give any legal remedy in most such
cases.
My discussion has suggested that communications that result from
institutional capture can create an array of harms. Some of these harms-
the unfairness to and exploitation of dissenting members, the weakening
of associational ties and commitments-do not sound in First Amend-
ment values specifically. Other harms-the misleading nature of the re-
sulting communications, the misallocation of resources and consequent
distortion of the marketplace of ideas, the "compelled affirmations" by
dissenting members-relate directly to familiar free speech values. I
have illustrated these harms, however, by a hypothetical case. If we
move from the hypothetical world to the real one, how serious is the
problem of institutional capture?
There is no manifest answer to that question. My own impression,
however, is that the problem is pervasive. It seems to me that all manner
of associations-universities, 6° business corporations, churches, profes-
sional associations, and, of course, governmental institutions-are fre-
quently the targets of factions who seek, often successfully, to capture
them in order to endorse or spread the factions' favored messages. The
associations in which lawyers are most deeply involved-the ABA and
the AALS-regularly (in my view) take partisan and unnecessary posi-
tions on issues with respect to which the diverse views of their members
should be respected. Thus, the ABA submits amicus briefs-gratuitously
and improperly, in my humble opinion-in cases on a wide range of con-
troversial issues (from affirmative action to freedom of association to
capital punishment) about which lawyers hold different views and as to
60. On universities, see STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN TIME 18-19
(2008).
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which there is no good reason for the ABA to take a partisan stance.
The AALS, by imposing a sort of quasi-boycott on a hotel whose owner
contributed money to one side in a California ballot initiative, effectively
and unnecessarily endorsed a position that many citizens and even a few
intransigent and unenlightened academics (again, I happen to be one of
them) do not share.62
Still, it is understandable that the problem of institutional capture
goes largely unnoticed, and that many might resist classifying it as a
problem at all. For one thing, the factions who commandeer associations
typically do not thereby violate any positive law. And they naturally be-
lieve in the justice of their causes. So it is easy for them in their righteous
zeal, and for others who agree with them, to overlook the damage they
inflict on institutional integrity and to freedom of speech and association,
and to understand themselves simply to be exercising their legal rights to
spread a message they believe to be true and just.
In addition, whether a particular expression or message is the result
of dubious commandeering will usually involve complex and contestable
judgments. I have tried to describe a practice by which factions capture
associations for the purpose of sending or supporting extraneous and
partisan messages-i.e., messages not closely related to the associations'
shared and understood purposes. But what messages are "extraneous"?
How can we distinguish between extraneous messages and proper ones?
After all, associations often express messages and take positions-they
sometimes exist precisely for that purpose-and it is always people with-
in the associations who determine what messages such associations will
send and what positions they will take. So, what is the difference be-
tween this normal and inevitable functioning of associations and what I
am calling institutional capture?
61. See STEWART GREENLEAF, FEDERALIST SOc'Y, REPORT ON ABA AMICUS BRIEFS 5,
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/2007032l-AmicusArticle.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). The Report
concludes:
The ABA has filed numerous amicus briefs over the past two decades, often in cases in-
volving contentious issues that split the legal community, including ABA members. The
constitutionality of the line-item veto and independent counsel law, the limitations on
capital punishment, and the scope of the Fourth Amendment and the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule are among the areas addressed by ABA amicus briefs. But the
breadth and controversial nature of at least some of this activity is not proscribed by the
Association's policies. The standards governing the approval of amicus briefs are broad
enough to allow the Standing Committee on Amicus Briefs and the Board of Governors
to sign off on briefs supporting controversial positions on which the ABA has not yet
adopted any policy. At present, Board of Governors discretion, and the potential political
effects of especially vocal ABA entities objecting to some other committee's proposed
brief, are the principal blocks on the process.
Id.
62. For a discussion, see Eugene Volokh, More on the AALS "Boycott" of Hotel Because of
Owner's Contribution to Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Initiative, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Sept. 5,
2008, http://volokh.com/posts/1220638833.shtml.
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The question in any given instance requires attention to both the
substantive and procedural dimensions of an association. Substantively,
an association and its purposes are defined by such things as its history,
its established practices, the tacit understandings of its leaders and mem-
bers, and perhaps its accepted or official statements of purpose (organiz-
ing documents, mission statements, and so forth). Procedurally, associa-
tions have methods by which different sorts of decisions are supposed to
be made. And they may have a sort of institutional character. Not all
associations are the same: some organizations are understood to be de-
mocratic and "bottom-up," 63 while others are more "top-down," self-
consciously investing more responsibility and authority in a leader or
leaders. 64 Insofar as communications made in the name of the association
are made in accordance with accepted procedures and with processes that
respect the essential character of the organization, there is less basis for
saying that the association has been "captured" (even if not all members
agree with the content of particular communications). Conversely, if a
faction bypasses the normal or accepted procedures or makes decisions
that do not respect the association's essential character, the charge of
"capture" has more force.
These substantive and procedural dimensions of an association are
often complex and subject to competing interpretations. So there will
often be differing views about whether any particular message or en-
dorsement is the result of "capture," or "commandeering." Although I
have mentioned what I believe to be some illustrative examples, I under-
stand that these examples are debatable. My purpose here is not to de-
termine whether "capture" has occurred in any particular case. My im-
mediate purpose, rather, is to suggest an alternative explanation for our
intuitions about governmental religious speech-an explanation which
63. Suppose, for example, that the BSA in my hypothetical case has traditionally been a
generally democratic organization. It has an executive board, but the board has typically performed
internal and largely routine administrative functions; any major decisions have been the product of
wide-ranging consultation within the organization. Perhaps most association members have paid
scant attention to the selection and doings of the national leaders and would have difficulty even
remembering their names or picking them out of a line-up. In this situation, if the (previously almost
anonymous) leaders then make major decisions and issue controversial public statements for the
organization on sensitive issues, there will be an understandable sense that these leaders have
"commandeered" the organization for their purposes.
64. To give just one example, in some churches, such as the Roman Catholic church, the
upper leadership may historically have been viewed as having considerable authority to determine
and declare the official views of the association, without a great deal of input from ordinary mem-
bers. In such an association, a statement made by leaders but not supported by many members will
not cause the harms mentioned above to the same extent. Thus, if an association is understood to be
"top-down" and hierarchical with a strong central authority, statements emanating from that author-
ity are not as likely to be understood as an expression of the views of the lower-level membership.
And members who contribute time, effort, and money to an organization which they understand to
be governed by a strong centralized authority will do so knowing that the authority may take posi-
tions or issue statements without consulting with the membership: that is the sort of association to
which they choose to contribute.
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may also help to illumine the difficulties associated with government
speech generally.
C. Government Speech and the Problem of Capture
Political communities presided over by governments are one class
of association-a vitally important class, given their wide-ranging func-
tions and coercive powers-subject to capture or commandeering.
Return to an example mentioned earlier. Suppose the White House
issues an official declaration saying that the Athanasian doctrine of the
Trinity is true and that the Arian doctrine is heretical. Leaving aside the
question of constitutionality, I suspect that nearly everyone in this coun-
try will believe that this declaration is at least inappropriate. But why?
The easy explanation, in our current constitutional climate at least, is that
the declaration violates government's obligation to be neutral in matters
of religion. That explanation implies that the words "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance are similarly inappropriate. And of course some
citizens-Michael Newdow, for instance-heartily agree. 65 But many
other citizens, like Justice O'Connor, perceive these expressions as fun-
damentally different, and so having articulated a neutrality principle they
are forced to offer strained and even unseemly distinctions to try to ra-
tionalize these diverse intuitions. 66 The discussion of institutional capture
suggests an alternative explanation (other than neutrality) that helps dis-
tinguish between those religious expressions nearly everyone finds inap-
propriate, and those that many find acceptable.
That discussion indicates that government would act inappropriately
by expressing messages or endorsing positions on matters extraneous to
government's proper purposes or concerns. Of course, there is vast dis-
agreement about what government's proper purposes or concerns are-a
difficulty I will consider again shortly. But for now let me venture this
observation: although the issue is enormously controversial, there is in
the American political tradition a great deal of precedent and support for
a view in which government recognizes and participates in the minimal
expressions and observances that are sometimes described as "civil relig-
ion."67 Many people believe-and from the nation's beginning many
65. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 (2004) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring).
66. Id. at 33-45; cf Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARv. L. REV. 155, 235
(2004) (observing that "[O'Connor's] rationale is unconvincing both to serious nonbelievers and to
serious believers"). Steven H. Shiffrin observes, "I am sure that a pledge identifying the United
States as subject to divine authority is asserting the existence and authority of the divine." Steven H.
Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 70 (2004).
And he adds that "pretending [that this and similar expressions] are not religious is simply insult-
ing." Id. at 71.
67. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH, Civil Religion in America, in BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON
RELIGION IN A POST-TRADITIONALIST WORLD 168, 168 (1970) ("[T]here actually exists alongside of
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have believed-that government may properly promote this sort of ge-
neric religion.68 Civil religion has its vociferous critics, of course, both
religious and secular: I am not here offering any defense on the merits,
but merely observing that support for civil religion is deeply entrenched
in our political tradition.69 On the other hand, there is little or no support
or precedent for the view that a proper function of government-in this
country, at least-is to make more definite theological pronouncements
or to resolve intricate theological controversies.
If this observation is correct as a descriptive matter, then it is under-
standable that highly sectarian pronouncements by government (like the
hypothetical approval of Athanasian doctrine) would be viewed as im-
proper. They are improper not because government is somehow obli-
gated to be neutral in all matters of religion, but rather because there is
no viable conception of the proper function of governments, in this coun-
try anyway, by which such highly sectarian statements would not be
wholly extraneous to governments' proper role. It would thus be hard to
see them as anything other than products of improper commandeering or
capture. Conversely, more generic religious statements like the national
motto, while still controversial, are well within the functions of govern-
ment as these have traditionally been understood by many in this coun-
try.
As a sort of thought experiment to test this alternative explanation,
we might consider whether analogous partisan but not religious state-
ments by government would generate similar intuitions. Imagine some
parallel generic and more specific statements that governments con-
ceivably might make in the areas of science, music, and sports:
and rather clearly differentiated from the churches an elaborate and well-institutionalized civil relig-
ion in America.").
68. I discuss this tradition at much greater length in Steven D. Smith, Constitutional Divide:
The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions (forthcoming 2010).
69. For an exchange of views on the subject, compare Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger
Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo-Christianity and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275
(2007), with Steven D. Smith, "Sectarianizing" Civil Religion? A Comment on Gedicks and Hen-
drix, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 307 (2007).
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1. Science
a) A government education agency declares that science is a
valuable human enterprise and that scientific education and
research should be encouraged.
b) A government agency declares that the Big Bang theory is
true but that "string theory" is bogus science.
2. Music
a) A government agency responsible for promoting cultural
affairs says that music is a valuable human achievement
and activity, and that musical performances and music edu-
cation should be promoted.
b) A government agency declares that jazz music is the high-
est and best form of music originating in this country and
that Country Western music is aesthetically inferior.
3. Sports
a) Congress passes a resolution declaring that baseball is an
important part of the national heritage and that a particular
week will be designated as "National Baseball Week."
b) Congress passes a resolution declaring that the New York
Yankees have been the most worthy and admirable fran-
chise in the history of baseball, to be revered above any
other team (especially including the Boston Red Sox and
the Los Angeles Dodgers).
In each of these instances, I suspect, many citizens would likely re-
gard the generic statements as unobjectionable but would find the more
specific statements to be inappropriate. But why? The specific statements
are controversial, to be sure, and some people would disagree with them.
But that does not seem to be the precise problem here. After all, some
people disagree with anything government says (including the more ge-
neic statements I have given above); it surely does not follow that gov-
ernment cannot speak. In these instances, moreover, I suspect that even
people who happen to agree with the specific affirmations-the state-
ments condemning string theory, disparaging Country Western music,
and extolling the Yankees-would acknowledge that government acts
improperly in saying such things.
If I am right in these surmises about common judgments in such in-
stances, then I think the examples support my alternative explanation of
governmental religious speech. It is not governmental religious messages
per se that are especially objectionable, but rather inappropriately narrow
affirmations. Sectarian affirmations, perhaps ("sectarian" in the sense in
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which the word is occasionally used to denote views or statements,
whether or not they are theological in character, that seem specific and
unduly partisan). And sectarian affirmations by government are objec-
tionable not because there is some constitutional prohibition of sectarian
statements per se; rather, they are objectionable if, because, and to the
extent that they go beyond the proper functions of government. In that
case, they suggest and reflect an objectionable capture of governmental
institutions by partisan factions, and they produce the evils associated
with such capture.7°
But this conclusion points to what may be the larger reason why
government speech in general is problematic, and especially problematic
today in a way that was not as apparent in the past. I call this larger rea-
son "the big problem."
1I. THE BIG PROBLEM: WHAT IS GOVERNMENT FOR ANYWAY?
The preceding discussion has suggested that some common objec-
tions to religious messages by government may be best accounted for as
manifestations not of some special problem of religion, or even of gov-
ernment speech in particular, but rather of a more general problem of
institutional capture. The underlying, animating idea here is simple
enough in the abstract: it is simply a notion of institutional integrity. As-
sociations have a character and a purpose. Members and leaders of an
association ought to respect that character and those purposes, rather than
trying to exploit the association to promote causes and send messages
that are extraneous to the association's character and purposes--even
messages that may seem to be righteous, good, and true. Members and
leaders who use associations in this way ought to be criticized as hijack-
ers, not praised as heroes of truth and justice; and they ought to be criti-
cized even by those who happen to agree with the particular expressions
that the commandeered associations issue.
71
Whether this sort of exploitation-or capture, or commandeering-
has occurred in a given instance is often a complex and contested issue
turning on judgments about the character and purpose of the association.
But not always. So the controversial status of generic religious expres-
70. To be sure, even if it turns out that the core underlying objection is to sectarian govern-
ment speech, not to religious speech per se, the objection still might find a more secure foothold in
the constitutional text and doctrine when directed against religious sectarian speech than when
focused on nonreligious sectarian statements. Even so, it might be that the most compelling objec-
tion is to sectarian speech, not to religious speech as such, and that such speech is problematic not
because govemment is violating an obligation of neutrality, but because government is speaking and
acting in ways extraneous to its proper purposes.
71. Abner Greene points out to me that concerns about institutional integrity and about insti-
tutional capture are not entirely coextensive: even a majority of members, acting openly and in
complete accord with an organization's procedures, might cause the organization to act or speak in
ways that are extraneous or contrary to its character and purpose. This point seems right, although in
such cases it would also be arguable that the association has in effect altered its self-understanding of
its character and purposes.
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sions by government today reflects disagreements about whether obser-
vance and promotion of civil religion is a proper function of American
governments. And the uncontroversial inappropriateness of more nar-
rowly sectarian statements reflects the fact that it is very hard to find
support or precedent in the American political tradition for any concep-
tion of government that would warrant these kinds of statements.
So far I have discussed the problem of institutional capture-and
the related notion of institutional integrity which such capture offends-
in relation to government religious speech. But a broader possibility now
reveals itself: perhaps it is the problem of institutional capture (along
with the principle of institutional integrity) that lies behind most or all of
the controversies associated with government speech. What a govern-
ment can properly say depends on the defined proper and essential role
or function of the government. And issues of government speech are
difficult-intractable, maybe-because there is no agreement about what
government's purpose and function is or is not. In this respect, contro-
versies about government speech are merely symptoms of a deeper dis-
agreement about the proper domain and role of government. Those
symptoms are unlikely to be satisfactorily treated so long as the underly-
ing disagreement persists.
One way to consider this hypothesis is to remember-or, rather, im-
agine-a world in which the proper functions and powers of government
are more clearly defined and limited. So imagine a world in which the
national government is limited to exercising a contained and finite set of
powers enumerated in, say, the Constitution. And state governments are
understood to be confined to acting for "public" purposes, as opposed to
"private" purposes: the line separating these spheres is, let us imagine,
relatively clearly drawn. In this world, I submit, government speech as
speech would not seem especially problematic. So long as national or
state governments acted only in accordance with their contained and fi-
nite powers, they would presumably be free to speak, or pay others to
speak for them, as they deemed fit. Conversely, if a government began
issuing messages not closely related to the functions and powers en-
trusted to it, people (including people who happened to agree with what
government said) might be critical not only of the substance but of the
expression itself. But even then, the objection would not be against the
government for speaking, exactly (as if the speaking presented some
special problem). It would be a criticism of the government for exceed-
ing its proper powers or functions: the fact that this excess consisted of
speech would be, in a sense, incidental.
I am not trying to be excessively Utopian here, so I am assuming
that there would still be plenty of disagreement in this simpler, cleaner
world. As a result, citizens would often disagree with the substance of
what governments might say. But those disagreements would not chal-
lenge the right or authority of governments to speak.
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I have described this world as imaginary, and I think it probably is.
But it is most likely true that if we were to go back a century or so, there
was at least a widespread belief that the functions and powers of gov-
ernments were meaningfully confined by something like the enumerated
powers doctrine and the "public purpose" constraint. Maybe the belief
was na'lve, but it was earnestly and widely held. And so it is not surpris-
ing that "government speech" per se did not then seem to present a con-
spicuous constitutional problem. Conversely, as the twentieth century
progressed, the constitutional limitations on government power were
progressively dissolved. Or, if you prefer, the fragile or illusory nature of
the supposed limitations became increasingly apparent. And of course,
citizens vary radically in their conceptions of what the proper role of
government should be. Those disagreements manifest themselves in dif-
fering views about the propriety of different kinds of government speech.
But if, as I have suggested, controversies about speech are merely
reflections of deeper disagreements about the nature and functions of
government, then it seems unlikely that we will be able to find satisfac-
tory solutions by focusing on controversies on the level of speech. That
is because, ultimately, it is not speech that is the problem, but rather gov-
ernment.
CONCLUSION
Still, we have little choice but to address and manage the controver-
sies that arise as best we can. I suspect that the popularity of "neutrality"
as a strategy reflects this necessity. If there were some shared under-
standing of what the functions and nature of government are, we would
not need to tell governments to be "neutral" toward anything: we could
simply try to ensure that governments do their job, no more and no less,
as well as they can (we would of course argue about whether and how
well governments were doing this). Given the disappearance of meaning-
ful, agreed-upon limits on governments' proper domain and functions,
7 2
we try to make up for the loss by instructing governments to be "neu-
tral." Governments could comply with this instruction, if at all, only by
not speaking, and that is not about to happen. Arguments based on neu-
trality may be rhetorically useful, but (or because) they typically serve
more to obfuscate than to illumine.
I said at the outset that I would not be offering solutions to the doc-
trinal problems presented by government speech, and I believe I have
kept my word. My central purpose has been to diagnose, not to prescribe.
Actually, though, there may be some potential practical implications in
this diagnosis. For example, some of the most difficult problems in this
area in recent years have grown out of the assumption that governmental
72. Alan Chen surmises that consensus about the proper role or function of government is
unlikely to develop. See Chen, supra note 22. It would be hard to disagree.
970 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:4
religious speech is especially problematic: if we were to recognize the
error of that assumption, as I have suggested, those particular problems
would disappear (as a matter of constitutional law, at least).
More generally, though, my diagnosis suggests that we should rec-
ognize that what seem to be constitutional problems raised by govern-
ment speech are not fundamentally problems about speech at all. If there
are solutions to these problems, we will need to look for them elsewhere.
